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ABSTRACT 
 
The Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma, 1942-1945.  
(May 2008) 
Troy James Sacquety, B.A., Mary Washington College;  
 M.A., University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Brian McAllister Linn 
  
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was created during the Second World 
War to be a central collector, producer, and disseminator of foreign intelligence.  Its 
secondary role of clandestine warfare did not come easily.  One OSS unit, Detachment 
101, surmounted numerous problems to become a model clandestine and special 
operations unit able to create its own indigenous army that waged war behind Japanese 
lines in Burma.  This study uses previously unexplored primary source materials from 
the OSS records held by the U.S. National Archives to examine the unit and its 
organizational changes from 1942 to 1945. 
Detachment 101 succeeded in the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) for the 
simple reason that it was able to function independent of immediate control from either 
the U.S. Army or OSS main headquarters.  Source documents reveal that the unit’s 
commander was left on his own to decide how the unit would operate, and how to 
incorporate various OSS branches and capabilities into its operational matrix.  The CBI’s 
lack of resources dictated that the Detachment 101 had to streamline its efforts to be 
 iv 
successful.  Its officers needed to get acquainted with the entire operation and then 
integrate their disparate elements into where they best fit as the whole.   
An exploration of the documents reveals that each of the unit’s two commanders 
molded the unit into an organization that reflected their personalities.  Colonel Carl F. 
Eifler, was bold and impetuous and modeled the group to accomplish any task—even if 
it could not.  Colonel William R. Peers, focused the group’s efforts on assisting the north 
Burma campaign.  Under his direction, the unit rapidly became a much more cohesive 
unit able to help the Allies win control of north Burma.  His direction was instrumental 
in Detachment 101’s first real test; the Myitkyina Campaign.  Examination of the 
primary documents uncovers that by the end of the war, the unit had become so 
successful and so flexible that it was the only ground combat unit fighting in north 
Burma, and was able to adopt a variety of dissimilar missions.  Although other OSS 
combat operations gave exceptional service, none was as central to the conduct of an 
entire campaign as was Detachment 101.   
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 CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), considered a predecessor organization to 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and U.S. Army Special Forces, was created 
during the Second World War as the first United States government organization whose 
role was to be a central collector, producer, and disseminator of foreign intelligence.  
However, popular histories have mythologized its secondary role of special operations, 
and that is why the organization is most misunderstood today.1  The role of clandestine 
warfare did not come easily for the OSS.  The fledgling organization made remarkable 
strides in a very short time, but also experienced dramatic failures because of 
inexperience.  However, one OSS unit, Detachment 101, surmounted these problems to 
become a model clandestine and special operations unit that used indigenous personnel 
to create its own “army” to wage war behind enemy lines.  The flexible nature of 
Detachment 101 was the key that allowed it to evolve its organization and operating 
methods to enable its success in a variety of clandestine guerrilla and intelligence-
gathering operations against Japanese forces in Burma.    
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of Military History. 
 
1
 For the purpose of the operations through 1942, the term COI/OSS will apply.  Detachment 101 started 
off under the Coordinator of Information (COI) and transitioned into the OSS.  However, the first 
contingent of personnel in Detachment 101 did not hear of the OSS transition until months later.  
Therefore to avoid confusion, the term COI/OSS will apply through mid-1942.  Thereafter, OSS will be 
used exclusively as by that time the COI ceased to exist and there was no confusion that it was the OSS 
under whose authority Detachment 101 operated. 
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This flexibility allowed each of its two commanders to mold the unit into an 
organization that reflected their personalities.  Colonel Carl F. Eifler, bold and 
impetuous, modeled the group into one that believed it could accomplish any task—even 
if it could not.  Colonel William R. Peers, the second commander, scaled back the 
Detachment’s ambition when he took over command.  Instead, he focused the group’s 
efforts on assisting the north Burma campaign, and rapidly turned the group into a much 
more cohesive unit that was capable of helping the Allies win control of north Burma. 
Detachment 101 would not have succeeded in a similar fashion had it served in 
any other area.  It achieved success in the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) for the 
simple reason that it was able to function independent of immediate control from either 
the U.S. Army in the CBI—under whose tactical authority and overall strategic direction 
it operated—or OSS headquarters in Washington D. C.  All operations, decisions, and 
organizational changes were under the discretion of the Detachment 101 commander.  
This “benevolent neglect” from higher echelons allowed the commander of Detachment 
101 to independently decide how the unit would operate, and how it would incorporate 
various OSS branches and capabilities into its operational matrix.  The lack of resources 
in the CBI—it was one of the lowest priority theaters—dictated that from the start 
Detachment 101 would have to streamline its efforts if it were to be successful.  For 
instance, in contrast to other OSS units, Detachment 101 chose not to follow the OSS 
standard of branch “compartmentation”—in which in the interests of operational 
security, separate functional elements were kept unaware of the actions of others.  
Instead, from its earliest days, Detachment 101’s lack of resources dictated that it had to 
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encourage its officers to get acquainted with the entire operation and then integrated 
their disparate elements into where they best fit as the whole.2   
Detachment 101 did not remain a static command.  The unit evolved from the 
sabotage and smuggling methods developed by Eifler in 1942-43, to employing a system 
of combined operations under Peers.  In Detachment 101’s version of combined 
operations, the unit had under its own operational control, land, air, and sea elements and 
every OSS branch that it chose to incorporate into its force structure.3  The success of 
this unit, when placed in its theater setting and overall importance, was unmatched by 
any other OSS organization.  Detachment 101’s operations in the Burma Campaign best 
achieved OSS creator and leader, Major General William Donovan’s vision of how 
special warfare operators could assist conventional forces.  Although other OSS combat 
operations gave exceptional service, none was as central to the conduct of an entire 
campaign as was Detachment 101.   
The following study looks at Detachment 101’s organization and how it 
contributed to mission success and allowed the unit to conduct limited combined 
operations.  This work does not analyze Donovan’s ideas, or to compare and contrast 
one OSS group’s success with that of another.  Its purpose is to examine Detachment 
101’s organizational evolution and describe how that impacted the effectiveness and 
complexity of its operations.  These operations in turn, influenced how the leaders of 
Detachment 101 chose to organize and direct the unit.  It was in part for this reason that 
                                                 
2
 William R. Peers to William J. Donovan, “Report Covering Period 1 February to 29 February, 1944, 
inclusive,” 29 February 1944, F 52, B 39, E 190, RG 226, NARA. 
3
 Although OSS Detachment 101 used the terms interchangeably, for the purposes of the study, OSS 
entities as a whole will be referred to as “Branches,” while those elements at Detachment 101 will be 
called “Sections.”   
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the Detachment was able to easily absorb functions that had immediate tactical use into 
the group’s organization, but had difficulty doing so with more “strategic” elements. 
No other study has chronicled or analyzed the development and evolution of the 
unit from that of conducting acts of sabotage to that of a sophisticated coordinated 
guerrilla and unconventional warfare campaign that integrated propaganda, intelligence 
gathering, local auxiliaries, and liaison with U.S. and Allied forces.  In this way, the 
author feels he can make the best contribution to the literature of the China-Burma-India 
Theater and that of the OSS.  Most other works focus exclusively on operations.  This is 
the first to explore how the organization of an OSS group contributed to its success.  
 Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation will trace the history of the Detachment from its formation in 
1942 until its dissolution in July 1945.  The chapters are broken into segments defined 
by important events either in the Burma campaign or to the unit.  An introductory 
chapter explains the CBI, as well as Burma, its peoples, geography, climate, strategic 
situation, and a brief history of the Detachment.   
The second chapter describes how the Detachment organized itself from its 
introduction into the CBI in mid-1942 until February 1943.  This was an ad-hoc but 
formative period for the Detachment, during which the unit’s very existence was only of 
an experimental nature and at risk of cancellation.  However, in these early months 
Eifler made the administrative and command arrangements that would allow the unit to 
be successful.  Despite the Detachment changing dramatically by 1945, several of the 
principles established in this period remained operational practice.   
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The third chapter provides the first of three operational case studies, which 
discuss the operations of Detachment 101 and how its structure affected the unit’s 
mission and focus.  It was operations that gave the Detachment its reason for existence 
and the lessons learned that drove change.  This operations chapter examines the early 
operations of 1943 and detail how the Detachment learned from failure and reinforced 
unexpected success.  In contrast to the other two operational chapters, this one precedes 
the organizational chapter covering the same period.  This is because at this stage, 
operations drove organizational change, not vice-versa, as would later be the case. 
The fourth chapter details from February 1943 until December 1943, in which 
Detachment 101 better secured its role and place in theater, and was in turn given a 
change in operational directive in the lead up to the Myitkyina Campaign.  This period 
was crucial for the Detachment.  It had experienced many operational failures, but 
learned from them and incorporated these lessons into its operational structure.  The 
period ends with Eifler’s removal from command.  His brash nature had helped to force 
the acceptance of the unit in the CBI.  He established a can do attitude in the group and 
made the administrative connections necessary to permit success.  His leadership style, 
however, could not sustain the group as it moved into 1944 and more complex, 
sustained, and difficult operations. 
Chapter V analyzes from January 1944 to May 1944.  These were the first five 
months of the Detachment under Peers’ leadership.  He rebuilt the outfit into one that 
was less cumbersome and that was more suited to serve as an adjunct to conventional 
forces.  It was here that the unit began to recruit an indigenous force in earnest to wage 
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an insurgent war against the Japanese.  With this act, Detachment 101 transformed itself 
from the role of intelligence gathering and sabotage operations and evolved into a true 
guerrilla organization.   
Chapter VI covers the period of Detachment 101’s organization from May 
through August 1944.  By the end of this period, Peers had molded the unit into one that 
bore little resemblance to the one that arrived in Burma in 1942.  During this period, the 
group began to incorporate many strategic assets into its make-up.  These capabilities, 
such as counter-intelligence and psychological operations, had less of an immediate 
tactical need.  As such, their incorporation into the unit was more troublesome than 
purely tactical elements had been. 
The seventh chapter is the second operational case study and examines 
Detachment 101’s assistance to American, British, and Chinese forces during the 
Myitkyina Campaign.  In these actions, the newly raised guerrilla forces of Detachment 
101 played a crucial part in the crowning achievement of the American effort in Burma.  
However, the secondary and memoir literature has not fully explored the OSS’s role, 
particularly its relationship with Merrill’s Marauders.  This chapter provides an 
assessment of how well Detachment 101 had used the elements in its force structure. 
Following this case study, Chapters VIII and IX explore the evolution of the 
organization through the fall of Bhamo in December 1944 and Lashio in March 1945.  
They discuss how the unit wound down its operations and used its assets to help other 
OSS groups as the war in Burma closed.  The final months of the Detachment are 
covered in Chapter X.  During this period, the unit served as the only ground combat 
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force available for use in north Burma.  It was at this time that the unit best exhibited its 
inherent flexibility. 
Chapter XI is the final operations chapter.  Detachment 101 was waging two 
separate campaigns in the final months of the war in Burma.  In the Shan States, the 
Detachment built upon its ability to improvise and evolve its operations.  It assumed a 
more conventional role and provided the only American ground forces available to halt 
Japanese forces fleeing from Burma into Thailand.  Rather than look at the campaign in 
the Shan States—since it has received the most attention in published memoirs on 
Detachment 101—the final chapter will look at Detachment 101’s contribution to the 
Arakan Campaign.  This little-studied campaign involved land, air, and unlike in the 
Shan States, maritime OSS assets.  It shows how, at least organizationally, Detachment 
101 was capable of a small-scale version of combined operations and how well the 
Detachment’s organizational changes allowed it the flexibility to successfully conduct 
operations.  The conclusion recapitulates how the unit evolved from 1942 to 1945 and 
how its organic flexibility allowed it the freedom to alter its operations to meet the 
changing situation.   
A Note on Sources 
 
A wealth of untapped primary material exists on OSS Detachment 101.  By far, 
the most important of these sources is Record Group 226 (RG 226) in the National 
Archives II at College Park, MD.  This record group is composed of the documents of 
the OSS’s predecessor organization, the Coordinator of Information (COI) and the OSS, 
as well as a few post-OSS records of its follow-on organization, the Strategic Services 
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Unit (SSU).  The only OSS records not included in RG 226 are some records from OSS 
Washington regarding the Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch; however, this has no 
effect on a theater study of an operational OSS organization.4  The records of RG 226 
formed the basis of the initial files of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when it was 
created under the National Defense Act in 1947.  The CIA held these records in its 
custody, and the Agency only began releasing them to the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA) beginning in the early 1980s.5   
The OSS records present a unique group among those held by NARA.  They are 
the only records of any nation’s intelligence service open in their entirety.  In contrast to 
many record groups held by NARA, they are also virtually a complete record.  When 
turned over to NARA, the Agency held back only a few reports still deemed of 
intelligence interest—most of which has been subsequently released—or deemed of 
having no historical value.  This enables one to find a depth of detailed information on 
the OSS.  Regarding Burma and Detachment 101 alone, there were some 2500 boxes of 
documents.  However, the results of the search were mixed.  The early frantic period of 
the unit while under Eifler does not have the same documentation as that of the 1944-
1945 years.  Fortunately, Eifler was an exceptionally clear and detailed writer, which 
makes up in part for this deficiency.   
                                                 
4
 When the OSS was dissolved in 1945, the Research and Analysis (R&A) section and its records went to 
the State Department, while the other branches deemed worthy of saving formed the Strategic Services 
Unit (SSU). 
5
 For more on the transition of the records to NARA, see Lawrence H. McDonald  “The OSS and its 
Records” in The Secrets War:  The Office of Strategic Services in World War II, ed. George C. Chalou, 
(Washington D.C.:  National Archives and Records Administration, 1992) 
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Donovan’s personal papers, a subset of RG 226 at the National Archives, proved 
surprisingly limited, having almost no mention of Detachment 101.6  The records of the 
China-Burma-India Theater (RG 493) also contained virtually no mention of 
Detachment 101 or the OSS in general.7  However, this too was an important discovery.  
Combined with the detail in RG 226, the lack of material in either RG 493 or Donovan’s 
papers showed how little direction higher commands gave to Detachment 101.  Although 
these commands directed the Detachment in generalities as the strategic situation 
dictated, they provided little tactical guidance. 
Another primary source has been the Detachment 101 veterans’ group, which has 
been in existence since 1946, and the families of Detachment 101 veterans.  As a whole, 
they have been very receptive, and the source of many valuable documents and 
recollections.  This includes hundreds of personal letters, decades of the group’s 
quarterly newsletters, and copies of many original notes, diaries, unpublished memoirs, 
and other records.  The membership also provides a mechanism to double-check official 
records by being able to contact the participants of a particular incident.  In a word, this 
source has been invaluable. 
                                                 
6
 An explanation for the lack of correspondence was found in a letter dated 26 May 1943 in which the OSS 
headquarters area operations officer for the Far East relays to Colonel Eifler that all that Donovan required 
of him in the way of correspondence was to continue sending in monthly reports.  (Carl O. Hoffman to 
Carl F. Eifler, “Yours of April 21 and 26, 1943” 26 May 1943, F 27, B 191, E 92, RG 226, NARA.) The 
only direct correspondence to Eifler from Donovan was a 2 June 1943 letter congratulating him on his 
excellent job.  William J. Donovan to Carl F. Eifler, National Archives microfilm, Roll 110, A 3304, E 
180, RG 226, NARA.  A copy of Donovan’s records are also held by the U.S. Military History Institute at 
Carlisle, PA. 
7
 The only substantial inclusion of the OSS in RG 493 concerned the post-war OSS “Mercy” missions 
under Detachment 202 to parachute operatives into POW camps in China for the purpose of protecting the 
prisoners from Japanese retaliation.   
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These primary sources became even more crucial when one reviews the 
secondary literature.  With few exceptions, the literature of Detachment 101 consists of 
veteran’s memoirs.  The most important of these memoirs are the two works co-written 
by the former commanding officers.  Tom Moon and Eifler co-wrote The Deadliest 
Colonel and Dean Brelis and Peers produced Behind the Burma Road.8  Of these, Behind 
the Burma Road is the most valuable because of its greater scope and frankness.  Even 
so, its primary focus is on operations, though not all of these, like those in the Arakan, 
are covered in detail.  Other broad works include Detachment 101 veteran Richard 
Dunlap’s Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma.9  This work is valuable for the 
personal accounts that it relates, but, like the other works, focuses on operations.  A 
variety of memoirs of veterans who served in the unit is available, although they are 
narrower in focus.  Examples of these include Thomas Chamales’ Never So Few, Roger 
Hilsman’s American Guerrilla:  My War Behind Japanese Lines, and Dean Brelis’s The 
Mission.10  These memoirs provide details of individual participation, but not an overall 
view of the Detachment’s organization and operations.  This is also true for limited press 
books such as Bill Brough’s To Reason Why, Thomas Baldwin’s I’d Do it All Again:  
                                                 
8
 Thomas N. Moon and Carl F. Eifler, The Deadliest Colonel (New York:  Vantage Press, 1975) and 
William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road:  The Story of America’s Most Successful 
Guerrilla Force (Boston:  Little, Brown and Company, 1963)  
9
 Richard Dunlap, Behind Japanese Lines:  With the OSS in Burma (Chicago:  Rand McNally, 1979) 
10
 Thomas Chamales, Never so Few ( New York:  Scribners, 1957); Roger Hilsman, American Guerrilla:  
My War Behind Japanese Lines (Washington:  Brassey’s, 1990); Dean Brelis, The Mission (New York:  
Random House, 1958) 
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The Life and Times of Tom Baldwin, and Harry “Skittles” Hengshoon’s Green Hell:  
Unconventional Warfare in the CBI.11   
Until recently, the OSS has also escaped substantial academic study.  There has 
not been a scholarly work written on Detachment 101.  Regarding the OSS in Asia, the 
only scholarly works are Maochun Yu’s OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War, E. Bruce 
Reynolds’ Thailand’s Secret War:  The Free Thai, OSS, and SOE during World War II, 
and Richard Aldrich’s Intelligence and the War Against Japan:  Britain America and the 
Politics of Secret Service.  None of these works gives much detail on Detachment 101.  
Although not true scholarly studies, the two volumes of The War Report of the OSS by 
Kermit Roosevelt—the official OSS history—and its British counterpart Charles 
Cruickshanks’s SOE in the Far East are valuable resources, but likewise neither deals 
exclusively with Detachment 101.12   
This paucity of secondary sources leaves the way open for this study to offer a 
contribution to the literature of the OSS, U.S Intelligence and military history, that of the 
participation of the United States in the China-Burma-India Theater, and that of the 
Second World War.  This study provides an in-depth look at the organizational and 
operational evolution of a unit faced with an extremely difficult task in an extremely 
                                                 
11
 Bill Brough, To Reason Why (Whickham, UK:  Hickory Tree Press, 2001); Thomas Baldwin, I’d Do it 
All Again:  The Life and Times of Tom Baldwin (Tustin, CA:  Wambtac, 1996); Harry “Skittles” 
Hengshoon, Green Hell: Unconventional Warfare in the CBI (Huntington Beach, CA:  B & L Lithograph, 
2000) 
12
 Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), E. 
Bruce Reynolds, Thailand’s Secret War:  The Free Thai, OSS, and SOE during World War II  
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War 
Against Japan:  Britain, America, and the Politics of Secret Service (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); 
Kermit Roosevelt, ed. The War Report of the OSS. 2 vols.  (New York:  Walker and Company, 1976), 
Charles Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1983). 
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foreign environment.  Such a study offers the potential of providing lessons that might 
prove useful today. 
  
13 
CHAPTER II 
 
A PRIMER ON BURMA, OSS ORGANIZATION, AND OSS DETACHMENT 101 
 
This chapter will serve to acquaint the reader with the topics being discussed in 
the following chapters.  It will first explain General William J. Donovan’s vision for the 
covert action/special operations side of COI/OSS, and then give a brief overall history of 
Detachment 101.  The chapter will conclude with a primer on Burma including the 
operational environment and the indigenous inhabitants.  The intent is to bring the reader 
to a level of understanding on the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) and Detachment 
101’s war that will negate the need to consult outside sources in order to understand the 
subsequent chapters. 
Donovan’s Vision 
In June 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed World War I hero 
William Donovan as the first and only chief of the Coordinator of Information (COI).  
The COI, renamed one year later as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was the first 
United States government organization tasked with the specific role of central collector 
of foreign intelligence.  It also had the secondary mission of being prepared to engage in 
subversive or “black” activities, otherwise known as clandestine warfare.  However, the 
road to the creation of this capability in the COI was not immediate.13 
                                                 
13
 For the directive assigning OSS its basic functions, see Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A 
History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.:  Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1981), 428. 
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Prior to the creation of the COI, Donovan saw a need for a new intelligence 
organization that would better serve the decision-making process of policy makers, and 
through covert action, be a force multiplier for combat forces.  Secretary of the Navy 
William F. Knox, Donovan’s friend, assisted and influenced his beliefs.  It was also 
Knox who suggested to President Roosevelt that Donovan make an unofficial trip to 
England to evaluate the war situation and the British intelligence services.14  During the 
December to 18 March 1941 trip, Donovan was given unprecedented access to British 
bases, including those in Africa, and was able to evaluate first hand what the OSS would 
later consider its counterpart and mentor organization, the British Special Operations 
Executive (SOE).15   
A Medal of Honor winner from the First World War, Donovan had an intense 
personal interest in clandestine warfare and extensively studied SOE’s sabotage role.  He 
saw such warfare as an important method to support intelligence gathering that would 
enhance the combat capability of regular military formations.  He envisioned that an 
American special operations element would function in three escalating stages:  
infiltration and preparation, sabotage and subversion, and finally, direct support to 
guerrilla, resistance, or commando units.  Much in the model of the British Commandos, 
special operations had the added benefit of performing what one OSS history termed 
“increasing the enemy’s misery and weaken his will to resist.”  After returning from 
Europe, Donovan wrote President Roosevelt, “My observation is that the more the battle 
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machines are perfected the greater the need in modern warfare of men calculatingly 
reckless with disciplined daring, who are trained for aggressive action … it will mean a 
return to our old tradition of the scouts, the raiders, and the rangers.”16 
When appointed head of the COI, Donovan was tacitly given the mission to 
prepare for the possibility of using covert warfare methods, but he could do little to 
recruit for them.  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Donovan again called for the 
formation of an American special operations force and wrote to Roosevelt on 22 
December 1941, “… as an essential part of the strategic plan, there be recognized the 
need of sowing the dragon’s teeth in those territories from which we withdraw … That 
the aid of native chiefs be obtained, the loyalty of the inhabitants cultivated … and 
guerrilla bands of bold, and daring men organized and installed.”17  With the U.S. now at 
war, he could recruit, but getting COI/OSS deployed for overseas missions would be a 
greater challenge. 
In order to prove the value of clandestine warfare, Donovan sought to insert the 
COI into an active combat theater.  He was met with much skepticism.  Many senior 
Army officers could not understand what role COI, and later, the OSS, could play in 
their areas of responsibility (AOR), and some were even hostile to an OSS presence.  For 
instance, General Douglas McArthur virtually banned the OSS from his South West 
Pacific AOR throughout the war.  However, Donovan found openings in other theaters, 
such as the North Africa Theater of Operations.  The early COI/OSS operations in 
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NATO proved to be the key needed to allow greater participation throughout the 
European Campaign.  However, this would not be the same situation for the CBI.18 
Detachment 101; 1942-1945 
Burma was an active combat theater from 1942 to 1945.  This allowed 
Detachment 101, as the OSS component operating in Burma was called, to build on 
previous achievements, reflect upon mistakes, and evolve its operations into those of 
greater complexity.  This helped the unit to become the showcase OSS organization in 
the Far East.  The unit performed its functions so well that the official OSS history called 
it “the most effective tactical combat force in OSS.”19  It is this length of service—and 
relative absence of political barriers like the OSS experienced in China—that makes 
Detachment 101 a unique and valuable organization to study.   
In comparison to U.S. participation in other operational theaters, Burma was a 
backwater.  The resource-starved CBI was an unusual theater and merited its nickname, 
Confusion Beyond Imagination.  Later on, to the OSS, however, “the Burma Campaign 
is probably not going to be the big show, but it is the going show.”20  It was an important 
aspect of the war mainly because of President Roosevelt’s desire to keep the Chinese in 
the war, and his insistence on treating the Chinese as an equal ally.   
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  The CBI was a complex operational theater with many strong-willed and often 
conflicting personalities.  For instance, Army Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, the 
senior American officer in the CBI, stubbornly stuck to his belief—until early 1944—
that with U.S. assistance, the Chinese could field an effective army.  Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek and his loose confederation of commanders hampered Stilwell in his 
endeavor.  They hoarded American supplies for the post-war period in which they knew 
that they would have to confront the Chinese Communists.  Stilwell had an additional 
adversary in his subordinate, Major General Claire L. Chennault, who had the ear of 
President Roosevelt.  Chennault believed that air power was the answer to defeating 
Japan and preached that with a minimum of Chinese-based aircraft and sufficient 
support, he could win air superiority in China, bomb mainland Japan, and through this, 
force a Japanese retreat in the Pacific.21  The British likewise compounded Stilwell’s 
problems, as Burma was in their sphere of influence and they had the lead in conducting 
warfare there.   
These brief examples of friction out of many among the upper command in the 
CBI reflect the confliction of effort and corresponding delay in formulating a strategy to 
remove the Japanese from mainland Asia.  It was into this political quagmire that the 
COI sent its first intact unit to go overseas.  However, in one respect the COI/OSS was 
lucky.  Despite the lack of American resources in terms of personnel—or even because 
of it—the theater became a cornucopia of special operations units.  In Burma alone, 
American special operations units included Merrill’s Marauders, MARS Task Force, and 
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the First and Second Air Commandos.  British special operations units included the 
Chindits, Force 136, V-Force, and elements of the Special Boat Service.   
Activated on 22 April 1942, Detachment 101 was the first special operations unit 
formed by the COI.22  The COI gave Detachment 101 commanding officer Major Carl F. 
Eifler the authority to select a small group of twenty men to go overseas for service 
somewhere in the Far East.  Eifler was a bear of a man.  He was tall, muscular, a hard 
drinker, and intelligent.  He was a brash, no-nonsense type who overcame obstacles by 
sheer will and determination.  He did not care how the mission was done—or who got 
the credit—as long as it was successfully accomplished.23  Prior to the war, Eifler had 
been an Army Reservist while in the U.S. Treasury Customs Service, where he worked 
against smuggling rings.  This experience schooled him in the unorthodox methods of 
criminals and smugglers.  It was also through the Army Reserve that he met Stilwell.24  
After the war, Eifler struggled to recover from injuries received in Burma, but managed 
to finish a career in the Customs Service and earn a Doctorate of Divinity.  He died in 
2002 at the age of ninety-five. 
The COI only gave Eifler’s group a brief training period.  Half went to the newly 
appropriated former Civilian Conservation Corps camp turned sabotage school of Area 
B, now known as Camp David, Maryland, while others went to Camp X, the SOE 
training area in Canada.25  After Eifler spent several weeks trying to find a place for the 
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group in China, Stilwell directed him to settle the unit in India, and prepare to conduct 
operations against Japanese-occupied Burma.  The group was fortunate to find an out-of-
the-way tea plantation in Nazira, Assam State, from which to plan their operations.  
Under the name of the U.S. Army Experimental Station—the cover story being that they 
were researching malaria—the men quickly enmeshed themselves in their work.  They 
found that their previous ideas of warfare were no longer applicable, but despite 
Stilwell’s initial instructions, the group thereafter had little direction from either the 
Army or COI/OSS headquarters in Washington.  The men had little choice but to simply 
muddle through and develop their organization and operating methods as they went 
along.  The first undertaking was to establish an agent training school, and then to push 
what could be called an observer mission into the area near Sumprabum in north Burma.    
Despite these minor achievements, Detachment 101 was under intense pressure 
from Eifler, who wanted to please Stilwell and to produce results that would allow the 
continued existence of the unit in the CBI.  Eifler loathed failure and expected an equally 
determined effort from his men.  The result was long hours and multi-tasking to ensure 
that everything—and more—was accomplished.26  The British indirectly compounded 
this pressure.  At higher levels, they were extremely wary of having an autonomous 
American intelligence unit in their sphere of influence, and they tried to subsume 
Detachment 101’s operations under SOE as happened in Europe.27   
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To achieve success, the Detachment attempted a series of long-range penetration 
operations.  Although they were nearly all complete failures, the unit gained valuable 
experience from the missions and used the lessons to conduct subsequent operations.  
The unit’s overland shallow penetrations in 1943 were much more successful.  In 
particular, Operation FORWARD, the observer mission near Sumbrabum under Captain 
William C. Wilkinson, would prove to be the success that follow-on operations, such as 
KNOTHEAD, would build upon.  These shallow penetrations were the forerunners of 
the employment of independent guerrilla columns in 1944-1945.  Detachment 101 also 
established several agent groups, such as under agent “Skittles,” which operated some 
fifty miles or so in front of the American engineering units charged with building the 
Ledo Road.  They provided critical intelligence on the Japanese forces in the area and 
conducted civil affairs duties to win hearts and minds among the indigenous 
population.28 
The year 1944 brought even more success and proved to be the turning point for 
Detachment 101.  Eifler was no longer the unit’s commander.  He was replaced by 
Lieutenant Colonel William R. Peers.  A career Army officer, Peers stayed in the 
military after the war.  He served with the CIA during the war in Korea, and had several 
tours in Vietnam.  He retired as a Lieutenant General after thirty-six years of service.  
One of his final acts in the military was to direct the My Lai massacre investigation.  
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That the U.S. Army had appointed him to lead the commission is a reflection on his 
standing in the military and that he had served with distinction and above reproach.  
Peers died in 1984 and is considered one of the most influential pioneers of U.S. Army 
Special Operations.  
The unit secured a firm role by finding niches that conventional forces in Burma 
could not fill.  Detachment 101 started to recruit indigenous guerrilla troops, provided 
strategic and tactical intelligence such as enemy order of battle and ground targets for 
the 10th Air Force, and guided lost aircrews back to Allied lines.  These roles provided a 
morale boost to the Army Air Forces in the CBI.  Not only were their bombing attempts 
in north Burma now much more successful with Detachment 101 agents securing 
targeting intelligence and acting as forward observers, but pilots were no longer 
automatically doomed to starvation, death, or capture should they be forced down.   
Another key role for Detachment 101 was to serve as guides for, and to screen 
the flanks of regular U.S. and British formations.  This assistance contributed to the 
crowning achievement of Allied forces in north Burma, the 1944 capture of Myitkyina.  
In this campaign, Detachment 101 provided support to the GALAHAD force—the 
5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), commonly known as Merrill’s Marauders—troops 
of the Chinese Army in India (CAI), and the British Chindits.  Detachment 101 also 
provided intelligence and cut Japanese lines of communication around Myitkyina—in an 
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area roughly the size of Connecticut—thereby sealing off the Japanese garrison from 
retreat and outside support.29 
After Myitkyina fell in August 1944, Detachment 101 continued to support 
Allied forces as they sought to secure their hold on north Burma.  The taking of Bhamo 
and Lashio effectively ended this campaign.  At the same time, Detachment 101 
extended liaison to regular British formations of the Fourteenth Army.  Following the 
fall of Rangoon, Major General Daniel I. Sultan, the NCAC commanding officer, 
ordered Detachment 101 to clear the Shan States and to prevent disorganized Japanese 
forces from falling back into Thailand.  The unit served as the only available ground 
combat force and had to assume a more conventional role. 
While these events were unfolding in north Burma, Detachment 101 was 
operating a separate campaign in conjunction with the XV Indian Corps along the 
southern coast of Burma.  In late 1944, the Detachment subsumed operations in the 
Arakan being conducted by the Ceylon-based OSS Detachment 404.  Deemed the 
Detachment 101 Arakan Field Unit (AFU), the group was composed primarily of OSS 
personnel from the Maritime Unit and Operational Groups, but had representation from 
other OSS branches.  DET 101 AFU finished its mission in June 1945 after the Allies 
captured Rangoon.   
By July 1945, Detachment 101’s service was finished and many of the personnel 
of the unit took their experience and knowledge on to other OSS operations.  
Detachment 101 had become the preeminent and one of the largest OSS overseas 
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organizations.  Upon cessation of operations, the unit had created an impressive 
scorecard of nearly 5,500 known Japanese killed.  Detachment 101 was able to 
accomplish this with a loss of some twenty-nine Americans and 184 indigenous soldiers 
killed and 86 indigenous personnel captured or missing.  The initial twenty-one men of 
the OSS Special Operations (SO) Branch grew so that at its height Detachment 101 had 
nearly 9,200-armed guerrillas.  Nearly 1,000 OSS and a few attached Allied personnel 
had served in the Detachment, although the daily complement was a few hundred.30  The 
group received a Presidential Unit Citation for its actions in the final battles in Burma.  
This was an honor in OSS shared only by the Operational Groups in the European 
campaign. 
Burma:  A Country Study 
 To the Americans of Detachment 101, Burma and the Indian frontier were wild 
lands.  One newly arrived officer reported on his experience with the local wildlife, “Ray 
SAW the tiger, which he describes as somewhat smaller than a waterbuffalo, [sic]…”31  
Despite the wild nature of the local terrain, Detachment 101 would not have been 
successful unless it had a permissive operating environment.  This section will provide 
the reader familiarity with the Burma faced by the men of Detachment 101.   
Burma was then and remains a complex country with multiple and competing 
ethnic groups.  The country had been under British domination since 1885.  Until 1937, 
the British administered Burma as a part of India.  However, this was an arbitrary 
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administrative pairing as the two countries have little in common with the exception of 
certain border areas.  From 1938 until 1942, the British administered Burma as a 
separate colony.  It was not unified in any great sense, then or now, which is evidenced 
today in the multiple ethnic insurgencies present within its borders.  For instance, the 
ongoing Karen struggle for independence started in 1949, soon after Burma’s 
independence from the United Kingdom. 
Burma, now called Myanmar, is a country about the size of Texas, and has 
geographical extremes.  On the southern coast is the capital city of Rangoon, now called 
Yangoon.  Above Rangoon, but still along the swampy mangrove-lined coast, is the 
Arakan region.  As one travels north from the coast, the terrain is increasingly rugged 
until one reaches the Kachin hill tracts.  There begin the mountainous foothills to the 
Himalayas.  These jungle-covered mountains form just past Myitkyina, the capital of 
Kachin State, and the relatively rolling hills immediately become small steep mountains 
that increase in size and elevation the farther one journeys north.    
The ruggedness of this terrain would prove to both a blessing and a curse for 
Detachment 101.  The mountains provided cover.  In many cases the Japanese did not 
have a significant presence in these areas with the exception of large towns and villages.  
This allowed the Detachment freedom of movement and ensured that it could operate 
relatively unseen by the Japanese.    
In contrast to Allied thinking early in the war, the Japanese were not the masters 
of the jungle.  As one American OSS officer later noted, the Japanese were so exhausted 
by the time they reached the mountain passes into India and so short of supplies that 
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“their mad gallop across Thailand and the flat-lands of southern and central Burma 
slowed down to little more than a blind stagger at the India-Burma border.”32  But, the 
terrain also made movement extremely difficult for the Allies.  Detachment 101 
estimated that it took a man thirty days to walk the same distance that a light plane could 
fly in one hour.33  An example of the difficulty in moving over this terrain was 
chronicled in an early 1944 report: “Tilly got lost in the high grass, had to part the grass 
and fall on it . . . slashed his arms and trouser legs.  He then got to the top of a hill and 
climbed a tree.  He got nearly to the crotch and got his hand caught in a bee hive . . . 
started off through the pit grass.  He went right over the cliff 30 feet.”34 Almost all 
ground movement had to be on foot, with all supplies either carried by porters or pack 
animals.  As a result, Detachment 101 columns could not carry much in the way of food, 
ammunition, or heavy weapons.  All weapons had to be man-portable, which limited the 
heaviest weapons to light machine guns, such as the British Bren gun.  Artillery was not 
present in any sense of the word.  What would have substituted for this would have been 
grenades, light mortars, or an occasional bazooka.  Detachment 101’s light weaponry 
ensured that its units were unable to sustain prolonged contact with the enemy.   
The terrain made logistics difficult.  Roads were few, making overland resupply 
impossible.  Any such effort would have consumed more supplies than it could deliver.  
The solution was to resupply each guerrilla force every few days or weeks by air.  This 
solved the problem of carrying large amounts of supplies, but also resulted in waste as 
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units tended to shed any excess.  This method of supply made dedicated airlift a 
necessity and greatly increased the cost of Detachment 101 operations.  Air resupply, 
however, ensured mobility, and the guerrilla units could move with little fear of running 
out of supplies while behind enemy lines. 
The ethnic groups in Burma played a huge role in the Japanese invasion, 
occupation, and liberation.  The Burmans are the largest and most dominant ethnic 
group.  They primarily inhabit the most populous areas in southern Burma, make up 
some 70 percent of the total population, are predominantly Buddhist, and during the war 
were generally pro-Japanese.  Prominent Burmans had even formed a fifth column that 
aided the Japanese invasion.35  The Burmans’ Japanese sympathies made the life of an 
agent inserted into a Burman region extremely hazardous.  Toward the end of the war, 
the indigenous populations in the south could no longer believe that the Japanese would 
win the war.  Only then did they extend themselves to any degree to help the Allied 
cause.36   
Although other minorities such as the Shan and the Chin helped the Allies to 
varying degrees, the ethnic groups that would be most important to Allied operations 
were the Naga, Karens and Kachins.  With centuries of strife with the Burmans, they 
were very willing to side with the Allies, and saw the British, and correspondingly the 
American forces, as their protectors.  Their goodwill towards the Allies did not apply to 
the Chinese, who like the Burmans, were also a source of ethnic tension.  Inhabiting the 
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India/Burma border near Assam were the Nagas.  Their culture would be considered the 
most primitive of the ethnic groups, and they were rumored to be headhunters.  For this 
reason, they were greatly feared—at least initially—by the American forces, who did not 
venture far into Naga-held areas for the fear that they would wind up as trophies.  
However, the Nagas were pro-Allied, and provided great service to Detachment 101 and 
the British-led V-Force, a similar intelligence gathering organization.  The Karens were 
independently minded and many were of the Christian faith, an asset to the Allies in 
trying to get these indigenous groups to work with them.  In a tacit agreement, SOE 
focused most of its recruiting on Karens, making this group less important to the OSS.37 
By far, the most important ethnic group to the operations of Detachment 101 was 
the Kachins, also known as the Jinghpaw.  This group inhabited north Burma, where the 
majority of Detachment 101’s initial operations would occur.  In the Kachin, 
Detachment 101 had the fortune of finding a warlike and willing ally.  They were 
staunchly pro-Allied, more so on account of their relative weakness as a minority than 
anything else.  For generations, the British had taken advantage of this ethnic buffer, and 
pitted the Kachins against the Burmans and the Chinese.  Having endured excesses by 
the occupying Japanese troops and their Burman auxiliaries, the Kachins were violently 
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anti-Japanese and formed several disorganized guerrilla groups before the Allies 
arrived.38    
The Americans and Kachins developed a true affection for each other.  The 
Kachin did not see Americans as a colonial power that had post-war designs on Burma, 
nor did Americans generally act in a colonial manner toward indigenous peoples, as did 
many of the British.  The decades-long presence of American missionaries in north 
Burma also helped Detachment 101’s relationship with the Kachin.  The missionaries 
had rendered the language—Jinghpaw—into a written language.  Although most 
Kachins were not Christians—a large portion were animists—the goodwill of the 
American missionaries had impressed the Kachins.39   
The Kachin proved to be ideal guerrilla fighters, as a 1943 OSS report espoused, 
“a Kachin with a “dah” [traditional knife/sword] can be comparable to a whole panzer 
division in his own country.”40  Being the inhabitants of a predominantly undeveloped 
jungle environment, many of the Kachins had developed hunting skills from an early 
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age.  They were at home in the jungle and experts in junglecraft.  Their knowledge in 
this regard far surpassed any that the Japanese had acquired.  The Kachins did not fight 
fair as a westerner would understand it; however, that was perfectly fine for the OSS.  
For instance, it was not an acceptable fighting practice to the Kachins to hold ground.  
Rather, hit and run ambushes were the norm.  These qualities gave the Kachin what 
seemed to the Americans as an almost superhuman power to read the jungle.41   
The first style of fighting that the Americans of COI/OSS envisioned they would 
use in the Far East was in the model of the SOE school of sabotage and subversion.  
Under Kachin tutelage, however, Detachment 101 combined these methods with 
extensive use of ambushes.  Detachment 101 sections would often stay in a general area 
with a central command post that would serve as a focal point from which patrols were 
sent out and supplies cached.  These areas could be relatively permanent if the group 
devoted the time to hack a small aircraft landing strip out of the surrounding jungle.  The 
guerrilla columns moved through the jungle along small game trails or on hidden 
pathways, often known only to local residents.  Only when a suitable place was found 
from which to ambush a Japanese patrol—and even then, only on their own terms—
would the Detachment 101 columns fight the enemy.   
The OSS adapted well to this style of warfare because it suited their armament.  
In a typical ambush, a Detachment 101 group would stake out a position along a road or 
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trail and wait.  When an enemy column arrived, a pre-arranged signal would trigger the 
group to fire.  At times, the burst of fire was only long enough to make it through one 
magazine in their automatic weapons, or just enough time to throw a few grenades.  
There was no point in conserving ammunition, as the 101 group did not intend to stand 
to fight.  With the Japanese then reeling in confusion, the OSS group would melt back 
into the jungle.  At this point, as one post-war depiction noted, “nobody covered 
anybody” as until they reached a prearranged rendezvous, it was “every man for 
himself.”42 
The Japanese characteristically reacted by jumping to cover on the sides of the 
road or trail.  Here they encountered another weapon in Detachment 101’s arsenal, the 
punji.  Employed in South-East Asia for centuries, punjis are sharpened fire-hardened 
stakes of bamboo that have been set on end into the ground at an angle, and in a location 
where an enemy is likely to step or take cover.  Punjis also were an outstanding 
psychological weapon, further demoralizing Japanese troops in areas where Detachment 
101 operated. 
Burma was one of the most debilitating environments in the Second World War 
for military operations because of the climate and endemic diseases.  It is a tropical 
country and can have extremely hot and humid conditions.  Temperatures in central 
Burma reach well over 100 degrees Fahrenheit during the hot months of March through 
May.  From June-September, the monsoon takes hold with the constant moisture leading 
to rot, decay, and rust of most equipment.  Detachment 101 reported in June 1943, “A 
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cleaned pistol will develop rust pits in 24 hours, a pair of shoes not cleaned daily will rot 
in a week.”43  The majority of the areas where 101 would operate were thick jungle, 
some of which at the time was unexplored.  Leeches, mosquitoes, and corresponding 
diseases—such as malaria, typhus, and encephalitis—were prevalent.  In his memoir, 
Defeat Into Victory, Field Marshall William J. Slim, commander of the British 
Fourteenth Army, discussed the problem that his forces had with disease:   
In 1943, for every man evacuated with wounds we had one hundred and twenty 
four evacuated sick.  The annual malaria rate alone was eighty-four per cent 
annum of the total strength of the army and still higher for the forward troops … 
At this time, the sick rate of men evacuated from their units rose to twelve 
thousand per day.  A simple calculation showed me that in a matter of months at 
this rate my army would have melted away.44 
 
Americans faced a similar situation in north Burma.  In 1943, the rate of malaria in the 
CBI was 206 per 1,000 per year.  After much effort to combat the disease, by 1944 it had 
only dropped to 167 per 1,000 per year.  In special circumstances, the rate could become 
even higher.  Merrill’s Marauders, for instance, suffered appalling rates of dysentery, 
malaria, and scrub typhus during their campaign to seize Myitkyina.  By 4 June 1944, 
they had suffered 1,020 casualties from disease in contrast to 424 reported killed, 
wounded, or missing.45  In just his first month operating behind the lines, medical officer 
Lieutenant Commander James C. Luce reported treating among the local population one 
hundred three cases of malaria, ten of dysentery, two of tuberculosis, one hundred of 
scabies, four of ringworm, thirty of tropical ulcers, and twenty-seven of gonorrhea in 
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addition to numerous other ailments.46  For the members of Detachment 101, the 
struggle with disease was paramount.  Unlike other Allied formations in the CBI, they 
were far behind enemy lines.  If one took ill, the only remedy was to either find or 
build—a lengthy process—a short airfield in which one of the Detachment’s liaison 
planes could land to extract the ill soldier.47  If a Detachment 101 soldier could not be 
airlifted out, the only alternative was to drop medical supplies and hope for the best.   
As it arrived in theater, Detachment 101 faced a monumental task.  Not only did 
it have to try out its unproven operating methods, but it also had to figure out exactly 
how to apply these methods to a strange environment.  The next chapter will detail these 
initial efforts at deconfliction and attempts to take the war to the Japanese. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK:  MID 1942-JANUARY 1943 
 
The initial months for Detachment 101 in the CBI set the stage for the unit’s later 
actions throughout the war.  During this early period from mid-1942 to early 1943, 
Detachment 101 took on an ad-hoc nature, and the group made due with what was 
available.  Despite the lack of resources, however, it made great strides in establishing its 
operating areas, its command and liaison arrangements, setting up a base of operations, 
and determining how and when it would wage war on the Japanese in occupied Burma.  
By early 1943, Detachment 101 had established itself on tentative ground, but was 
nonetheless emplaced in the American effort in the CBI.  Its methods remained 
unproven, however, as did the unit’s relative worth in the China-Burma India Theater.  
However, like the unit at this time, the entire CBI Theater was in confusion. 
The China-Burma-India Theater was among the most remote of the U.S. 
operating areas and was at the tail end of a limited logistics train.  Its confusing 
command arrangement was compounded by the complexity of coordinating with the 
British, who had overall supremacy in Burma.  As the senior American officer in theater, 
Stilwell had multiple and often conflicting duties.  He was the commander of U.S. forces 
in the CBI, and oversaw the distribution of lend-lease materials.  He was also the chief 
of staff to Nationalist Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and the commanding 
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general of the Chinese Army in India.  His multiple command duties, however, only 
contributed to problems brought on by the debacle of the first Burma campaign. 
By May 1942, the victorious Japanese had run the Allies out of Burma.  The war 
in Burma, then a British colony, began in late January 1942.  Japanese forces quickly 
overwhelmed a mixed force of British, Burmese, Indian, American, and Chinese 
defenders.  By May 1942, the Allied forces—including Stilwell’s small staff—had been 
thoroughly routed and fled to India.  With Burma’s fall, the Japanese severed the final 
land route to China.  This was important because China had been at war with Japan since 
1937 and its coast was under occupation.  A furious Stilwell commented, “I claim we got 
a hell of a beating.  We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell.  I think we 
ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it.”48  However, at the moment, 
Stilwell had little with which to accomplish this task. 
An Undefined Problem 
As Eifler and his group made their way to the Far East, they had little idea how—
or even where—they would operate.  Their initial instructions from COI/OSS were 
vague at best; their operating area ill defined and the group itself in extreme disarray.  
Not only was Detachment 101’s very existence on the line, but so was the reputation of 
the OSS as a whole.  Only Eifler’s sheer will, the group’s sense of purpose, and their 
intense desire to get into action against the Japanese bonded the group into a cohesive 
unit.49  
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From a March 1942 conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Preston Goodfellow, 
then the U.S. Army G-2 liaison officer detailed to the COI, Eifler was under the 
understanding that his Area of Responsibility (AOR) was to be anywhere in China, 
Korea, Burma, Malay States, Indo-China, Hainan Island, and Japan itself.  In addition to 
planning operations to cover all or part of this great swath, Eifler also had to come up 
with his own individual operations plan.  On the surface, Eifler’s plans were relatively 
simple; however, for the time they were extremely complex and forward thinking.  He 
was laying the groundwork for a completely new type of para-military unit that had no 
precedent in the United States military.  Eifler planned to use: 
(1) a small group of officers … to contact groups in the War Zone and purchase 
acts of sabotage.  (2) To organize and train an organization to penetrate enemy-
held territory and conduct a campaign of directed sabotage to harass the enemy 
… This organization must be divided into two parts:  (1) a section to train agents, 
(2), an Operations Section … The undersigned intends to … contact the 
Government officials necessary, locate patriotic organizations who have 
members inside enemy lines, sell myself to the people I intend to use and train 
them as agents and smugglers … Lines of communication will be developed.  
The undersigned not only plans to use existing radio equipment but will attempt 
to develop a new, small set that will better suit the problem as I now visualize 
it.50 
 
Given his set of operating parameters, Eifler had to choose his personnel with 
nary a clue as to what—or where—his eventual mission would be.  He selected what 
men he could find that had the necessary language, cultural or technical skills that would 
encompass the operating location or methods in which he had the possibility of working.  
Since the group was so small, each man had to fulfill multiple and often non-
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complementary duties.  An example of this is Sgt. Sukyoon Chang, who served as mess 
sergeant, as an instructor, and as possible liaison to any Korean resistance movements.51   
Given his operating plans to employ smuggling methods to insert groups behind 
the lines, use radios to stay in contact, and support any type of clandestine mission that 
the group might encounter, Eifler needed to choose personnel with the skills to cover all 
these requirements.  Fortunately, Eifler was not a novice to smuggling methods.  Prior to 
the war, he had been in the Customs Service and in the Army Reserve in Hawaii.  He 
used the contacts gained during those years to handpick a few men who had experience 
with smuggling.  In regards to recruiting communications personnel, however, he had to 
rely upon the judgment of others.  Radioman Allen R. Richter was brought on board 
when Eifler and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel John G. Coughlin (who outranked Eifler 
at the time, but such was the COI/OSS) visited the Officer Candidate School (OCS) at 
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.  They asked Richter, who had an extensive background in 
radios, if he would like to drop out of OCS and join the outfit as an enlisted man for a 
secret mission.  Eifler explained the mission as possibly being in the Far East and from 
which he was virtually guaranteed that he would not return.  Richter accepted and three 
days later was on a train to COI headquarters at “Q” building, Washington D.C.52 
All told, the original contingent of what the COI would initially call the “Eifler 
Mission” was comprised of twenty-one officers and enlisted men.  At this early stage, 
the COI/OSS had not yet formalized the branch structures that would be present in the 
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OSS later in the war.  Working within this understanding, however, one can extrapolate 
the branches represented in the initial contingent by examining the duties for which each 
man was responsible.  One each was involved in administration, photography, medical, 
research and development, secret intelligence, special funds, two in supply, three in 
training; while five personnel each were assigned to communications, and special 
operations.  It must be stressed again that each of these men performed a multitude of 
tasks.  Their duties represent the first melding of COI/OSS functions in Detachment 101; 
however, that these men were in reality all from the Special Operations (SO) Branch is 
significant.  This established from the beginning that regardless of a man’s branch and 
training, he performed the duties deemed of the greatest need.  This precedent carried 
through for the remainder of the war.53   
This blending of roles was not ordinary practice in the OSS.  Observers sent from 
Washington frequently commented on this unique aspect of Detachment 101.   
“It is apparent that in all this description reference to SI [Secret Intelligence], SO, 
OG [Operational Group], etc., is absent.  Such branch divisions simply do not 
occur in the thinking of this unit.  There is work to be done, there is a staff to do 
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it, and all are working as OSS/DET. 101 men, doing whatever aspect of the job is 
feasible, appropriate, and important at the moment.”54 
 
Detachment 101’s operational flexibility could create problems.  In 1943, 2nd 
Lieutenant Thomas B. Leonard of the Operational Group (OG) Branch arrived at 
Detachment 101 headquarters.  Leonard was commissioned in the U.S. Army Signal 
Corps, but had quickly to join the OSS.  Despite his lack of expertise with radios, the 
chief communications officer of Detachment 101, Captain Phillip S. Houston, assigned 
Leonard to his section.  Fearing that Leonard might compromise agents who were 
behind the lines through his poor radio technique, Peers assigned Leonard to field 
operations in north Burma immediately.55  In contrast to all other theaters in which the 
OSS operated—including the South East Asia Command and China—Detachment 101’s 
OGs did not operate independently.  Rather, as had happened with Leonard, they slipped 
into the SO role—a much better fit in his case than Communications.  Instead of going in 
as a group, Detachment 101 detailed individuals out to groups that were already behind 
the lines.  To this day, the existence of OGs in Detachment 101 is still a revelation to 
those who worked in OGs in other operational theaters.  
Deconfliction 
Once Detachment 101 arrived in theater, Eifler found out that most of his 
preconceptions were wrong.  Contrary to what COI/OSS Washington had said, they had 
arranged little.  No one in the theater knew of Eifler’s mission or had even heard of the 
COI/OSS.  He even had difficulty in securing transportation.  At every turn, Eifler found 
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U.S. Army organizations that wanted to absorb Detachment 101—just for the personnel 
the group represented—but did not want to support the COI/OSS unit’s mission.56    
Eifler quickly found that the skills of specialized warfare were not those most 
needed.  Rather, he needed an experienced staff or liaison officer.  One was not 
available, so Eifler filled the role.  OSS headquarters in Washington was of no help and 
gave very little guidance.  This was in part due to the difficulties in communication 
between India/China and Washington, but mostly because of Donovan’s poor 
administrative skills.57  Not only did Eifler have to win over reluctant officers—both 
U.S. and Allied—but he had to explain to them the unproven mission of the COI/OSS; to 
engage in subversive warfare.  He succeeded admirably.  This was in large part due to 
his insistence to press forward and to accept what missions he could wrangle for his new 
command so long as they conformed in some way to the COI/OSS plan of action.    
Eifler’s first step was to meet with Lieutenant General Stilwell, the CBI 
Commanding Officer.  Eifler was under the impression that Stilwell had sent for him by 
name, having picked him to lead Detachment 101.  The 20 May 1942 instructions given 
to Eifler by Preston Goodfellow enhanced this impression.  They stated that Detachment 
101 was “to carry on in the Theater of Operations with the knowledge and consent of 
General Stilwell.”58  But, Stilwell had not called for Eifler, nor did he want him or his 
unit.  Stilwell relayed that he had been asked by COI representatives—who were trying 
to find any overseas posting for a special operations unit—who he would like to see lead 
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such a group.  Eifler was the officer Stilwell named.  What Eifler did not know—and 
what COI headquarters took for granted, perhaps with an added bit of subterfuge—was 
that Stilwell had responded in the theoretical.  He had meant his reply to be if the COI 
sent a group to his AOR then he wanted Eifler, not that he actually wanted such a group.   
Despite this misunderstanding, Stilwell remained more receptive to an OSS 
presence than other theater commanders.  He had few other options.  In January 1942, 
Malaya had fallen to the Japanese, and the British surrendered Singapore a month later.  
Having simultaneously occupied Thailand, the Japanese invaded Burma in late January 
1942.  By May, Allied forces were in full retreat.  Less than a month after his arrival, 
Stilwell led his small staff out of Burma on foot.  Furthermore, the CBI was so resource-
starved that Stilwell only commanded a smattering of American aviation units and some 
poorly led and equipped Chinese troops that had been sent to protect the Burma Road—
the Allied lifeline that supplied China.  The only Allied intelligence unit in his AOR was 
the British-led “V-Force” in north Burma.59 
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Stilwell determined that Eifler’s group would not operate in China.  The general 
recognized that Chinese leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would not allow an 
autonomous and secret para-military unit in his territory.  Instead, Stilwell gave orders to 
Eifler to operate from India into Burma.  At first, Stilwell was unclear where he wanted 
the unit to concentrate its operations.  He told Eifler his unit could do the most good by 
disrupting Japanese shipping in Rangoon.  However, this mission was soon cast aside 
when it proved impracticable, and it was in north Burma that Detachment 101 would 
commence its first operations.  According to Eifler, it was here that Stilwell said that all 
he wanted to hear were “booms” coming out of the jungle.  Although not reflected in the 
official record—likely, because the order was verbal—Eifler detailed in his memoir that 
Detachment 101 had ninety days in order to make these “booms” happen.60 
Stilwell’s main concern in the CBI was keeping the Hump route open, and 
Japanese fighter planes based at Myitkyina airfield were hampering the flights of the 
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unarmed cargo aircraft.  This forced American aircraft to fly a longer route at the cost of 
greater gas consumption and reduced cargo.61  Stilwell therefore directed Eifler to cut 
the lines of communication around Myitkyina to render the airfield ineffective.  The 
mission also had a Machiavellian secondary objective.  Such missions might bring about 
Japanese reprisals on the indigenous population, thereby serving as a brutal form of 
propaganda that could only help the Allied cause and help dissuade the indigenous 
population from working with the Japanese.62 
Eifler also sought to clarify the command structure with Stilwell.  They agreed 
that Detachment 101 would remain a COI/OSS unit, but would be under the tactical 
control of Stilwell’s headquarters.  Initially, Stilwell gave specific directions to 
Detachment 101, but as it ingrained itself in Burma, his headquarters began assigning 
strategic objectives and allowed the unit’s commanders to figure out the best way to 
carry out them out.  By July 1943, Eifler commented to OSS Washington that Stilwell 
gave him a “complete hand as far as our unit is concerned.  We are practically a little 
Army on our own.  We issue our own orders and, as far as possible, keep care of our 
own administration.”63  In practice, Eifler did not have to directly report to anyone in the 
CBI outside of the COI/OSS command chain, as long as he maintained liaison with 
Stilwell’s Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) in Burma.  In essence, Detachment 
101 served at the behest of Stilwell, but he only gave strategic direction to the 
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Detachment.  OSS Washington also continued its benign neglect.  It let Detachment 101 
run itself with little interference with only the instructions that “… no important 
operations will be carried out without prior approval” and that the unit was “to operate 
entirely on your own organizational equipment.”64  Essentially, Detachment 101 was on 
its own, an arrangement that would initially prove confusing, but in practice would work 
remarkably well.  Inter-theater COI/OSS command would be a more difficult obstacle.65  
A joint COI/OSS and U.S. Navy effort that would be formalized in April 1943 as 
the Sino-American Cooperative Agreement (SACO) was operating in China under the 
leadership of Commander Milton “Mary” Miles.  Since Miles outranked Eifler, then a 
major, the presumption was that Eifler would report through, and be under the direction 
of, Miles.  However, Detachment 101 was the first unit of its type, and the COI/OSS did 
not have much of an overseas presence.  Eifler had no precedent to follow and despite 
repeated pleas for clarification, OSS Washington never informed him of whom he was to 
report to.  Miles was also unsure, but eventually solved the bureaucratic issue by telling 
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Eifler that he was far too busy handling Chinese liaison to also handle liaison with the 
British.  Since Burma was in the British sphere of influence, extensive coordination with 
them was a necessity.  Miles therefore gave Eifler—subject to contrary orders from 
COI/OSS headquarters—operational control of the Burma AOR, and directed him to 
report though the arrangement worked out with Stilwell.  This meant that with few 
exceptions from the American military/COI/OSS chain of command, Detachment 101 
had a free hand in the running its operations and reporting requirements.66 
OSS and SOE 
In spite of the American command arrangement, Eifler still faced failure if the 
British did not agree to the type of operations that he had planned.  The British viewed 
the COI/OSS and Detachment 101 with mixed emotions.  On one hand, the Detachment, 
if successful, could offer more teeth to the American effort in north Burma, which the 
British viewed as virtually nil.  Stilwell was focused on keeping the Chinese in the war 
and had expended the majority of his effort on the Hump route.  The British saw this as 
largely a waste of effort.  They did not share Stilwell’s assessment that the Chinese, if 
led well, could provide valuable and disciplined combat forces.67  With the British 
Empire assailed on all fronts, they could ill-afford to spend much in the way of materials 
on retaking Burma.  Therefore, the prospect of having American help, even if it were a 
secret paramilitary unit, was a temping one.  There was potentially a secondary motive; 
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the chance of getting increased US assistance.  The British were extremely under 
resourced and sought out increased U.S. assistance in regards to transport aircraft and 
logistics.  Helping the COI/OSS might open up additional future U.S aid. 
On the other hand, the British viewed American efforts with suspicion.  A large 
American presence in the former British colony, especially a clandestine special 
operations group, could undermine Great Britain’s status as a colonial power.  The U.S. 
previously had a few colonies, such as the Philippines, but they had been on their way to 
independence before the Japanese invasion.  Moreover, the Americans had nothing in 
the way of overseas territories as compared to Great Britain’s colonial empire.  Many 
Americans were ideologically opposed to imperialism, a sentiment of which the British 
were not unaware.  A second issue was of no less importance.  An American clandestine 
effort might not be under direct British control.  From the British perspective, American 
armed and trained indigenous guerillas posed a potential threat to postwar British rule.68 
Soon after his arrival in India on 20 June 1942, Eifler met with Colin Mackenzie, 
the commander of SOE in India.  Fortunately, for Eifler, the meeting was positive and 
the two agreed to a division of responsibilities.  As the senior organization in theater, 
SOE had first choice in the recruitment of suitable personnel.69  Mackenzie assigned 
Major Wally Richmond as the SOE liaison officer to ensure the two organizations 
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coordinated their efforts.70  Both OSS Washington and Stilwell’s headquarters 
eventually concurred on Mackenzie and Eifler’s agreement.71 
The issue of Detachment 101’s relationship with the British was not solved at 
this meeting and it would later be a subject of issue.72  When it cropped up again in late 
1943, Detachment 101 had already conducted independent operations and both the OSS 
and Stilwell opposed placing Detachment 101 under British control.  Stilwell made it 
known that if the British insisted, he would discontinue support and ask that Detachment 
101 be removed from theater.73  The threats worked and coordination was formalized in 
1944 through the establishment of “P” Division, chaired by Lord Louis Mountbatten of 
South East Asia Command (SEAC).  It functioned as a board that discussed Anglo-
American intelligence/clandestine operations.  In these meetings, deconfliction of OSS 
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and SOE operations was the goal, as well as liaison to inform each party of the other’s 
actions.  Although Detachment 101 continued to have British and Commonwealth 
personnel assigned, the organization was always in complete control of its operations.74 
Finding a Location 
With these formalities out of the way, Eifler set out to find a base of operations.  
Detachment 101 needed an isolated location that was near a railroad and river, near the 
Burma border, but also relatively near a U.S. Army supply depot.75  Following a tip from 
the British, and with concurrence from Stilwell’s headquarters, he located a secluded 
location on the grounds of the Assam Tea Estate near Nazira.76  Detachment 101 and the 
tea plantation owners worked out a lease agreement.  This lease allowed the Detachment 
use of the extensive geographic expanse of the plantation, including the bungalows, and 
the nearby virgin jungles—in all dozens of square miles.  The tea plantation’s extensive 
area was necessary to allow the Detachment to train agent groups in isolation.  This 
compartmentation was necessary so that agents would not be able to recognize their 
colleagues.  No matter how excruciating the torture, they would be unable to give away 
any information on other than their immediate group.  The Detachment may have drawn 
this lesson from a Japanese attempt to land saboteurs on the west coast of India.  These 
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groups were quickly located and destroyed because they trained as one complete unit, 
and once one agent was broken, he gave information on all the others.77   
Another benefit to the tea plantation was its relative isolation.78  While 
problematic for liaison with Stilwell’s headquarters—nearly one thousand miles away—
it was very close to the eventual operating area.  Seclusion also meant that the 
Detachment could go about its business without a great deal of interference from other 
military units.  The tea plantation offered a large number of servants who could work as 
cooks, guards, housecleaners, or other help.  This allowed the elite personnel of 
Detachment 101 to focus on establishing a school, developing communications, and 
figuring out how to pay for their clandestine war. 
Detachment 101 Sets Up the Jungle School 
As it arrived in theater, the Detachment first had to understand the operating 
environment in Burma.  Since the most that many of the men of Detachment 101 would 
know of Burma had come from the pages of National Geographic, an early priority was 
to learn as much as they could about the country and its inhabitants.  They read as much 
about the area as they could, and were helped by studies put together by people familiar 
with the region, such as by noted Burma specialist F. Kingdon Ward in September 
1942.79  However, the Detachment had to perform much of the area familiarization of 
peoples, geography, and climate themselves as a prerequisite to starting operations.    
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The next order of business on the Detachment’s priority list was to start a school 
to train agents.  By 8 October 1942, fifteen students—several of them being trained for 
SOE—were under instruction, with the core classes being radio operations, codes and 
ciphers, signal plans, security, unarmed combat, weapons, demolitions, and junglecraft.80  
From there, the numbers and effort greatly expanded so that by November 1942 there 
were five separate camps.81  To ensure confidentiality, agent trainees were given noms 
de guerre, such as “Skittles,” “Robby,” “Goldie,” or “Parry.”82  Within months, Eifler 
told COI/OSS Washington that he had fully trained agent groups ready for operations.83  
The instruction at these camps was understandably brief, however, and Eifler had limited 
manpower to devote to the groups.  He assigned three of his men as permanent 
instructors, while others would fill in as required.  One of his first requests for additional 
personnel was for instructors. 
Yet, there were still instances of concern.  Despite cooperation with SOE, other 
liaison obstacles remained, most notably with British and Indian authorities in the Nazira 
area.  Part of Detachment 101’s training program was to send the students out on 
extended exercises in which they were to recommend ways to infiltrate or destroy Allied 
installations.  These forays familiarized students with the intelligence-gathering process, 
tested their ingenuity, and let the Detachment see how they would handle themselves 
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under pressure if caught, as inevitably some were.84  This happened to what would 
become “W” group, whose members British officers questioned after apprehending the 
group while walking along a road in Assam.  The agents were unable to produce any 
identity documents and placed under arrest.85  The British authorities had a strong 
suspicion that the agents were intelligence officers working for the Americans, but 
nonetheless grilled them until OSS personnel showed up to ensure their release.  Both 
Detachment 101 and the local British authorities decided that a form of validating agents 
was necessary and identification passports became a standard set of each agent’s 
documentation.  These would remain at base and, in the event of capture, would be used 
as a means of affecting the agent’s release.86  These identifications did little to preserve 
the secretive nature of the organization, but they were necessary because Detachment 
101’s agent trainees were either Burmese, Anglo-Indians/Burmans, or other locally 
recruited personnel.87  Such agents working on behalf of the Japanese might easily be 
passed off as OSS students.   
One final aspect in regards to documentation was needed for the agents of 
Detachment 101; determining their legal status.  Therefore, Eifler had a contract drawn 
up between himself, representing the United States Government, and the individual 
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agent.88  The document guaranteed monetary assistance to an agent’s beneficiaries in the 
event that the agent died while on a mission.  To its credit, Detachment 101 took great 
pains at the end of the war to honor these ad-hoc commitments. 
Detachment 101 was well on the way to becoming established in theater.  
However, the unit could not ignore the mundane.  A way had to be found to pay for 
everything.  Eifler’s expenses totaled some $6,400 monthly, most of which was payroll 
for the students and helpers at the training camp.  Eifler had only brought limited funds 
from COI/OSS Washington with him.  He had tried to take more—$20,000—but OSS 
Washington balked at the suggestion, and he only managed to squeeze out $6,000.  
Headquarters had thought that all Eifler would have to do was wire for more money and 
it could then be placed in his overseas account within twenty-four hours.  This proved 
impractical.  In the first place, the remoteness of India meant that Detachment 101 had 
limited and sporadic communications with Washington.  In fact, Eifler counted himself 
lucky when he received an answer in a week, but it was often three weeks or more.89 In 
the second, Detachment 101’s bank, Lloyd’s Bank Unlimited in New Delhi, was 
hundreds of miles away.90  Even a secondary account established at the Calcutta office 
did not solve the problem of delayed payments. 
Finances were already starting to become a critical problem by the end of 1942.  
In the interim, Captain Robert T. Aitken, the man thrown into the job of finance officer, 
devised a temporary solution.  He arranged to bring the banking system closer to Nazira.  
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To handle the unit’s immediate needs, Aitken created subsidiary accounts.  These 
included ones with the Treasury Office in Jorhat, located some fifty miles from Nazira, 
with the Sibsagar Sub-Treasury, about fifteen miles from Nazira, as well as with the 
accounting office at the tea plantation.  His requirements were diverse.  Varying but 
specific forms of payment, from silver coins to paper bills to opium, were required.  
Eventually Detachment 101’s demands for certain forms of money, such as silver 
rupees, stripped local locations of their stocks.  This lead the Detachment to look for 
other solutions.  In the meantime, however, none of the financial institutions involved, 
from Lloyd’s to Assam Company Limited, asked questions as to why the U.S. Army 
Experimental Station had odd financial requirements.  This permitted Detachment 101 to 
retain at least a semblance of secrecy.   
Communications  
Communications were perhaps the most important problem that the Detachment 
faced as it tried to determine how best to conduct operations.  The Detachment could, 
through trial and error, work out methods to train, and then infiltrate personnel and 
agents into enemy-controlled territory.  Without a long-range, reliable, secure, and 
portable radio system, however, these agents and groups would be unable to 
communicate back to Nazira.  If these groups could not establish communications, they 
were effectively worthless.  They would be unable to pass intelligence back to the Allies, 
take directions from headquarters, or schedule resupply drops.   
The Detachment would have to develop its own radio sets, as they soon 
discovered that existing military radios were unsuitable.  They and their accompanying 
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power source weighed too much, did not have enough range, or could not withstand the 
harsh Burmese jungles.  The Detachment’s radios had to be reliable as there would be 
few opportunities to repair them once behind the lines.  They also had to be compact and 
easily transportable.  Since Detachment 101 was planning to train indigenous troops to 
be radio operators—many of whom were illiterate and who did not understand 
English—the radios had to be simple to learn to operate under jungle conditions.  An 
additional requirement was that they had to be constructed of locally procured materials.  
Very little had yet arrived in the way of supplies and orders from the United States took 
months to arrive.  The Army Signal Corps had priority for production, meaning that 
COI/OSS requirements were filled last.  Commercial parts could not be obtained on the 
local market as prices were some 2000-6500 percent higher than pre-war prices.91 
Eifler assigned five men, who also had additional duties of handling the coded 
traffic, to develop the Detachment’s radio.  What they accomplished was nothing short 
of amazing.  They jury-rigged radios together using tin cans as tuning condensers, made 
housings from metal plate and lumber, and coils out of scrap wire.  They even draped 
antennas over fences or trees, none of which was “good engineering practice,” but the 
radios worked remarkably well.92  Each radio weighted about three pounds, with the 
accompanying batteries adding another thirty-five pounds.  Further refinement would 
result in an even greater reduction in weight.  It would be these locally-produced radios 
that the first of Detachment 101’s groups would take into the field in late 1942 and early 
                                                 
91
 Carl F. Eifler to William J. Donovan, “Detailed Report of My Activities Covering the Period December 
26 1942 to date,” 6 April 1943, F49, B 39, E 190, RG 226, NARA. 
92
 Eifler to Donovan, “Detailed Report of My Activities,” 6 April 1943, NARA. 
  
54 
1943.93  Not only did the sets meet local conditions, but also they were of longer range 
than had originally been hoped.  Eifler reported to OSS headquarters in December 1942 
that the radios could even receive stations in the mainland United States.94   
Once an appropriate set was developed, the Detachment then had to construct a 
communications network that could handle its envisioned far-flung operations.  This 
network started with liaison contacts that include daily exchanges with U.S. Army and 
British networks.95  On 13 January 1943, Detachment 101 established the first outlying 
communications hub, radio station “D,” in Calcutta under the direction of Captain Harry 
W. Little.  This station eventually would become a separate OSS unit, Detachment 505, 
which was in charge of supplies and procurement for Detachment 101.  Since no 
additional qualified personnel were arriving from the United States, Detachment 101 
trained the first complements of its agent school as radio operators.  These were trained 
at “Camp O,’’ which was established on 6 January 1943.96  These would be used both to 
serve on the field teams and in an expanded liaison network.   
Moving Toward the First Operations 
Eifler’s ambition and ideas soon surpassed the twenty personnel available to him.  
In February 1943, he wrote back to OSS headquarters requesting personnel with the 
following specialties:  finance, medical, communications, technical (to perform what 
would later be the work of Research and Development (R&D), photography, and 
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armorers.97  With this request for more personnel, Eifler made the first steps of moving 
Detachment 101 beyond an organization that would rely solely on SO personnel to fill in 
other roles as needed.  As it was, Eifler had already begun the Communications, Special 
Funds (Finance), and Schools and Training Branches.   
Eifler wanted to use his experience in the Customs Service to establish 
smuggling routes to infiltrate agents deep into enemy territory and to extract potential 
agents and materials.  While Eifler’s methods did not work as planned, it is important to 
keep this concept in mind as one looks at Detachment 101’s initial operations.  Two 
types of these early operations are covered, short and long-range penetrations.  Both 
types provided valuable lessons that the Detachment used to shape the organization into 
1943-44. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE FIRST FORAYS INTO JAPANESE OCCUPIED BURMA:  MIXED 
RESULTS 
 
 
 By early 1943,  Detachment 101 was established at Nazira and surmounted its 
immediate bureaucratic problems.  The unit now had to concentrate on the very reason 
why it was in the Far East in the first place, to conduct actions against the enemy.  It 
would be the success or failure of these initial missions that would determine if 
Detachment 101 would have General Stilwell’s blessing to continue operating.   
Detachment 101’s field operations in 1943 can be classified as either short or 
long-range penetration operations.  The short-range operations were shallow 
penetrations into enemy territory, usually conducted on foot.  In contrast, long-range 
penetration operations were conducted hundreds of miles behind Japanese lines with 
personnel inserted by airborne or maritime means.  The short-range operations were not 
of the type that Eifler originally envisioned for the unit, nor the ones that Stilwell had 
asked for.  They would not provide the strategic results requested, but would only serve 
to enhance a long campaign.  They promised little return but delivered far more than the 
Detachment could have envisioned.   
Eifler expended great amounts of effort on the riskier long-range penetration 
operations.  He wanted to give Stilwell the “booms” that he wanted to hear coming from 
the Burmese jungle.  In contrast to the short-range operations, the long-range operations 
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were nearly all failures and none accomplished the initial directive from Stilwell to 
Detachment 101 to sever Japanese lines of communication to Myitkyina.  By the end of 
1943, these missions had accomplished little other than giving the unit extensive lessons 
learned upon which it would restructure its capabilities.  Instead, the short-range 
intelligence gathering missions would prove to be the key to Detachment 101’s success.  
William R. Peers, later commander of the unit, wrote in a post-war study that at 
first Detachment 101 knew nothing about the locale or the operating techniques that they 
would use.  Not having the luxury of experience, they then continuously examined their 
results and changed their operating techniques to fit the situation.  An in-depth view into 
the early operations will give a roadmap showing why the Detachment’s leaders chose to 
focus their organizational efforts as they did.  Since both short and long-range operations 
occurred simultaneously but had no direct influence upon one another, these operations 
will be covered thematically instead of chronologically.98   
The First Short-Range Effort:  Operation FORWARD 
 At the end of 1942, Detachment 101 still had limited means and only had a few 
more personnel than when it arrived in theater the previous summer.  Despite its lack of 
resources, the unit had to justify its existence and advance operations beyond the setting 
up of a base and a training school.  One way to accomplish this was to provide Stilwell 
intelligence on the enemy.  Little guesswork was involved for the location of where to 
start.  This first group, code-named Operation FORWARD, and operating from Fort 
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Hertz—the only area in north Burma that the Allies still occupied—would prove to be a 
crucial success.  Based upon its example, Detachment 101 would expand its operations 
throughout north Burma.   
 Detachment 101 did not intend the FORWARD group to be a separate para-
military operation.  The original intent was for it to be a forward operational base located 
at Fort Hertz that was to be an adjunct campus to the agent school at Nazira.  The intent 
was that closer contact with the Japanese near Fort Hertz would allow the agent groups 
to hone their craft and gain experience, giving them a greater chance of success when 
behind Japanese lines.99   
The Detachment could spare few personnel, so the initial complement of 
FORWARD was small.  On 28 December 1942, Colonel Eifler, Lieutenant Colonel John 
G. Coughlin, Sergeant Allen R. Richter, and a few civilian agents made their way from 
Assam.  From Fort Hertz, they were to go to Sumprabum, which at the time was the 
furthest point into Burma that was then under Allied control.  The group was only to 
report on local conditions and study how the OSS could use the area to train agents and 
to try to strike at the Japanese.100   
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The group immediately ran into problems.  The rocky relationship with the 
British military commander at Fort Hertz would prove to be the biggest challenge that 
would confront Detachment 101 in its first attempts at getting into action.  This 
relationship dramatically shaped the efforts Eifler would take to conduct independent 
combined operations instead of being dependent on the good graces of the British.   
Eifler had previously arranged through his SOE liaison that when his small 
contingent arrived at Fort Hertz, that its personnel were not to be identified as 
Americans.  They were to operate in British uniform for cover purposes.  The British 
commanding officer of Ft. Hertz, a Colonel Ralph Gamble, had other ideas.  Even before 
the OSS group had arrived, their cover was blown.  Everyone the group met knew them 
as Americans, including “even the coolies in the fields.”101  Eifler immediately had the 
men switch back into American uniforms and adopt the cover of a 10th United States 
Army Air Force (USAAF) radio group that had been expected to arrive.  The OSS group 
then made its way to Sumprabum, where Eifler learned that Gamble believed he had 
operational control over the mission.  This left Eifler with the unenviable task on 13 
January 1943 of directly informing Gamble that would not be the case.  After having 
given initial cooperation, Gamble then proved to be obstructionist by refusing quarters, 
equipment, and most other forms of support.  In response, Eifler announced to Gamble 
that his plan was impracticable and that he intended to withdraw his men.   
In reality, the threat was a subterfuge because Eifler did not intend to withdraw.  
He told Gamble that he would leave a small radio team to report on local conditions.  
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This team would give Gamble all the required cooperation and Eifler might be able to 
revisit the original plan should conditions merit.  Accordingly, on 4 February 1943, 
Captain William C. Wilkinson and several agents arrived from Fort Hertz to reinforce 
the small contingent.   
The short visit to Fort Hertz had dramatic repercussions.  It was from this trip 
that Eifler got the idea of recruiting Kachins.  He reported to Stilwell, “After surveying 
the condition in these hills it is my firm belief that the natives in the Kachin Hills … can 
be united in an effort against the Japanese.  I believe it perfectly possible to raise forces 
in these hills that will be in a position to continually strike the Japanese from their flanks 
and from their rear.”102  From the aftermath of a Japanese advance on Sumprabum, 
checked by the Kachin Levies on or near 8 January 1943, Eifler also learned that value 
of Kachin soldiers and their unique fighting techniques.103 
Wilkinson moved his group to Sumprabum, where they could fill a gap in the 
supply of local intelligence.  On 8 January 1943, Eifler cabled Stilwell that if it could be 
of assistance to the 10th Air Force in reporting weather or other information, his group 
stood by to act accordingly.  The group also used its secure communications to transmit 
information from the British back to the Americans.  This included sending reports from 
Captain R. W. Reid, the British SOE officer, back to headquarters in India.  This simple 
role filled by the Detachment shaved two to three days off the passing of reports, 
allowing greater use of the information before it was overtaken by events.  The group 
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was able to report on developments in the area, thereby becoming intelligence collectors 
in their own right.  For example, by the first week of February 1943, the group was 
acting as an impromptu air warning station that supplemented the Army’s chain of 
stations that reported on Japanese air movements.  The group also recruited an ever-
expanding cadre of indigenous agents who infiltrated through Japanese lines and 
reported on area intelligence and Japanese dispositions.104 
Another opportunity, that of conducting limited combat operations against the 
Japanese, had a large impact on Detachment 101.  From May to July, the FORWARD 
group continued to push its operating base ever further south until it reached Ngumla.  
As early as June 1943, the group conducted limited sabotage operations and recruited 
Kachins to be sent back to Nazira for training as radio operators.105  In early August, 
Eifler told Wilkinson to “hit the [Japanese] any way, shape and form that you want to hit 
him … smack him and smack him hard.  The more you smack him, the more I’ll like it.  
Use guerrilla tactics on their supply lines and the tactics in which we are supposed to be 
specialists.”106  By late 1943, FORWARD’s operations—compounded by that of the 
British-led Kachin Levies and the indigenous Kachin resistance—had Japanese troops 
only traveling at night and made them so nervous that they were randomly firing into 
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trailside vegetation.107  Through FORWARD, Detachment 101 was beginning to 
formulate the type of guerrilla tactics that they would perfect by the end of the war.   
Operation FORWARD garnered local support by conducting impromptu civil 
affairs missions.  In December 1943, Wilkinson reported that he had begun a 
“campaign” to provide the locals with unobtainable “luxury goods.”108  He had items 
such as salt, cloth, yarn, and clothing airdropped and sold at cost.  In the July report to 
OSS chief William J. Donovan, Eifler noted that the group did not have any medical 
personnel with them and had suffered from numerous illnesses, including blackwater 
fever, malaria, and typhoid.109  In October, Eifler contacted Milton Miles at SACO, who 
directed Navy doctor Lieutenant Commander James C. Luce to go to Detachment 101.110  
Luce quickly set up medical facilities at FORWARD that were available to the 
indigenous population.   
The trade and medical efforts proved very popular, and gained FORWARD trust 
and goodwill from the Kachins.  This was so much so that by August, Wilkinson had ten 
Kachin headmen (the heads of their villages) on his payroll and by October, employed 
sixty-two Kachin soldiers.111  Just four months later, FORWARD reported that, given 
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the word, the locals in the area would revolt against the Japanese.112  Eifler decided to 
expand upon this idea.  Luce was able to help with this directly.  When Detachment 101 
recalled Wilkinson in December 1943 for another assignment, Luce assumed command.  
He now had two roles:  chief medical officer in the area and guerrilla leader.  Luce, a 
career naval medical officer, previously wounded on the USS Maryland at Pearl Harbor, 
could not have found himself in a stranger environment.  However, he fit very well into 
the role and served with distinction. 
FORWARD found yet another role that greatly increased the support that 
Detachment 101 would get from the Army Air Forces.  The group began to rescue 
downed aircrew and pilots.  This mission grew out of the unit’s efforts to assist 
individual Chindits during Orde Wingate’s retreat out of Burma in March-April 1943.  
FORWARD ultimately rescued nine Chindits, one of whom later died.113  While the 
Chindit relief mission was limited, the Detachment made it known to the Allied air 
forces that they now could help rescue downed aircrews, resulting in raised morale and 
greatly increasing cooperation from the Army Air Forces. 
FORWARD continued to experience obstruction from Colonel Gamble, such as a 
refusal of quarters and airlift priorities.  In July 1943, the Detachment headquarters 
reported, “all we get out of Sumprabum and Fort Hertz is trouble,” and Peers had 
previously written in June “Wouldn’t life be sweet if there weren’t as many 
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Gambles!”114  Wilkinson also had to contend with an act performed by one of his 
subordinates that showcased the darker side of clandestine operations.  One of the SOE 
men detailed from the British, “Red” Maddox, executed a Kachin villager suspected of 
being a Japanese spy.  Although the situation appeared not to have caused any untoward 
reaction from the indigenous population, Wilkinson was quite incensed.  Detachment 
101’s position in the Kachin hills was not yet on firm ground and Wilkinson faced the 
distinct possibility that the Kachins might turn against his group.115 
FORWARD was originally to be a group of limited goals that was mainly an 
adjunct to the agent training school.  Three unique roles, however, that would be critical 
for the Detachment came out of this first mission; supplying intelligence on enemy 
targets, rescuing Allied aircrew and lost soldiers, and the recruitment of Kachins.  These 
add-on missions helped cement Detachment 101 into the American effort in Burma, and 
defined the unit as it went into 1944.  From FORWARD’s example, the Detachment 
would push similar missions into the field, such as the KNOTHEAD group into the 
upper Hukawng Valley in August 1943.  As 1943 ended, Detachment 101 had several 
active and successful short-range operations operating in the field.   
Long-Range Penetration Operations 
While it would be the short-range missions that proved the value of Detachment 
101, only long-range penetrations would give Stilwell the “booms” that he wanted 
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within the allotted ninety days.  This placed great stress on the inexperienced and 
overworked staff.  All of the personnel in the Detachment had multiple jobs and faced a 
herculean task in accomplishing them all well.  This problem was compounded by poor 
to nonexistent area intelligence, and poorly trained operators who were selected—not 
trained—to fit the mission.  While there was a frenzy of effort in the Detachment, it did 
not necessarily equate to a well-planned operation. 
In contrast to the short-range operations, the early long-range penetration 
missions of Detachment 101 were almost all total disasters, with casualties averaging 70 
percent.  Only one mission succeeded out of the six attempted.  Eifler ignored his 
group’s lack of experience and poor intelligence in his eagerness to show the value of his 
organization to Stilwell.  Although there were some COI/OSS personnel active in North 
Africa at the same time, these long-range penetration missions of Detachment 101 would 
execute the first OSS attempts at strategic sabotage.116  In operations of this type, failure 
equated to the loss of the entire team.  These operations, however, also provided some of 
the most valuable lessons from which the Detachment could use to build itself and its 
subsequent operations.   
“A” Group 
 The first long-range sabotage mission launched by Detachment 101, was 
undertaken by “A” Group.  This mission created a false sense of operational 
preparedness, which additional long-range penetration operations subsequently eroded.  
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The “A” Group mission was to disrupt Japanese air operations from Myitkyina by 
cutting rail lines and blowing bridges south of the city, thereby cutting the inflow of 
supplies to the Japanese fighter base and stopping its interference with American efforts 
to supply Chinese forces via the “Hump” airlift route.117  “A” Group was composed 
exclusively of British Commonwealth personnel.  Jack Barnard led seven operators:  
Oscar Milton, Patrick Maddox, Pat Quinn, John Beamish, Aram “Bunny” Aganoor, 
Dennis Francis, and Saw Egbert Timothy, most of whom had worked in the timber or 
mining industries of Burma for years.118  Eifler recruited them with the help of Colonel 
Richmond, the British liaison officer, who knew many of the men personally.119  Most 
had prior military service.  Jack Barnard, John Beamish, and Pat Maddox came from 
SOE—while Oscar Milton was on loan from the Burma Army.  Four Kachins: Ah Khi, 
Ahdi Yaw Yin, Yaw Yin Naung, and Lazum Naw also accompanied the group.120  Many 
of the “A” Group had made the grueling walkout of Burma with remnants of the Chinese 
Army in 1942.  This prior experience gave the “A” Group members the necessary 
backgrounds to survive and operate hundreds of miles behind Japanese lines.  This 
                                                 
117
 Carl F. Eifler to William J. Donovan, “Report of Action to Date and Request for Instructions,” 24 
November 1942, F 49, B 39, E190, RG 226, NARA.  The exact wording of this mission guidance can be 
found in a letter to Eifler that is in the author’s possession:  Joseph W. Stilwell to Carl F. Eifler, “Letter of 
Instruction,” 15 September 1942. 
118
 [Jack Barnard], “Report on Secret Operations in Burma,” [post-June 1943], F 448, B 30, E 154, RG 
226, NARA. 
119
 Eifler to Donovan, “Report of Action to Date and Request for Instructions,” 24 November 1942, 
NARA. 
120
 Eifler to Donovan, “Detailed Report of My Activities Covering the Period December 26,” 6 April 1943, 
NARA. 
  
67 
included knowledge of the terrain, environment, peoples, and culture, as well as critical 
language skills.121  
 The first major task for “A” Group was a successful infiltration.  The initial plan 
called for the group to move overland into their operating area from Fort Hertz, where 
FORWARD was getting settled.  However, Gamble’s poor operations security 
convinced Eifler that the Japanese would discover that the clandestine group—
accompanied by its necessary porters—was trying to infiltrate.  Eifler then decided to 
parachute the group behind the lines.  After only a few hours of ground instruction, the 
group was deemed ready to jump.  On 5 February 1942, Barnard accompanied an aerial 
reconnaissance mission to review the drop zone.  Two days later, Barnard and Timothy 
parachuted in safely, although the drop destroyed their radio.  The remainder of the team 
dropped in the next day after confirming that the recognition panels indicated the area 
was safe.  Despite this being the first jump for the group, all landed without mishap.122 
 “A” Group quickly set to its mission of destroying three area railroad bridges.  
After creating a rally point where the teams would rendezvous for the walk out once 
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their bridges were blown, “A” Group split up.  Milton, Timothy, and the four Kachins 
stayed at the rally point.  The others began their 40-mile march south.  Near their targets, 
the three teams split up and moved to their respective bridges.  Maddox and Francis 
went to the Namkwin Bridge, Quinn and Aganoor headed for a smaller bridge two miles 
south, and Barnard and Beamish moved to the Dagwin Bridge.  All appeared to be going 
well.  The three teams got to their objectives on the night of 23 February 1943.  Once 
there, they prepared their demolitions for a timed simultaneous explosion.123   
However, Maddox and Francis, plagued by faulty timers, dropped the Namkwin 
Bridge too early.  The premature explosion jeopardized the other teams’ efforts.  Barnard 
and Beamish abandoned their mission.  Enemy forces discovered Maddox and Aganoor 
while they were placing their charges.  They fired on local police who came to 
investigate the bridge.  Soon, the police and local Japanese occupation troops were in 
pursuit.  Quinn and Aganoor split up to increase their chances of escape.  Each intended 
to independently work his way back to the rally point.  Maddox escaped but Aganoor 
was captured and presumably killed.  Fortunately, unbeknownst to the OSS, the first 
Chindit operation, a large long-range penetration raid led by British Major General Orde 
Wingate, was also operating nearby.  Because the Japanese presumed the Chindits had 
done the bridge demolitions, they did not expand the search for the scattered teams.  The 
OSS benefited from the confusion but also learned the value of better coordination.124 
Barnard and Beamish made it to the rendezvous camp on the 24th, after speed 
marching forty miles in less than a day.  They thought that the Japanese had killed or 
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captured the other two groups, and that enemy forces were in close pursuit.  Without 
pausing to rest, Barnard, Beamish, Milton, Timothy, and the Kachins gathered what 
supplies they could carry and beat a hasty retreat.  Maddox and Francis arrived on the 
27th and Quinn showed up the next day.  From here, Maddox, Francis, and Quinn—
minus Aganoor—started their trek north back to Fort Hertz.  Both sections of “A” Group 
were following the same general trail, but made their way independently to Fort Hertz.  
They knew that the first outposts of the Kachin Levies, a British-led frontier force, were 
located on the approaches to Fort Hertz.  Maddox’s group arrived on 16 May 1943.   
Barnard’s group, in the lead and in contrast to Maddox’s group, had radio contact 
with Detachment 101 and received some supply drops.  On 7 March, the OSS dropped a 
note ordering them to stay in the area and provide intelligence based on an urgent and 
critical need.125  The Japanese had reinforced the area around Myitkyina in response to 
the Chindit expedition, and NCAC feared that they would make a push north to take 
Sumprabum.  Barnard’s group lingered in the area and collected intelligence on targets, 
roads, and the Japanese military, determined which villages were friendly to the Allies, 
and assessed the general situation in Burma.  His group returned to Ft. Hertz on 11 June 
after eighteen weeks in the field behind enemy lines.  Afterward, Barnard and Beamish, 
elected to return to SOE.  Maddox later parachuted in to take charge of the RED group 
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and Quinn did the same with PAT in November 1943.  Milton chose to lead the OSCAR 
group that was tasked to rescue downed pilots.126 
“B” Group 
Despite the fact that “A” Group was still behind enemy lines, Eifler felt 
pressured to launch additional—and increasingly ambitious—operations.  Thus, the 
second sabotage team, code-named “B” Group, was launched while “A” Group was still 
south of Myitkyina.  “B” Group parachuted in near Lawksawk, further south of “A” 
Group, during daylight on 24 February 1943.  “B” Group, led by Harry Ballard, was 
comprised of John Clark, Vierap Pillay, Lionel Cornelius, Kenneth Murray, and Cyril 
Goodwin.  All were either Anglo-Burmans or Anglo-Indians recruited from refugee 
camps in India.127   
Peers was part of the drop crew on the aircraft.  In his book, Behind the Burma 
Road, he explained his misgivings about the selected drop zone because it was only a 
few miles from several villages and the local inhabitants would be easily notice the drop 
aircraft.  Assured by Ballard that the group would be fine, Peers approved the parachute 
drop.  Never again would the mission leader have the authority to make the decision to 
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execute.  The Detachment 101 staff correctly concluded that a group’s leader could not 
be relied on to make an objective assessment when immediate risk had escalated.128    
Lawksawk was out of the range of Allied fighters based in India.  Therefore, a 
China-based Army Air Corps C-87 and P-40 fighter escort was necessary.  In early 
1943, Detachment 101 had only the Army Air Corps for air support.  Stilwell’s 
priority—and hence that of the 10th Air Force—was to fly as much cargo as possible into 
China over the Hump route.  Thus, the request for a single cargo plane had to go through 
10th Air Force command channels to General Clayton L. Bissell before it reached 
Stilwell.  Stilwell denied the request because he wanted Detachment 101 to infiltrate 
groups overland to avoid taxing his limited airlift.  Eifler pointed out that “A” Group had 
demonstrated that this was not always practical.  Stilwell relented when Eifler said that 
the entire mission—reconnaissance, personnel and supply drop—could be done by a 
single mission.  Eifler also agreed to bomb Lashio on the return flight.  His supply 
bundle kickers would manhandle twenty 30-pound bombs out of the aircraft over the 
Lashio airfield to disrupt Japanese air operations.  Detachment 101 launched “B” Group 
on 24 February to add to the “booms” that “A” Group was supposedly already making in 
Burma.  Twenty minutes from the drop zone, the drop crew offered the men of “B” 
Group brandy-laced coffee.  At 1530 hours, they jumped.  All landed safely although 
Goodwin had hung up in a tree.  As the cargo and escort planes circled overhead after 
the drop, one man waved goodbye.  Unfortunately, the men on the ground could not see 
what Peers saw from the C-87.  
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As we made our last pass, we could see a discomforting sight:  villagers 
streaming out in every direction, heading towards the drop zone.  I had an aching 
feeling that the lines looked hostile.  I couldn’t get it out of my head that they 
were out to kill.  And because of this, I felt it had been a bad decision.  As I sat in 
the plane, I felt miserable about the whole affair and wondered why I had ever 
got mixed up in this sort of business.129   
 
Neither Peers not the rest of Detachment 101 would learn what happened to “B” Group 
until June 1945. 
“W” Group  
Yet, without pause for reflection as to what had happened to “A” or “B” Groups, 
long-range penetration missions continued to be launched.  Lieutenant General Noel 
Mackintosh Stuart Irwin, commander of the British Eastern Army in the Arakan region 
of Burma, asked Detachment 101 for assistance cutting Japanese supplies on the Prome-
Taungup coastal road.  Any help that Detachment 101 could provide would aid in 
recapturing Donbiak (Shinkhali).130  Since the Arakan is principally a region of thick 
mangrove swamp along the west coast of Burma, “W” Group [Operation Maurice to the 
British] would have to go in by boat.  The “W” Group would be operating even farther 
south than “A” or “B” Groups, and well beyond Detachment 101’s area of operations. 
Detachment 101 was even less prepared for amphibious insertions than it was for 
those by air.  It would be another first for Detachment 101.  Unlike “A” Group, which 
received some parachute training, “W” Group would get none.  The Detachment had no 
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organic boats, and the landing party from Detachment 101 had no experience either.131  
The British naval delivery vessels had to be clear of the area by daylight to avoid 
detection and possible attack by the Japanese.132  The British boats carrying the team and 
its rubber boats could not carry sufficient fuel internally to support a night 
reconnaissance of the landing site the night before and return the next night to drop off 
the team.  Eifler requested that the boat carry extra fuel on deck to extend the range of 
the delivery vessels.  The Royal Navy refused the request because carrying fuel 
externally was against regulations.  Eifler asked Vice Admiral Herbert Fitzherbert, the 
Royal Indian Navy Commander, for a waiver.  The British admiral did not feel that there 
was any situation in the theater that warranted a violation of this regulation.133   
Anticipating that the mission could end in disaster, Eifler, who was to be a 
member of the party putting the group ashore, wrote a blunt memo.  Eifler gave the 
memo to Lieutenant Colonel John G. Coughlin, his second-in-command.  Coughlin was 
to forward the note to Donovan, if Eifler went missing.   
In the event that we do not come back, I wish to use this report as a reason to 
Washington why you should have your own boats … If I, at the present time, had 
my own boats, I would not even consider undertaking this project now … As I 
stated earlier in this report to you, chances at the present time appear to be 
against us, but we are going ahead … I do not feel that it is right to ask our men 
to take these unnecessary chances which become necessary in an attempt to 
coordinate or work with other agencies.134 
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The “W” Group consisted of six Anglo-Burman/Indian agents; Charles Morrell, 
John Sheridan, Vincent Snadden, John Aikman, Alex D’Attaides, and Geoffrey 
Willson.135  The team finally got ashore near Sandoway, Burma, on the night of 8 March 
1943.  They had to move, and hide before daybreak, more than 1,000 pounds of supplies.  
It took five tries to find a good landing site, but the wild card proved to be Eifler himself.  
Because of the time lost in the previous landing attempts, Eifler did not think that 
the agents would have the time to bury the rafts before dawn.  In order to reduce the 
chances of discovery Eifler decided to accompany them and swim to the motor launch 
with the rubber boats in tow.  After the six agents got ashore with their supplies, Eifler 
told them to get the stuff under cover.  When he shook their hands in farewell, he warned 
them that if discovered, not to be taken alive.136  That was the last time that Detachment 
101 saw “W” Group, but the drama was not over. 
The pounding surf and darkness proved to be nearly insurmountable even for the 
brawny OSS colonel.  As he struggled to drag the five rubber boats back through the 
surf, a wave threw Eifler head first onto a large rock.  Dazed, he barely managed to tow 
the rafts back to the launch craft in time.  The injury so disoriented Eifler that he only 
found the motor launch by the sound of the crew pulling up the anchor chain.  It had 
taken so long to get the agents ashore that dawn was soon approaching.137  Despite this, 
“W” Group marked the beginning of the end of Eifler as the commander of Detachment 
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101.  His head injury was severe.  Neither prodigious amounts of alcohol nor self-
medicating with morphine could dull the constant pain.138  The injury would eventually 
prove to be the grounds to remove him from command.   
The Aftermath 
Inserting the long-range penetration teams blind meant that the Detachment 101 
staff had no idea as to what happened to “B” or “W” Groups.  It was not until June 1945 
that Detachment 101 learned the fate of these teams.  After Rangoon’s capture in May 
1945, Peers, the last commander of Detachment 101, sent Lieutenant Daniel Mudrinich 
to Rangoon to investigate the fate of their lost agents.  Mudrinich had to rely heavily on 
X-2 (OSS counter-intelligence branch) interrogations of Japanese collaborators and 
friendly locals.  Despite Japanese holdouts taking potshots at him, the OSS lieutenant 
interviewed villagers who had seen the missing agents.  At the end of June 1945, the 
investigations were over and the Detachment’s financial officer George Gorin and 
lawyer Charles Henderson then settled the pay and provided restitution to the families of 
the lost agents.  What they discovered was the following. 
The drop on 24 February 1943 was the last contact Detachment 101 ever had 
with “B” Group.  Radioman Allen Richter remembered monitoring the radios for a week 
hoping for the call that never came.139  On the premise that “B” Group radios had been 
damaged in the jump, a B-25 escorted by two P-40s flew up and down the valley on 6 
March searching for recognition panels.  They were too late.  Two days before, the 
Detachment’s radio operators had heard the following Japanese broadcast:   
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Rangoon:  Unable to take any positive steps in the retaking of Burmese territory, 
the desperate British Army in India is now resorting to external activities, some 
of which were frustrated at the very start by the vigilant Japanese authorities in 
Burma and the loyal attitude of the Burmese towards their reborn country.  A 
recent report revealed that a group of six British spies on 23rd February landed by 
parachute at a certain point in North-Western Burma.  Entertaining the idea that 
any place was safe where there were no Japanese troops, they were greatly 
shocked when a group of alert Burmese villagers immediately rushed at them.  In 
the struggle that followed, the brave villagers killed three of the spies and 
captured the rest and subsequently delivered them to the Japanese troops 
stationed nearby.  This recent incident shows that any and all attempts by Britain 
to win and cajole the Burmese will end in failure and disaster.  All the Burmese 
people from the humble villager to the patriotic leader, realize the danger of John 
Bull.140 
 
According to Mudrinich’s 1945 investigation, the villagers led the captured 
survivors of “B” Group to Lawksawk.  On 27 February, the villagers turned them over to 
the Japanese who imprisoned them in Taunggyi.  The captured men provided no 
information despite being severely tortured for two to three days.  In an attempt to 
convince the rest to talk, the Japanese executed three men—likely Ballard, Goodwin and 
Hood.  The last three prisoners, all in very poor health, were dispatched under heavy 
guard to Rangoon on 15 March 1943, but there is no record that they ever arrived.141   
Eifler’s handshakes on the beach were the last contact with “W” Group.  Once 
ashore, the agents hid themselves.  The following day, they paid a fisherman to take 
them to the nearby village of Kyaukpyu.  “W” Group then managed to get to Dawmya.  
Here their luck ran out.  Local villagers probably betrayed the group to the Japanese.  On 
19 March 1943, on a trail near Dawmya, Japanese troops surrounded the agents of “W” 
Group.  Trapped, they followed Eifler’s advice and tried to shoot their way out.  The 
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group killed one Japanese soldier and wounded another.  However, Charles Morrell and 
John Sheridan lost their lives in the breakout.  The remaining four sought cover on a 
wooded hill nearby.  The Japanese forces mortared the hill, killing Vincent Snadden.  
The last three agents escaped by moving into heavier vegetation.  On the run, villagers 
from Natmaw chased and caught John Aikman, who was shot by the headman on 24 
March 1943.  Three weeks later, the Japanese captured D’Attaides and Willson.  They 
were taken to the prison at Taungup, tortured, and beheaded around 25 April 1943.142   
Despite having lost contact with “B” and “W” Groups and not knowing why they 
failed, Detachment 101 continued throughout 1943 and early 1944 to launch more 
ambitious long-range penetration operations further and further south.  In south Burma, 
the populations were not willing to help the Allies.  Thus, the later BALLS, BALLS #1, 
and REX missions were complete failures.  Unfortunately, for these groups, Detachment 
101 had not taken adequate time to reflect why long-range missions were unsuccessful.  
The Evaluations 
After the consecutive failures of “B” and “W” Groups, Detachment 101 had to 
reorganize, evaluate the lessons learned, and train for these future missions.  Detachment 
101 focused on the “A” Group operation and its short-range penetration operations.  
While it had succeeded in dropping only one bridge as opposed to the three targeted, 
“A” Group was quite successful.  The debriefs from “A” Group provided extensive 
intelligence on the attitudes of the local population, economic hardships, locations and 
patrolling schedules of Japanese troops, and familiarity with jungle conditions.  
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Detachment 101 was able to use this knowledge in its subsequent missions as it inserted 
forces into the Kachin-dominated area prior to the Marauder’s advance in mid-1944.143 
One key lesson learned in the long-range penetration operations was to insert a 
small pathfinder team into the area of operations to do a ground reconnaissance before 
the main body.  Detachment 101 did not recognize this lesson until “B” Group 
disappeared.  Scarcity of air support, the schedule of the drop plane, and allowing the 
mission commander to make the execution decision doomed that effort.  “W” Group, 
similar to “B” Group, was shackled to the regulations and operating restrictions of the 
Royal Indian Navy.  There was neither a pathfinder team, nor prior reconnaissance, nor 
boat training.  The post-mission note on “B” Group that called for air reconnaissance of 
the area of operations beforehand was ignored by “W” Group.144  These lessons later 
became standard operating procedure (SOP); however, they were too late to help the 
remaining long-range penetration operations in 1943, the BALLS, and REX missions, as 
well as BALLS #1, a mission in February 1944 to establish contact with the BALLS 
group.145 
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Detachment 101 also learned by default the very difficult lesson of overextending 
its capabilities and the necessity for current intelligence.  The successful shallow 
penetrations in 1943, FORWARD and its follow-on KNOTHEAD, established 
themselves by walking into north Burma.  These missions provided intelligence for 
bombing targets, built enemy order of battle, and kept the Detachment abreast of the 
general situation in Burma.  These north Burma operations benefited from the help of the 
indigenous pro-Allied Kachin tribes.  Of the long-range penetration missions in 1943, 
only one, “A” Group, was in a Kachin area.   
The third and most important lesson learned had a major impact on future 
operations and helped Detachment 101 grow into one of the largest OSS overseas 
commands.  Eifler realized how critical it was for the Detachment to have its own 
organic transportation to control the insertion, extraction, and support of teams behind 
enemy lines.  Eifler reported his problems dealing with the Army Air Corps on 6 April 
1943.  Every Army Air Corps unit—bombers, fighters, and transport—had to have local 
approvals before Stilwell gave his final approval.  Even with permission granted to use 
Air Corps assets, Detachment 101 operations were still bound by USAAF regulations, or 
to its officer’s indifference or hostility.  In trying to insert a team in March, Eifler could 
not pull the Army Air Force officer away from a cribbage game long enough to get his 
attention.  This is what Eifler told OSS headquarters in Washington:   
From the beginning … I have stated that successful operations should utilize the 
methods of the smuggler … We are forced at the present time, however, to use 
military methods that are all wrong for this kind of work … The planes we use 
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are military planes manned by military personnel, operated in a military manner, 
first thought and consideration being given to equipment … our first thought 
should be given our main equipment and that equipment is a trained agent.  He is 
a tool, a very expensive tool, and his life should be guarded jealously as long as it 
is in our hands.  If he is to be flown into enemy territory, he should be given 
every chance of a successful landing instead of which, flying under military 
regulations, he is taken over enemy territory in broad daylight, dropped in 
daylight along with his equipment … Military planes cannot fly at night.  Why, I 
don’t know.146 
 
Most of the same frustrations could be equally applied to amphibious insertions.   
The other crucial element to Detachment 101 was operational security.  Agents 
and operations exposed themselves to unnecessary risks because personnel who lacked 
the operational need to know were involved in operational insertions, resupply, and 
extractions.  Eifler had a solution.  He asked for permission to purchase a small fleet of 
aircraft that could take off and land on short landing fields and be fitted with pontoons if 
necessary.  As for delivery boats, Eifler, the former Customs Service officer, proposed a 
fast speedboat like those used by liquor smugglers during Prohibition in the United 
States.147  Fortunately, Donovan and the OSS staff agreed.  By the end of the war, 
Detachment 101 had its own small air force—dubbed the “Red Ass Squadron”—of light 
L-1 and L-5 liaison and artillery spotter aircraft.  These planes proved ideal for insertion 
and extraction of personnel, able or wounded.  Detachment 101 also had a small fleet of 
dedicated USAAF C-47 cargo aircraft to drop supplies.  In November 1943, OSS 
Washington sent a small boat similar to a PT-boat.  By 1945, Detachment 101 would 
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have a small fleet of high-powered PT-like boats, as well as a section of OSS Maritime 
Unit swimmers.  But, all this was post-Eifler. 
Although these operational failures in 1943 were serious, the Detachment staff 
learned from the mistakes, changed concepts of operations, developed SOPs, instituted 
necessary training, and incorporated the Kachins.  Detachment 101 learned the necessity 
for having current area intelligence, organic transportation assets, and the value of 
working with trusted and capable indigenous populations.  Unbridled enthusiasm gave 
way to more realistic operational plans that yielded results.  While Detachment 101 did 
not successfully apply these lessons to the long-range penetrations of 1943, they did 
afterwards.  They built on the more successful shallow penetrations in north Burma to 
expand their utility and to justify organic transportation.  They increased their 
probability of success tremendously.  By learning these lessons and focusing their efforts 
in the north where the Kachins could help, Detachment 101 would by May 1944 prove 
to be an effective intelligence collection unit that could field a strong guerrilla fighting 
force and become a thorn in the side of Japanese in north Burma.  The next chapter will 
examine the organizational and command changes that Detachment 101 undertook in 
1943 to make this a reality. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RETHINKING OPERATIONS:  THE DETACHMENT EVOLVES:  FEBRUARY 
1943-JANUARY 1944 
 
The period from February through the rest of 1943 was one in which Detachment 
101 went through considerable change.  It evolved from a unit focused on conducting 
sabotage operations behind Japanese lines to one that encompassed a spectrum of 
intelligence and guerrilla operations.  The expansion of Detachment 101’s activities 
required that it pay greater attention to its personnel and support elements, such as the 
Communications and Finance Sections.  It also required far more effective liaison 
efforts.   
After a formal agreement in April, Eifler no longer had to report to Milton E. 
Miles in China.  This made Eifler’s job easier, but also left the group unprotected and 
completely dependent on its standing with OSS Washington and NCAC.  By the end of 
1943, Donovan was concerned with Eifler’s increasingly erratic and risky behavior and 
recalled him that same December.  The recall happened at the very moment that 
Detachment 101 was starting to gain importance and a definitive role in the north Burma 
campaign.  As this chapter will show, in 1943 Eifler still managed to transform the 
Detachment into one of greater operational and liaison capacity.  These efforts allowed 
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the group in 1944 to expand upon the fledgling organization and become a potent force.  
This was important because the situation with conventional forces was disappointing.148    
American strategy in the Burma campaign centered on keeping China in the war.  
Since the Burma Road was enemy-controlled, the United States Army Air Forces 
(USAAF) established airfields in Assam, India.  From there they flew the hazardous 
“Hump” air-bridge through the Himalayan mountain passes to help supply the Chinese 
war effort.  This endeavor was costly in terms of aircraft and crews, who often crashed 
because of adverse weather or from running into cloud-cloaked mountain peaks.  The 
solution was to build a land route to bypass the original Burma Road.  In December 
1942, U.S. Army engineers started construction on the Ledo Road.  It began in upper 
Assam in India.  From there, it would cut across north Burma to link up with the original 
Burma Road at Lashio, Burma.  A ground campaign was necessary to secure this route, 
but it would require a conventional force. 
The majority of Stilwell’s forces, however, were the Chih Hui Pu, or Chinese 
Army in India.  This force was composed of the reformed 11,000-12,000 man 38th and 
22nd Chinese Divisions and the American-equipped Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group.  
The 38th and 22nd had been part of the troops supplied by Nationalist Chinese leader 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to help the Allies fight the original Japanese invasion of 
Burma.  These two divisions were forced to retreat into India.  There they reorganized, 
rearmed, and trained in American methods at the Ramgarh Training Center.  Despite 
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these troops being under Stilwell’s command, however, they were still beholden to the 
Generalissimo.  He often gave orders behind Stilwell’s back that countermanded those 
that he had issued.  The result was that Chinese officers often ignored Stilwell’s direct 
orders to push forward and engage the Japanese, unless they had similar orders from 
Chiang Kai-shek.  This resulted in much frustration on Stilwell’s part and that of the 
British, who regarded the Chinese as untrustworthy allies.  It also reinforced to Stilwell 
that he would have to rely heavily upon any American and British forces that might 
come under his command in north Burma, so that their willingness to engage might 
shame the Chinese officers into action.  This was going to be a problem when the Allied 
offensive in north Burma began.  Detachment 101, however, was laying the groundwork 
to allow eventual success. 
Operation FORWARD, commanded by Lieutenant Commander James C. Luce, 
had gone into the field in late December 1942 and had its headquarters at Ngumla.  
Operation KNOTHEAD, commanded by Captain Vincent Curl and emplaced in the 
upper Hukawng Valley, had been operating since August 1943.  These two groups 
served as headquarters for smaller groups that were led by American, British, or 
Burmese officers.  Each had several Kachins or other local recruits serving as guerrilla 
soldiers and intelligence collectors.149 Operation PAT, also in the area of the Allied 
advance, was led by Pat Quinn.  Quinn had been able to place an agent on a hill ten 
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miles from the Myitkyina airfield.  By using binoculars, this agent was able to report 
when Japanese aircraft used the field.150 
The Burmese in the south and the Chinese to the north had subjected the Kachins 
to generations of depredation, so much so that they had learned to defend themselves.  
Since they were outnumbered by their opponents, they became experts in guerrilla hit-
and-run tactics.  Technician Third Grade Tom Moon of KNOTHEAD reported that 
“Every time they got a chance to knock off a [Japanese] patrol they did it because it was 
a psychological play.”151  The Kachins also compensated for a lack of modern weapons 
by exploiting their environment.  One OSS member described this, “In a jungle ambush, 
the Kachins can do terrible things with sharpened bamboos.  They fill the bushes on both 
sides with needle-sharp stakes, cleverly hidden.  When a [Japanese] patrol was fired 
upon, and dived for the timber—well, I hardly like to talk about it.  After a few 
ambushes like that, the [Japanese] never took cover when we fired on them.”152   
With Kachin help, Detachment 101 groups were conducting limited offensive 
guerrilla actions by the end of 1943.  Some were quite fierce, as based on this 27 
December 1943 skirmish near Jaiwa, described in an OSS report.  
… the [Japanese] were quite close before our men opened fire.  Some [Japanese] 
fell but they were so close … that they rushed our men and hand to hand fighting 
ensued.  Six [Japanese] tried to seize our Bren gun and Sai La fought bravely 
against odds but was left with only the “locking handle” in his hand.  He then 
grabbed a Tommy gun from one of our patrol, shot 2 [Japanese] in an effort to 
retrieve his Bren gun.  The [Japanese] came to grips with him again, he tried to 
use his weapon hammer fashion on their bodies but struck a tree and was left 
with only the butt in his hand … [the Japanese] lost 15 killed and 5 wounded.153   
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The Detachment still had a long way to go before it would be able to assist a major 
conventional offensive. 
The Detachment Reevaluates Its Personnel Situation 
The main concern facing the Detachment once it had gained General Stilwell’s 
tentative acceptance to remain in theater, was to acquire additional personnel.  Through 
its liaison agreement with SOE, the Detachment had little trouble securing indigenous or 
Anglo-Indian/Burman recruits.  These additional recruits forced the Detachment to 
increase the capability of its jungle and agent training programs.  The Detachment had to 
expand its training area and by June 1943, Nazira consisted of seventeen camps spread 
out over a twenty-five square mile area.154  These camps accommodated an ever-
increasing number of students and by September 1943, fifty-seven students were 
undergoing radio instruction alone.155  At this time, with some 150 students in training, 
the Detachment 101 school was at its largest capacity for training indigenous agents than 
it would be for the rest of the war.156  The group also had no problem finding workers 
among the local population.  By November, the unit had some fifty Gurkha guards, a 
like number of cooks and bearers, fifteen to twenty office workers, and six couriers.157 
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But, these recruits were not enough to meet requirements, which the widespread 
nature of the Detachment’s operations exacerbated.  For instance, to facilitate liaison, 
supply, and operations, in March 1943 the Detachment had nine of its personnel—
including its primary officers—spread across the modern countries of Pakistan, Burma, 
India, China, and Bangladesh.158  The Detachment 101 staff realized that it would be 
impossible to undertake numerous and complex operations without an additional influx 
of OSS personnel.  To help the unit, Stilwell approved a table of organization that 
increased Detachment 101 to 52 officers and 69 enlisted men, or 121 total.159 
The overworked headquarters staff needed these new additions because they had 
been swamped with work once the unit began putting clandestine personnel into Burma.  
In February 1943, Eifler’s report to OSS Washington relayed that most of his sections 
were undermanned, the situation was growing worse, and that it was having a negative 
effect on operations.  Given his new requirements in February 1943, Eifler called for 
personnel for the following sections:  finance (3), recruiting (1), school (31), medical (5), 
communications (21), administration (3), ordnance (1), and miscellaneous (4).160  By 
September 1943, the original twenty-one man contingent had only been increased by an 
additional twenty-nine OSS personnel out of the sixty-nine requested.161  American OSS 
personnel were also needed for operations.  Though thought impossible in 1942, the 
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efforts of “A” Group had shown that it was possible for non-indigenous personnel to 
accomplish missions behind Japanese lines.   
Eifler had additional problems with the morale of the personnel that he already 
had.  Many officers were concerned that peers in other units were being promoted above 
them.  The specific incident that triggered resentment was the promotion of Captain 
Frank Devlin, the Detachment 101 supply officer based in Washington, to major.  This 
promotion came at a time when those who were in the field and previously had been 
senior in grade, had been passed over because slots did not exist in the Detachment for 
their promotion.  Eifler cabled his response to Donovan in the strongest words possible 
short of insubordination.  He said that Devlin’s promotion was unacceptable while others 
lagged behind and, “you created a condition for me that must be corrected.”162  The 
problems of promotion would continue to confront the Detachment. 
In addition, many of the new personnel that arrived did not necessarily alleviate 
the workload.  Several new recruits represented new OSS branches, and at least initially, 
served in those functions.  For instance, the first Field Photo personnel, led by the 
Hollywood director turned Navy officer John Ford, arrived in November after a sixty-
one day voyage.  This twelve-man contingent was there to record the Detachment’s 
achievements on film and was already filming operations by early December.  Their 
efforts served to enhance Detachment 101’s reputation with OSS Washington, which 
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indirectly helped to funnel new recruits from OSS headquarters.  Personnel from other 
specific branches had a much more tangible effect on the unit’s daily operations.163 
Finances 
With the increase in Detachment 101’s operations and unit structure, its funding 
mechanisms required more than an officer simply thrown into the role of treasurer.  In 
June, the Detachment asked that the OSS Special Funds Branch designate an officer to 
handle money for clandestine operations and to pay for locally-recruited agents.164  
Lieutenant George Gorin arrived in August to inherit the Detachment’s unique finance 
requirements and to replace the ad-hoc finance officer, Captain Robert T. Aitken.  Gorin 
immediately discovered the group’s unique financial challenges.  For instance, in 1942-
early 1943, silver rupees were an acceptable form of payment among pro-Allied locals in 
north Burma.  But, by the end of the year, so much silver had “poured” into the area that 
“the people now have more money than they ever had in their lives.  Some of them had 
made more money in this year than they would in their entire life.”165  At the same time 
that the area’s wealth was increasing, goods were rapidly becoming unavailable.  By late 
1943, the indigenous population no longer wanted silver as they had nothing to buy with 
their new-found wealth.  Instead, they wanted opium, or even better, cloth or salt.166  The 
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demand for these items could be insatiable.  For instance, FORWARD reported that the 
clothes in one goodwill drop—intended to last a month—were gone within half a day.   
Yet, the Detachment still had to be careful using these items as payment.  Having 
an agent wear Indian-made clothing, or use Indian-produced opium while in Japanese 
territory could amount to a death sentence.167  Still, by meeting these demands—at least 
in part—the Detachment enhanced the cooperation they received from the locals.  
Gorin’s problems were compounded by the Japanese occupation.  In places where he 
could still use silver as payment, only pre-war rupees were acceptable.  This was for two 
reasons.  First, an agent could not use newer minted coins while behind Japanese lines as 
that would immediately give them away as in Allied pay.  Second, the populace much 
preferred prewar coins because of their higher silver content.  But, the higher silver 
content had led the British government in India to withdraw pre-war rupees from 
circulation and declare them no longer legal tender.  Existing reserves were tightly 
controlled in banks and despite operational needs, Gorin was unable to obtain sufficient 
quantities.  Detachment 101’s isolation also hampered Gorin, who found that even if 
funds existed to pay for operations, the remoteness of the main bank accounts created 
inevitable delays.168    
It was also Gorin’s job to keep track of exactly how much the Detachment was 
spending.  In September, this total was some $54,000.  Gorin warned Washington that 
this figure would increase “sharply and without advance notice,” and that he could 
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estimate costs associated with training, but not those of field operations.169  By 
December, the full scale of these operational costs was a reality and Gorin reported that 
Detachment 101’s “expenses were increasing at a much greater rate than is our 
income.”170  The total was some $75,000 or an increase of $21,000 from September.171   
In September 1943, Detachment 101 sent the first samples of Japanese money 
from Burma and Indo-China to OSS Washington.  Eifler requested that OSS Washington 
make counterfeit examples of these, along with samples of Thai money that the group 
sent back in December.172  As early as October, Detachment 101 had received 
counterfeit examples of Japanese occupation money from OSS Washington.  Although 
the results were considered quite good, Detachment 101 still requested that the 
production facilities of OSS Washington pay more attention to the proper shading of the 
counterfeit bills.173   
Communications and Coding 
The dramatic growth of Detachment 101’s communications network throughout 
1943 compounded the over-tasking of the already seriously undermanned 
Communications Section staff.  The Detachment’s communications network started with 
the initial radio stations set up at Nazira, FORWARD, and those that were part of the 
mobile insertions like “A” and “L” Groups.  The Detachment needed, however, to 
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expand its network to include daily exchanges with the U.S. Army and the British.  
Since no additional qualified Communications personnel were arriving from the United 
States, the Detachment trained the first complements of the Detachment 101 agent 
school as radio operators.  This allowed the group to expand its radio networks to 
encompass twenty-nine field stations by December 1943.174    
However, a dramatically overworked Communications and coding (or 
cryptography) staff was soon approaching its breaking point.  In one fifteen-day period 
in March 1943, the radio personnel of the Detachment handled 135 messages composed 
of 9,377 character groups—jumbled letter groups read as words when decoded.175  
Contact had been established with twenty-seven radio stations.176  By July, the message 
traffic had increased to an average of 25 messages and 1,200 groups a day, or for over a 
fifteen-day period, 375 messages with some 18,000 character groups.  Radio contact 
alone took fourteen-and-a-half hours a day.  This was in the most part accomplished by a 
single person as all the other radio operators were on operational assignments or training 
perspective agents.  Other Communications personnel at Nazira had to make do, and 
were working a daily schedule of between sixteen to eighteen hours.  This presented the 
potentially serious problem of leaving messages unanswered or a lack of proper 
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tradecraft as the Communications and coding personnel sought to cut corners in order to 
reply to all incoming messages.177   
In August, the group had a respite with the arrival of the monsoon and messages 
for the month slackened to 710 messages and 31,945 character groups.  At this time, the 
chief of the Communications Section estimated that he would need 145 personnel to 
handle anticipated post-monsoon operations.178  Yet, in September, only eighteen 
personnel—military and civilian—were available to cover the communications needs of 
Detachment 101 headquarters at Nazira.  All were working twelve to fifteen hours a day, 
seven days a week, and the pace of communications had increased to an average of more 
than forty messages a day.  This made a monthly average of 1,254 messages composed 
of 67,828 groups.179  By November, the group had their largest amount of traffic to date 
with 1,426 messages and 91,927 groups.180  This produced such a hardship on the 
Communications personnel that Detachment 101 decided to split its radio hubs.  
Thereafter, lesser volume transmitters were to transmit to a new training area set up at 
Gelakey to reduce the impact of the daily schedule on headquarters. 
The Detachment continued to improve its homemade radio equipment.  Field 
operations had shown that the ever-present high humidity caused condensation inside the 
sets.  Major Phillip Huston wrote in September 1943, "after a short time of non-use in 
this climate, [an iron power transformer] is so full of dampness that to turn the 
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equipment on for use is almost certain to burn out the transformer.”181  Not only did the 
sets have to be waterproof on the outside, but also as robust as possible on the inside.182  
The group received some valuable feedback from Milton, of “A” Group.  He relayed that 
not only did an operator have to be thoroughly familiar with how to fix their set, but also 
that the batteries had to be light enough to permit their being carried long distances 
through rugged terrain.183  In November, Detachment also received its first OSS-
produced radios, the SSTR-1 and SSTR-5 sets, as well as experimental charcoal burners 
to supply power.184 
Developing Liaison 
As will be recalled from the previous chapter, the personnel of “A” Group were 
surprised to learn of the Chindit operations already taking place in their operating area.  
With this experience, the Detachment learned the importance of developing closer 
liaison in its AOR, and learned that the most important liaison efforts were not 
necessarily with other special operations units.  By far, the most important liaison efforts 
that the Detachment developed in 1943 were with U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) units.  
On the surface, these efforts could be relatively mundane.  For instance, in November 
the 14th Air Force asked if the Detachment was doing anything to report on weather 
conditions.185  Eifler took notice and by December, Detachment 101 was using its agent 
and radio network to report weather information three times daily to the 51st Fighter 
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Group.  Detachment 101 also had placed an agent with a radio to overlook the Japanese 
airfield at Myitkyina.  This station reported the daily schedule of enemy planes taking 
off and landing.  Not only did this help to warn cargo aircraft flying the Hump, but it 
also helped ensure USAAF cooperation when a Detachment drop aircraft required 
fighter escort.186   
Detachment 101 took liaison a step further.  Under the direction of Major Aiken 
and Captain Chester R. Chartrand, the group set up an Intelligence Section that kept 
track of all the field intelligence reports received.187  They then routed individual reports 
to the appropriate end user, and produced a daily intelligence summary.  Originally, 
Detachment 101 intended the summary for outlying OSS groups, such as for what would 
become Detachment 505, Detachment 101’s supply and personnel processing depot in 
Calcutta, India.  The group later made it available to the British 14th Army.188  The 
demand for intelligence grew so that by September 1943, Nazira had two regular radio 
communication schedules with the British, four each with the U.S. Army and Air Corps 
warning networks, and with naval observers in China and India.  Eifler also maintained 
liaison with Stilwell’s headquarters at the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC). 189 
The local liaison efforts with the British continued to function well, but they 
were problematic at a higher level.  Eifler complained in July that while the British had 
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said that they would stop interfering in the operations of his unit, it was not true: “they 
were still interfering—the politicals now instead of the military.”190  The British were 
concerned with the nature of Detachment 101’s individual liaison efforts with specific 
British groups rather than through higher headquarters.  They reasoned that Detachment 
101 was purposefully doing this to divide any potential opposition, but in reality, Eifler 
did it for the sole reason that it was the most expedient process.   
It was left to the upper command to standardize liaison arrangements.  This was 
accomplished with the setting up of “P” Division, the mechanism through which all 
operations—SOE and OSS—had to be submitted for review.  “P” Division gave 
Detachment 101 greater visibility into what was occurring in theater.  The group now 
had access to the reports and lessons learned of SOE as it attempted to infiltrate agents 
into Burma.  However, there was a downside to “P” Division as it initially represented a 
desire of the British to bring Eifler’s unit under their control.191    
The arrangement of “P” Division was worked out at the QUADRANT 
conference at Quebec from 19-24 August 1943.192  According to the agreement, “P” 
Division was to be a joint Anglo-American panel to deconflict clandestine operations.  
Both the Americans and British were to have a maximum of three “voters” each and in 
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all cases an equal quorum.193  There would also be a Staff Officer Special Forces, who 
would coordinate SOE and OSS operations.  This staff officer was to be the British, and 
his deputy American.194  Having Detachment 101 subordinate to the British was not 
acceptable to either the OSS or Stilwell.195   
The initial efforts for “P” Division took place in New Delhi in late 1943.  The 
OSS representative, Lieutenant Colonel Richard P. Heppner, relayed Detachments 101’s 
operational plan to the assembled members on the “P” Division panel and, at times, the 
presented information could be very basic.196  Heppner, unlike the other American 
representative to “P” Division, took the view that the “P” Division agreement allowed 
for Detachment 101 to remain autonomous.197  He reasoned that Stilwell, as the NCAC 
commanding officer, was not under the direct direction of Lord Mountbatten, the South 
East Asia Command Commanding officer.198  The final arrangement was agreed upon 
when Donovan arrived on a site visit in November 1943.199  Thereafter, Detachment 
101, unlike Detachment 404, which would soon be set up in Ceylon, was not under 
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SEAC direction.  Detachment 101 would coordinate its operations with SOE, as Eifler 
had already agreed to do, but it would not be under SOE control.  In June 1944, Peers, 
then commander of Detachment 101, was named the “P” Division Coordinator for 
Burma, thereby allowing him total operational control over the AOR.200 
From Detachment 101’s perspective, the “P” Division arrangement was 
confusing and far from ideal.  Detachment 101—as well as Stilwell—feared that the 
arrangement was simply a veiled way for the British to control clandestine operations in 
north Burma.201  British actions enhanced this fear in the very first “P” Division 
meetings.  In early November, a senior American representative to “P” Division, 
Lieutenant Commander R.L. Taylor, wrote to General Wedemeyer about a potential 
“crisis in OSS relations with the British.”202  In a meeting, the British had not honored 
the terms of the “P” Division arrangement and, instead, had stacked up the British and 
Indian government representation to eight as opposed to three Americans.   
In this move, the British tried to force the OSS into an uncompromising position.  
An irate Heppner fired off a letter of complaint in which he called “P” Division a 
“committee [that] does not represent coordination of OSS but rather its complete 
subjugation.”  He further relayed, “I am a firm believer in team play and cooperation.  At 
the same time I possess a certain amount of pride in nationality which causes me to rebel 
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at treatment as manifestly arbitrary as this.”203  Even at lower levels, the “P” Division 
arrangement was confusing.  As late as December 1943, Peers, then the transitional 
commanding officer of Detachment 101 wrote, “the thing that is not clear in my mind is 
who is “P” Division?”204   
Despite this, cooperation between the Detachment 101 and the British continued 
at the local level.  The British opened up their arsenals and equipment stores for reverse 
lend lease.  In this manner, a representative from Detachment was able to visit the Small 
Arms Factory at Ishapore, India, to evaluate British clandestine-operations type 
weapons.  These results were due to the liaison Eifler had already achieved with SOE 
and its representative with Detachment 101, Wally Richmond, who continued getting 
additional British and Commonwealth personnel for detached service to Detachment 
101.205   
Supplies Remain a Problem 
As the Detachment continued to expand through 1943, supplies, which had been 
the critical link in 1942, continued to be tight.  To combat this situation, the unit detailed 
Lieutenant David E. Tillquist to Karachi in present-day Pakistan.  Detachment 101 
hoped that having a representative in this port city would help prevent losses of supplies 
intended for Nazira.  This was necessary as other units tended to paint out Detachment 
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101’s identifying mark—Task Force 5405-A—and substitute their own.  Peers stated to 
OSS Washington in July that it was best to ship equipment along with new personnel 
who could serve as escorts.  He wrote, “regardless of how carefully a box is marked, if 
the identification is ripped off, the box belongs to the first person to claim it.”206  A 
solution arrived at by the Detachment 101 supply officers was to have OSS Washington 
mark each crate coming into theater for Detachment 101 with a green diagonal cross.207  
This practice was refined and later applied as standard to all OSS shipping.208 
 OSS Washington still made supply mistakes that were difficult for Detachment 
101 to comprehend.  For instance, in July 1000 M-1 carbines arrived with only one box 
of ammunition.  This prompted an incredulous Eifler to reply, “The shipment of carbines 
was gladly received, but thus far, they are of little value as only one box of ammunition 
has arrived.  This ammunition is not available in this theater at present.”209   
Using the local economy for supply did not provide much relief either.  In June, 
Peers reported that the mark-up on food items commonly available in the United States 
was some 300 percent.  In the short time the Detachment had been in India, the price of 
rice had risen from $1.40 per eighty-pound bag to $11.50.210  In September, Peers 
reported that despite anticipating future needs, the local merchants’ prices “are just one 
leap ahead of us.  Most of their prices are beyond reason, but their attitude is one of 
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indifference, if you don’t pay the price, someone else will.”211  The increase in 
indigenous personnel added to the Detachment’s woes, because many recruits had 
unique dietary requirements.   
In August, supply problems had somewhat eased.  Captain Harry W. Little, the 
Detachment 101 supply officer in Calcutta, arranged for the group to draw supplies from 
U.S. Army Service of Supply (SOS) stocks.  While this helped with common food 
supplies and sundries, it did not alleviate all the Detachment’s needs.  Vehicles remained 
a problem and could not be obtained through local SOS connections.  By late 1943, the 
five jeeps that Detachment 101 had managed to bring with them in 1942 were all in need 
of extensive repairs, but there were no parts available.  Lack of communications 
equipment likewise remained a problem and as late as September 1943, Detachment 101 
could only outfit four agents because there were not enough batteries for their radios.212 
 The SOS connection also could not help Detachment 101 acquire mission-
specific items.213  Such items included oddities like .58 caliber model 1861 Springfield 
muskets, acquired in September 1943 for use by the Kachins, who preferred the single 
shot muskets to more modern weapons.214  Other items included OSS-produced articles 
developed by the Research and Development (R&D) Branch, whose existence was 
unknown to Detachment 101.  For instance, in September 1943, the unit only learned of 
a new OSS-produced medical kit after seeing one with a Navy lieutenant enroute to 
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China.  Until this time, Detachment 101 had been producing such kits in an ad-hoc 
fashion to supply to their agents.215  Thereafter, Detachment 101 requested notification 
of all OSS-produced equipment.  Field reports enhanced the need for these notifications.  
William C. Wilkinson, at FORWARD, said “there were many situations which showed a 
definite need for OSS special items,” which at the time, the group did not have.216 
November and December marked a dramatic improvement in the supply 
situation.  Washington was beginning to give the unit priority.  In one shipment alone, 
the group received a sixty-three foot boat and crew, four jeeps, the Field Photo unit and 
equipment, twenty additional personnel, and fifty tons of communications equipment, 
arms, ammunition, and rations.217  Reflecting on the increased operations tempo and 
attention from Washington, the unit reorganized the Supply Section into something more 
simple and efficient.  The first improvement was to build four supply warehouses.  The 
Section then categorized supplies into most-used and infrequently used items.  They 
placed the most frequently used items in the primary warehouse, which doubled as the 
Section office.  Another warehouse served as the receiving shed for new supplies, the 
third used for bulk and infrequently used items, and the fourth as the parachute packing 
facility.  The addition of five new personnel assisted operations and even permitted 
Peers the time to design and make an improved container for dropping supplies that was 
then manufactured in Calcutta and shipped to Nazira.218 
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New Additions to Detachment 101 
 The early operational failures in 1943 were most notable for the lack of organic 
transportation assets.  The Detachment had been unable to obtain aircraft for the simple 
reason that the War Department would not allow the OSS to ship planes directly to 
Eifler.219  Instead, they had to come out of Stilwell’s allotment.  Since Stilwell’s chief 
concern was to transport supplies over the Hump, the chance that the Detachment could 
draw an aircraft away from this was virtually nil.   
This problem began to be solved in June when the OSS-trained Free Thai group 
arrived in theater.  Originally assigned to Detachment 101, the OSS reassigned them to 
China just two weeks later.220  The unit brought three light planes with them, however, 
none of these planes could attain sufficient altitude to surmount the Hump.  The 
commander of the OSS Free Thai Unit, Lieutenant Nicol Smith, agreed to turn the 
planes over to Detachment 101 at Eifler’s insistence.221  At the end of October, the first 
dedicated pilot for Detachment 101, Sergeant George W. Stanford, was recruited and on 
his way from Washington.222  That month, the Detachment was also fortunate to pick up 
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a circa-1920s Gypsy Moth biplane.  This was a lucky occurrence as soon after its 
procurement, Eifler managed to crash a Piper Cub airplane behind Japanese Lines.223 
 Detachment 101 also received its first boats in 1943.  As early as July, Eifler was 
already discussing his specific needs for a fast “smuggler’s boat” with OSS 
Washington.224  In anticipation of receiving small boats, in September 1943, Detachment 
101 began construction of a small base at the mouth of the Brahmaputra River in 
India.225  The first boat—the Miami—a sixty-three foot air rescue boat, arrived on 23 
November.  It was readied over the next few days and then immediately pressed into use 
by Eifler in a successful mission to rescue nine crewman of a B-24 downed near 
Rangoon.  This action, though reckless, again ensured cooperation from a very grateful 
10th Air Force.226 
 Although not an internal capability, Detachment 101 gained one other valuable 
asset at the end of 1943.  Through their extensive liaison efforts with the USAAF and the 
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goodwill generated by the extraction of downed Allied pilots, Detachment 101 acquired 
increased use of C-47 cargo aircraft for airdropping operations.  This had an impact.  In 
September and October, Detachment 101 conducted only two airdrops, both to 
Operation FORWARD.  In November, Coughlin suggested that the Detachment form its 
own Air Operations Section and the group used the capability to handle an ever-
increasing tempo.227  The addition of parachute-qualified Lt. Thomas Riley further 
assisted operations.  Thereafter, the Detachment also made improvements to handle its 
supply requirements and tried to ensue that an OSS member was on each drop aircraft.228 
In November-mid December alone, the Air Operations Section of Detachment 
101 conducted eighteen airdrops, dropping some 84,000 pounds of supplies.  While 
some airdrops were conducted during the same sortie, this still represented a 900 percent 
increase over the previous two months.  Detachment 101 reported in December, “There 
is no doubt … that these services to the Air Corps are recognized … and the reason why 
we enjoy [their] full cooperation.”229  These airdrops, conducted with C-47s and proper 
drop crews represented a tremendous step for the group and a portent of how it would 
standardize its operations throughout the war.   
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 While Detachment 101 was becoming a more reliable organization that was 
poised to contribute significantly to the American effort against the Japanese in Burma, 
Eifler’s days with the unit were numbered.  One Detachment 101 member, in comparing 
Eifler’s leadership style to his successor, William R. Peers, described how each would 
demolish a building.  “Ray [Peers] would carefully remove each brick and end up with 
neatly stacked piles; whereas, Carl [Eifler] would get a Bull Dozer and level it -
 NOW.  Both would achieve the objective, but in a different manner.”230  This 
recklessness and impetuosity made Eifler unsuitable to remain in command.  As the unit 
gained more success, it needed its operations to work and to be a counted upon entity.  
Eifler’s lack of success in his pushing the long-range penetration operations gave an 
indication that the unit needed more careful operational planning.  Although Peers was 
speaking about a compromised mission, he could have been speaking about Eifler’s 
command style, “It seemed to me we were moving a trifle too fast … We were getting 
into something we were not yet prepared to do.”231 
In June 1943, Eifler asked Donovan to come out to evaluate Detachment 101, so 
that he could get a better understanding of Detachment 101’s problems and efforts.232  
Donovan came in November and immediately accepted Eifler’s invitation to visit one of 
the groups that was behind Japanese lines.  In a foolhardy move, they flew in the Gypsy 
Moth to visit KNOTHEAD.233  Afterwards, the OSS Chief ordered Eifler to relinquish 
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command for medical reasons and to return stateside to recover.234  Donovan briefly 
placed Coughlin in charge of Detachment 101 before turning it over to Peers.235 
Colonel Eifler had played a critical role in the Detachment.  He was impulsive 
and reckless, but he also set out to succeed regardless of the amount of effort required.  
His friendship with Stilwell had gained Detachment 101 a place in Burma and had 
allowed the unit to stay despite its early failures.  Largely through his unceasing liaison 
efforts, he had built the unit from nothing into a group capable of conducting shallow 
penetration operations and that was beginning to be in control of its own operational 
assets.  Under his direction, the group evolved from a Special Operations (SO) only 
function into one that was beginning to encompass other capabilities.  In particular, the 
Communications Section became critical to the functioning of the unit, and without it, 
the group would have been useless.  In addition, this Section was responsible for what 
was at first merely the forwarding of intelligence, to what later became collection.  As 
tactical intelligence became of importance to the USAAF’s bombing campaign, 
Detachment 101’s SO function became secondary.   
Given that Detachment 101 had stepped into a largely unknown operating 
environment—and was a pathfinder entity in its own right—ongoing operations shaped 
the group’s direction and it could only react to events as they occurred.  Yet, in this 
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critical period for Detachment 101, the group learned to capitalize on its strengths.  It is 
a direct result of the lack of direction from either Stilwell or Donovan that Detachment 
101, under Eifler’s direction, was able to achieve its new direction.  This next chapter 
will detail Peers’ initial efforts to meld Eifler’s with his own and to expand upon the 
size, structure, and utility of the Detachment.  The early months of Peers’ command 
would be critical as Detachment 101 braced itself for the Myitkyina Campaign.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
PEERS TAKES OVER:  DETACHMENT 101 COMES OF AGE:  JANUARY-
MAY 1944 
 
Colonel Eifler’s necessary initial audaciousness and recklessness of had gained 
Detachment 101 a foothold in the CBI, but Colonel Peers was responsible for reforming 
the unit into an effective organizer that enhanced the U.S. effort in the theater.  Like 
Eifler, Peers was largely left to his own devices in running the Detachment.  Colonel 
John G. Coughlin was the ranking officer in theater and technically Peers should have 
reported through him to Donovan.  But, according to Peers, Coughlin “gave me absolute 
free rein.”236 
Although taking much from his former mentor, Peers quickly phased out Eifler’s 
brash operational style.  These methods had left a mark on Detachment 101, but his 
legacy was not entirely good.  One visitor to Detachment 101 remarked immediately 
after Eifler departed that “Their attitude … is a bunch of desperados who know that 
sooner or later they are going to be hunted down but hope to sell their lives as dearly as 
possible when the time comes.”237  Instead, Peers replaced potentially high return but 
exceptionally risky operations focused on specific objectives, with ones aimed at four 
broader goals: secure information on Japanese military movements and intentions; locate 
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targets for the USAAF; rescue downed USAAF personnel; and foster guerrilla 
warfare.238  Peers transformed Detachment 101 into a far more reliable force that 
developed a reputation for doing the impossible.  This gave Stilwell great confidence in 
Detachment 101.  As one senior OSS observer remarked several months after Peers took 
over, “I do not think that the OSS could be in a stronger position in any theater than is 
the 101.”239 
Peers built on the reputation Eifler had established.  Although the majority of 
Eifler’s long-range penetration operations had been failures, the shallow penetrations 
had been successful.  Originally designed to be jumping off points for other operations, 
these shallow-penetration operations became ones upon which Peers could capitalize.  
Before he could do so, however, he needed to reform the Detachment’s force structure.  
Peers accomplished this by strengthening the core areas of personnel, schools and 
training, liaison, and communications.  He also sought to “get the organization 
decentralized” so that each unit could function more independently.  These efforts 
produced results, especially when supplemented by additional resources.240 
In February 1944, Stilwell decreed that the American personnel in the British V-
Force transfer to Detachment 101.  This gave Detachment 101 a trained cadre of five 
officers, thirty enlisted men, and forty Kachins.  Many of the Americans were on loan 
from the 988th Signal Service Battalion and were welcomed as additional radio 
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operators.  With the inclusion of the V-Force personnel, Detachment 101 gained much 
more than additional operational capacity.  Former V-Force personnel brought with them 
a great knowledge of the Burmese jungles and peoples.  This coincided with the 
establishment of an operations center at Nazira that helped coordinate the field groups 
and increased the utility of Detachment 101’s intelligence.  As the unit moved to support 
the Myitkyina Campaign, this cell assumed great importance.  First, however, the group 
had to reorganize before it could undertake an all-out effort in north Burma.241   
Elsewhere, Detachment 101 kept building its field units to increase their 
intelligence gathering and eventual guerrilla potential.  By January 1944, Operation 
FORWARD was observing all the roads north of Myitkyina and had agents working in 
Myitkyina and Bhamo.  Through these efforts, Detachment 101 was able to produce a 
detailed order of battle of the Japanese forces in the Myitkyina area by February 1944.  It 
was important that the unit had the time to learn the area and gain the trust of the local 
inhabitants, because they were in place to assist conventional Allied forces during the 
drive on Myitkyina.  Beginning in March, the OSS shifted its priority from supplying 
intelligence on the Japanese, to that of assisting Allied forces as they stove to secure 
north Burma and the eventual route of the Ledo Road.  This involved assisting both 
British Major General Orde C. Wingate’s Chindits and Brigadier General Franklin D. 
Merrill’s GALAHAD force. 
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After he returned from his initial Chindit expedition in 1943, Wingate set out to 
train a second force that he dubbed the “Special Force,” or “Long Range Penetration 
Groups.”  Although officially its six-brigades were known as the 3rd Indian Infantry 
Division, the force retained the Chindit name.  This second Chindit force entered Burma 
in two phases.  Brigadier General Bernard E. Fergusson’s 3,000-man 16th Infantry 
Brigade began walking into Burma on 5 February 1944.  They had a 360-mile march to 
their rally point at Indaw.  The main Chindit body was flown in gliders into a landing 
strip code-named BROADWAY, south of Myitkyina, during the night of 5 March as part 
of Operation THURSDAY.  Nearly 9,250 Chindits were landed deep behind enemy lines 
by the USAAF 1st Air Commando, a specially-created unit with fighters, light bombers, 
transports, liaison aircraft, gliders and helicopters.  Lieutenant Colonels John R. Alison 
and Philip G. Cochran formed the unit to resupply the Chindits and to evacuate their 
wounded and sick.   
Once in Burma, the Chindits met stiff resistance from the Japanese.  Shortly after 
Wingate died in a plane crash near Imphal, India, (24 March 1944) MG William Slim, 
the British 14th Army commander, transferred the force to General Stilwell.  They were 
to cut the Japanese lines of supply to Myitkyina from the south.  The light force took 
heavy losses but prevented enemy forces from reinforcing Myitkyina.  By the time the 
Chindits were withdrawn to India in August 1944, they had suffered 1,400 killed and 
2,500 wounded.242 
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Code-named the GALAHAD force, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), 
popularly known by the nickname Merrill’s Marauders, was led by Brigadier General 
Franklin D. Merrill.  It was essentially a regiment (about 3,000 personnel) commanded 
by a brigadier general.  It was a lightly armed force formed from volunteers, veterans of 
Guadalcanal and New Guinea, and jungle warfare specialists.  Like the Chindits, mule 
transport carried ammunition and food supplies.  Their airdropped supplies came from 
the 10th USAAF. 
The Marauders began their war in north Burma on 24 February 1944.  Their 
mission was to encircle the Japanese 18th Division because the Chinese divisions who 
had been fighting in the Hukawng Valley since October 1943, had proved unable—or 
unwilling—to do so.  The Marauders were to infiltrate behind Japanese lines to take 
them from the rear, while Chinese forces kept the main enemy force occupied.  
However, disease and combat severely weakened the Marauder battalions as they 
maneuvered behind enemy lines.  Before they captured the Myitkyina airfield on 17 May 
1944, they were already down to 50 percent effectives.  Marauders volunteers were also 
under the impression that after ninety days in the field they would be withdrawn.  
However, when the Chinese failed to capture the city of Myitkyina, Stilwell chose to 
keep his only American conventional force in the field.  By the end of May, the 
Marauders were evacuating seventy five to one hundred men daily because of disease.  
Stilwell admitted in his diary on 30 May that “GALAHAD is just shot.”243  That meant 
that the majority of the forces encircling Myitkyina were Chinese.  Detachment 101’s 
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actions in the campaign are the second case study and the subject of the following 
chapter. 
Existing Force Structure 
Although no longer commander, Eifler had not cut his ties to Detachment 101.  
He took his characteristic energy to OSS Washington, where he ensured that Detachment 
101 began to receive more personnel than ever before.  The additional personnel 
increased morale in Detachment 101.  The personnel most in demand at this stage were 
administrative, particularly typists, to generate reports, compile plans, and essentially to 
keep things running at Nazira.  Also needed were supply personnel, mechanics, and 
drivers.  Detachment 101 needed these rear-echelon troops to allow headquarters 
freedom to devote its efforts to driving operations.  The recruiting of indigenous agents 
continued unabated and Wally Richmond’s replacement, Major Coffey, recruited Anglo-
Burmese agents in Calcutta.  The largest remaining need was for medical personnel, with 
spaces available for twelve doctors and fifteen enlisted medics or pharmacists’ mates.244    
The operations of three sections in particular, the Maritime Unit (MU), Finance, 
and Field Photo, expanded rapidly in this period.  The fledgling MU Section was flush 
with their recent success of rescuing the nine aircrew downed deep over Japanese-
controlled waters.  The Section had ambitious plans and wanted to use the Miami as a 
training vessel and acquire two specially-modified PT boats and a forty-two foot launch 
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to conduct arms resupply, clandestine insertions, attack Japanese coastal traffic, and 
rescue work.245  But, by April 1944, the group managed to obtain just one other boat.    
Undeterred, the MU Section strengthened their relationships with the British 
maritime component of SOE and with the captains of smaller British naval vessels.  
These connections helped the OSS crews discover the pitfalls of navigating along the 
Burma coast and gave them access to current weather reports.  The group also 
discovered that there were no suitable locations for an MU base along the Indian or 
Burma coast during the monsoon season.  Ensign William Shepherd, the head of the MU 
Section, suggested that the group move to Ceylon, where the OSS was in the process of 
setting up what would become Detachment 404.246  Peers allowed the transfer, but 
expected the group to be back operating on the India/Burma coast after the monsoon was 
over.  Even though they would be co-located with another OSS group, the Section was to 
remain part of Detachment 101.247   
The Detachment’s Finance Section also saw increased activity and had the 
additional duty of accounting for the previous period.248  As an example, Gorin 
estimated the operations of FORWARD—employing 107 OSS and indigenous 
personnel—as requiring 9,000 rupees of new silver, 4,000 of old, fifty gold sovereigns, 
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and thirty sears [a seer is about two pounds] of opium.249  By May, the cost of operations 
had raised the cost of running the Detachment to some $150,000 per month.250  
Additional personnel allowed the Finance Section to once again reorganize to improve 
its efficiency.  One sergeant was in charge of being a cashier, another a disbursing agent, 
and still another, an accountant.  Showing a remarkable improvement, the greatest need 
facing the Finance Section was having enough office supplies.  
Field Photo also remained busy.  The group shot multiple rolls of film from 
behind enemy lines.  This was the start of a project to document the history of the 
Detachment.  They also began shooting motion pictures to send back to OSS 
Washington to be made into completed propaganda and training films.251   
The Detachment’s supply situation also improved.  One item that the Detachment 
received was vehicles, which were needed, as Peers claimed he had “probably the oldest 
running jeeps in India.”252  In January four new jeeps, three weapons carriers, two 
command cars, two trucks, a station wagon, a sedan, and a motorcycle were added to the 
motor pool.253  The additional vehicles created another headache, as they required scarce 
mechanics and non-existent spare parts.  Until these resources were available, there was 
no way to fix the vehicles when they broke down.  As Peers wrote to Donovan, “Our 
transportation is old and these roads simply beat them to death.”254 
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By February, supply problems had eased and the U.S. Army Services of Supply 
(SOS) provided items every two days by train from Calcutta or by truck from Chabua.  
Even so, some items remained hard to obtain, including ordnance, photographic 
materials, spare parts, generators, radio equipment, and specific OSS issue items.255  The 
acquisition of a warehouse in Chabua in April improved supply by allowing the 
Detachment to take advantage of the SOS stocks held there.  Even though Detachment 
101’s size and exact activities were a guarded secret, the unit reported that their supply 
requests to SOS were “deserving of attention and we usually receive their best.”256  By 
May, the chief medical officer at Nazira, Major Archie Chun-Ming, summed it up when 
he wrote, “We are still able to supply men in the field adequately in spite of the rapid 
expansion of personnel.  Our ability to do this can be credited to good planning.”257 
Supply at Nariza was one matter, but getting it to the field was another.  Captain 
Sherman P. Joost, newly in charge of the Detachment 101 Air Drop Section, reported 
that the facilities were “extremely inadequate,” but that “in all fairness … they being a 
new outfit … and already overburdened with their so-called regular customers,” that the 
Section was severely overworked.258  He reasoned that if Air Drop reduced its duties to 
just rigging parachutes to drop loads and preparing staples like rice, salt, and sugar, then 
the Section would run much more efficiently.  The Detachment also moved two officers 
and a radio operator to Dinjan Airfield to be collocated with the USAAF cargo 
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squadrons.  These officers were to secure aircraft, arrange flight schedules, brief the 
aircrews and pilots, put previously packed items on the planes, and accompany the 
drops.  This helped ensure that each group received their correct drop and that constant 
coordination was maintained with the two main units that helped in the Detachment’s 
dropping operations: the 2nd Troop Carrier Squadron and the Rescue Section of the Air 
Transport Command.259 
The Air Drop Section would soon have other things to worry about.  On 18 
January, the group experienced Detachment 101’s single worst disaster when three C-47 
cargo aircraft were lost while on a dropping operation to FORWARD.  A flight of 
Japanese Zeros pounced upon and shot down the aircraft, killing most of the aircrew and 
all of the OSS personnel.  This included a Navy pharmacist mate who was preparing to 
jump in, a Field Photo photographer, and the head of the Air Drop Section.260  The 
disaster had immediate consequences.  FORWARD did not get another supply drop for 
nearly a month, forcing them to live off the land.261  Even though supplies were low to 
non-existent, Luce continued providing medical care to the locals, accomplishing, in the 
words of another war, his best to win hearts and minds.  He reported that he was 
“astounded by the response of the natives to the advent of medical care” because they 
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acted as if it were only natural for the Americans to provide it.262  Additional food and 
medical drops covered the needs of hundreds of indigenous refugees who were fleeing 
from the Japanese advance in central Burma and away from the Allied offensive in north 
Burma.263 
Despite the work Luce was doing, his team could not work without supplies.  
Although the USAAF helped where and as often as they could, it did not meet all the 
Detachment’s needs.  Drops at this time averaged some 85,000 pounds a month with the 
realization that they would rapidly increase throughout 1944.264  By March, it had 
already risen to 137,057 pounds; April’s total was 200,000 pounds; and it rose to 
250,000 in May.265  This increase in available aircraft was helped by the Detachment’s 
contributions to the north Burma Allied offensive and its greater liaison efforts with the 
USAAF.  Peers knew that he could rely on limited cooperation from the USAAF, but 
that this had the possibility of becoming scarce as the campaign for Myitkyina started in 
full swing.  The Detachment estimated that it needs would be around 500,000 pounds 
dropped per month by September, so Air Drop became a primary concern.266 
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Even with the increased effort, some of the field groups were getting impatient 
with the Air Drop Section.  Complaints, such as this one from the field were common: 
“It should be logical enough to understand that a man who wears a 9 or 10 canvas shoe 
can not wear a 5 or 6 … I further suggest that the supply force try wearing shoes two or 
three sizes too small … I think it’s [sic] damn foolishness to drop a bunch of junk in the 
jungle that cant [sic] be used.”267  Major Raymond T. Shelby, in charge of the 
Operations Section at Nazira, responded with the following, “Don’t mind speaking your 
mind when you don’t receive specific quantities of food, equipment and so forth, give us 
hell … that is our sole existence to get you people what you need … so don’t spare us 
one minute … we don’t consider any of your requests or wires as complaints but as 
suggestions so we can more adequately serve.”268  Despite Shelby’s efforts, complaints 
continued; “every fucking time 30 Cal or .303 ammo is dropped … the opening shock of 
the chute rips open the container.  And we search the field for loose ammo.”269   
In February, Peers requested from OSS Washington the first heavy aircraft for 
the Detachment.  Although the Detachment had an allotment of twelve planeloads per 
month, the increased Japanese air activity had forced the supply drops to be done at 
night, and they required increased protection of anywhere from nineteen to seventy-four 
escort fighters monthly.  Peers requested that the OSS permanently assign an armed 
aircraft capable of dropping supplies to Detachment 101.  He wanted a B-25 medium 
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bomber, complete with operating and maintenance crews, and the possibility of a heavy 
B-24 bomber later.  He wrote to Donovan, “This may seem like we are asking a lot but 
when you are in an unarmed DC [C-47 Skytrain or DC-3] it is no fun, especially when a 
Zero shows up.”270  Although inadequate, Stilwell’s response was welcome.  He attached 
two USAAF C-47s for the “exclusive use” of the Detachment.271  The group also 
acquired three L-1 and one L-4 light planes, along with three pilots and a mechanic on 
loan from the 71st Liaison Squadron.  To assist airborne insertions, the group also 
opened a parachute school at Nazira.272 
To get groups into the field, however, liaison was of paramount importance.  
Throughout early 1944, Detachment 101 continued to strengthen its relationships with 
other commands.  Not only did the Air Transport Command (ATC) give the Detachment 
credit for the rescue of several airmen, but also the unit managed to score another coup.  
Through its intelligence network, Detachment 101 uncovered the existence of a Japanese 
radio station near Sumprabum that had been broadcasting false signals to lure American 
cargo aircraft off course so that they would fly into mountainsides.273  The ATC then 
briefed their pilots to avoid the trap.  In a further effort to help the ATC and the 10th 
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USAAF, in late February, Detachment 101 stood up the OSCAR group, whose primary 
purpose was the extraction of downed aircrews.274  The OSS’s plans to help in the north 
Burma campaign were finalized during Donovan’s earlier visit, after which Detachment 
101 sent the plans to “P” Division, the “clearing house” for special operations, for 
consideration.  Upon their clarification, Peers was ready to focus the Detachment’s 
efforts on this one goal by recruiting even more indigenous personnel, constructing more 
base facilities, and increasing training and liaison efforts.275 
While it had little else, Burma was not short of special forces.  Peers sought to 
establish liaison with every other unit of this type that was operating in north Burma.276  
The Wingate operation was an example that “P” Division was now functioning as 
intended.  Unlike their ignorance of the first Chindit expedition, Detachment 101 learned 
ahead of time that Wingate would lead a second expedition as part of a larger Allied 
campaign.  Not wanting to be again surprised, Detachment 101 made sure that they had 
liaison with Wingate.277  The Detachment also established contact with the 1st Air 
Commando’s commanders, Allison and Cochran.  Detachment 101 described the initial 
meeting with Cochran as “most pleasant and beneficial.”278  The unit then arranged 
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meetings with other Special Force commanders like with Colonel Frank Merrill, who 
had several representatives from Detachment 101 assigned to him.279  Detachment 101 
also established good relations with Colonel Joseph Stilwell, General Stilwell’s son, the 
Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) G-2 officer.280  By March, Peers was able to 
report, “our present set-up … is working very well, especially our relationship with 
Merrill and naturally with Combat Hq.”281 
In April, the unit formed addition relationships with various intelligence 
organizations, including the British forward interrogation center at Guahati, India, which 
held refugees and persons taken prisoner in Japanese-occupied territory.  This liaison 
enhanced the Detachment’s recruiting efforts.  Detachment 101 representatives also 
made contact with the British intelligence section at Agarapara, where they interred 
captured Japanese agents; the British Ministry of Information in New Delhi, which was 
involved in propaganda; and the Burma Police Intelligence section.282  These liaison 
efforts were some of the most important advances that Detachment 101 made in 1944.  
Through these connections, the group was able to ensure greater cooperation from other 
organizations, as well as tailor OSS support to their specific needs. 
Regardless of the help received, the Detachment still needed adequate 
communications.  Frustrations remained high with the lack of OSS commitment to the 
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Communications Section.  Peers wrote to John G. Coughlin in March that he did not 
think that OSS Washington understood the difficulties that Detachment 101 was having 
with its Communication Section, nor was it “interested in finding out.”  He went on to 
add that “I am fairly well perturbed at … having to do more signal work with less 
men.”283  The procurement and supply of radio equipment likewise remained a problem.  
In January, the lack of radio equipment was once again a limiting factor on how many 
agents Detachment 101 could place in the field.  Communications equipment was so 
difficult to obtain that Peers suggested that new personnel coming to Detachment 101 
not bring with them supplies of personal clothing—which could be obtained in theater—
but instead carry light radio equipment.284  By April, some of the communications items 
that the unit had ordered had not arrived despite a delay of eighteen months.285  The 
situation had somewhat eased in May, however, spare parts remained problematic.  The 
biggest problem then facing the Communications Section was a lack of suitable 
generators for field use.  This prevented using the OSS-produced SSTR-1 set in the 
field.286 
Compounded with the ever-increasing operational pace, the lack of 
Communications personnel likewise remained a difficulty.  In January, the Section 
reported that lack of personnel forced it to place half-trained indigenous operators on 
official circuits and let them finish their training—including in Morse code, “on the 
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job.”287  The next month, Peers was reporting that “our signal personnel is so limited at 
present time that the units we are furnishing information have assigned personnel to us 
to relieve the pressure.”288  The pace of the work continued to grow.  In December 1943, 
the Communications Section handled 1,571 messages with a total of 140,471 groups.289  
This was a new high for the group.  By May, the number of groups had exceeded 
200,000, up 24,000 from the previous month.290  To receive these messages, the 
Communications Section at Nazira had seventeen radio operators that handled the 
message traffic coming in from ten field operators/cryptographers and from the 
additional personnel posted in liaison positions.  These numbers, however, do not tell the 
complete story. 
In mid-February, KNOTHEAD reported that the group had spent five and half 
hours trying to pass traffic back to HQ.  They were likely the victims of a student trainee 
on the other end.  In exasperation, they asked for another radio operator, but were told, 
“there were none.”291  KNOTHEAD also reported that radio operators at Nazira often 
sent messages to the field that were undecipherable; and then did not stay on air to 
receive.  All these occurrences led to extreme frustration in the field.  This was 
compounded by new arrivals to the field groups who said that the locally-recruited radio 
trainees were reluctant to turn over their radios to a more skilled operator, less they 
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suffer embarrassment.  Instead, if overwhelmed, the operators would power down and let 
the follow-on operator receive the message.  Such methods were unacceptable. 
Despite KNOTHEAD’s subsequent recommendations, the Detachment had not 
solved the problem as late as February 1944.  Peers relayed that his Communications and 
subset Coding Sections were overworked, twenty-four hours behind in answering 
messages, and had committed a few potentially serious errors in missing replies to 
cables.  Peers understood that his Communications personnel were not lackadaisical, just 
seriously overworked.292  Regardless of the lack of personnel, the Communications 
Section had no choice but to transfer four of its radio operators to the Cryptography 
subsection.293  The creation of new facilities at Nazira, though an improvement, likewise 
exacerbated the personnel situation.  The increased traffic necessitated a new 
communications hut complete with improved facilities, receivers, and antennas.  The 
larger building allowed for the installation of new and more powerful transmitters.  
These in turn required the construction of two large antennas that would be of sufficient 
height to reach Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Chungking, China.  New generators and the 
laying of telephone and electric cable were also required.294  In an effort to build 
redundancy into its communications network, the Detachment also looked to older 
methods.  Having reasoned that past operations might have benefited from the 
capability, the group sought to have OSS Washington recruit a Pigeon Section.  This 
would allow agents to carry carrier pigeons with them on drops.  Should their radio not 
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survive the insertion, as was often the case, they would theoretically have other means to 
contact base.295   
New OSS Branches Arrive 
 January 1944 saw the inclusion into Detachment 101’s organization of the first 
non-direct action OSS branches, such as Morale Operations (MO), that represented 
functions not driven by immediate operational requirements.  Originally, under the 
Special Operations (SO) Branch, the OSS formed MO into a separate branch in January 
1943 to create and disseminate “black” propaganda.  Although in existence as a branch, 
the OSS did not finalize MO’s directive until later that year.  It had a correspondingly 
slow start and difficult time establishing itself overseas.  The Branch was in charge of 
subversion and psychological warfare activities on a theater-wide scale, and was 
authorized to conduct tactical propaganda with front-line units.296    
Following a plan approved by President Roosevelt on 26 May 1942, in June 
1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized OSS a black propaganda function in Burma 
that would serve to harass the Japanese, encourage Burmese national resistance, and 
prepare the way for Allied operations.297  However, the first attempt to add a true MO 
capability to Detachment 101 was a study paper authored by Lieutenant Commander 
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E.L. Taylor, USN, after Donovan sent him to the group on a fact-finding mission.298  
Although his proposals were overly optimistic, they made an impression on Peers.  He 
called for OSS Washington to send a dedicated MO officer and staff.  Peers envisioned 
the Branch as a “major unit” within the Detachment, but left it in MO hands to make 
their inclusion a reality.299  OSS Washington even had sample propaganda products for 
use in Burma, but could only forward them to the theater and hope that a staff that was 
untrained in their use or utility might employ them.300 
The MO Section of Detachment 101 was marked by the impermanence of its 
personnel.  The first representative of MO intended for Detachment 101 arrived in 
February, but stayed only long enough to recommend training programs for the jungle 
school.301  The next representative, Lieutenant Charles H. Fenn, intended to stay but 
higher authorities sent him to work in China.302  But, in the short time that he was at 
Detachment 101, he was a flurry of activity.  He managed to set up a short MO training 
segment with the school, effected a working arrangement with the Office of War 
Information (OWI), and made trips to both NCAC and to two OSS groups in the field.303  
                                                 
298
 E.L. Taylor to William R. Peers, “MO Possibilities and Needs at 101,” 2 January 1944, contained in 
Peers to Donovan, “Report Covering Period 14 December 1943,” 31 January 1944, NARA, and Taylor to 
Donovan, 9 January 1944, NARA. 
299
 Peers to Donovan, “Report Covering Period 14 December 1943,” 31 January 1944, NARA.   
300
 Edgar Sallinger to Harley C. Stevens, “Burmese Evil Spirits,” 20 March 1944, F 3, B 524, E 92, RG 
226, NARA.  In this case, the MO product was a sound device that emitted shrieks and wails.  The intent 
was to play on Burmese fears of jungle spirits.   
301
 Carleton F. Scofield to Herbert Little, 24 February 1944, F 24, B 191, E 92, RG 226, NARA. 
302
 See Charles Fenn, At the Dragon’s Gate:  With the OSS in the Far East (Annapolis MD:  Naval 
Institute Press, 2004) 15-19; Peers to Donovan, “Report Covering Period 1 February,” 29 February 1944, 
NARA. 
303
 OWI was charged with “white” or overt propaganda, while MO was responsible for “black” 
propaganda—in which the true source is hidden; Peers to Donovan, “Report Covering period 1 April,” 30 
April 1944, NARA, and Charles H. Fenn to Harry W. Little, “MO Operations From 101,” 10 April 1944, 
F 4, B 192, E 92, RG 226, NARA.  A brief account of Fenn’s trip into KNOTHEAD can be found in 
“KNOTHEAD Group-Report April,” 1 April 1944, F 433, B 29, E 154, RG 226, NARA. 
  
129 
In this last capacity, he gave a brief on MO’s utility, passed out examples of leaflets, and 
suggested rumors that groups might spread among the population.   
Under the arrangement enacted by Fenn, OWI agreed to begin producing 
propaganda pamphlets and leaflets for MO, as at the time the OSS had no production 
facilities of their own.304  MO derived the source material for their products from the 
debriefing of captured Japanese soldiers.  The resulting products aimed at driving 
wedges between the ethnic groups in Burma and the Japanese.305  One product depicted 
a Burmese knifing a Japanese soldier in the back.  Written in Japanese on the leaflet 
were phrases telling the Japanese how much they were hated, including “We shall kill 
you, the ants will eat your flesh, the jungle will swallow your bones.”306  Other leaflets 
told of the depredations the Burmese resistance was inflicting upon Japanese supply 
lines, even though nothing outside of that set up by the Kachins actually existed.  MO 
sent these products to the groups behind the lines for dissemination.  Fenn also used 
another MO specialty; starting rumors whose sole purpose was to erode enemy 
morale.307  He also had plans to enlarge MO by five personnel, including direct liaison 
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with NCAC and OWI.308  Upon Fenn’s leaving, however, MO was in essence no longer 
present in the Detachment.   
In January, the first representative of the Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch 
made his way to Detachment 101 for a familiarization visit.309  This branch was one of 
the original branches formed by the COI/OSS.  It employed personnel with research 
backgrounds—such as historians—and was designed to collect and analyze information.  
It would then present these findings in formal reports delivered to senior policy makers.  
With its inclusion in Detachment 101, R&A made the transition from strategic level 
intelligence to providing tactical level products for an immediate consumer.310 
In February, the group established regular contact with the main R&A office in 
New Delhi.311  In turn, this office furnished a liaison officer to Detachment 101, 
Lieutenant Charles Stelle, who the OSS sent to be the liaison officer for Wingate.  
Before being so assigned, however, he presented a case study for how R&A might be of 
use to Detachment 101, and in particular, to the Secret Intelligence (SI) Section.  
Impressed with SI’s weekly summary, Stelle saw that it could be improved with the 
addition of R&A officers who would cross-reference Detachment 101 reports with 
intelligence from other sources, such as open source materials.  The result would be all-
source intelligence reports.  Stelle saw additional ways that R&A personnel could help 
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Detachment 101 better utilize its intelligence collection.  He proposed forming an R&A 
section that could have an impact on a tactical and theater level, by assisting in imagery 
analysis, cartographic support, compiling thematic intelligence reports, debriefing OSS 
personnel when they returned from the field, prisoner interrogation, liaison, training 
personnel in intelligence collection, and operational planning.312 
 There remained deficiencies at the Detachment.  The group had striven so hard to 
improve its operational capacity that it ignored the mundane.  As evidenced in the 
reduced length of reports following Eifler’s departure, there were critical shortages of 
staff personnel, such as typists, to handle clerical matters.313  The increasing number of 
intelligence reports also meant that a standardized way of evaluating raw human 
intelligence was necessary.  Many of the intelligence  reports came from locally 
recruited agents, who tended to exaggerate the numbers of Japanese personnel.  By 
January 1944, the Detachment was expecting the arrival of OSS personnel to sift 
through, evaluate, and compile the reports.314   
 Although merely a renaming of the functions already being performed by Majors 
Robert T. Aitken and Chester R. Chartrand, the SI Section was first mentioned by name 
in January.315  The Section was to be responsible for providing the first evaluation, 
analysis, and dissemination of intelligence reports, and secondly, to act as a security 
manager.  In this first role, Detachment 101 made a truly a bold move and employed a 
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practice that is standard today.  Although it needed more personnel to accomplish its 
plans, the group set out in its first attempts to determine the intelligence needs of other 
organizations, as opposed to merely sending along reports as they came in from the field.  
The SI Section reorganized the Detachment’s intelligence collections into a series of 
eight geographic areas that allowed the SI Section to determine what intelligence report 
might best fit which non-OSS end user.  The more concise reports were considered so 
useful and the intelligence so unique that, in addition to receiving the daily radio 
broadcasts, NCAC detailed a plane each week to pick up the summaries.316 
Detachment 101 would also hold a conference with these intelligence consumers 
to find out their specific needs.  This enabled the Detachment to avoid forwarding 
intelligence that would be of little utility to a particular organization while at the same 
time, trying to focus on that organization’s unique requirements.  To enhance the 
usefulness of the intelligence reports, Detachment 101 would use standard U.S. Army 
classification meanings as opposed to those of the OSS or British.317  In an additional 
effort to increase the utility of its intelligence, the SI Section established a forward radio 
operator at Fort Hertz who could transfer information back to Nazira immediately.  The 
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SI Section also sought to analyze captured Japanese equipment, examples of which the 
filed groups sent back to Nazira.318  
The second role for SI, of security, was a foreshadowing of what the OSS X-2, or 
counter-intelligence branch, would later perform.  Peers cited the lack of physical 
security as one of his chief concerns when he took command of the unit.  Nazira alone 
had twenty-seven camps spread over an area of forty square miles and only forty-five 
Gurkhas available as guards.  The SI Section proposed a guard, or ground defense force 
that would supplement the Gurkhas and also conduct regular patrols against enemy 
agents.  They would also have a pure counter-intelligence role in which they would work 
to uncover any subversion from within Detachment 101 itself.  But, in common with 
other sections, the SI Section’s personnel situation would not permit expansion.319   
As opposed to the SI role, the other main function of Detachment 101 was 
Special Operations (SO).  The element received a makeover in March when the group 
began to create an Operations Section.  Peers had not been pleased with what he thought 
was disorganization under Eifler.320  Instead, he wanted a central staff, under Major 
Raymond T. Shelby, that was responsible for handling each group’s needs.  Shelby’s 
first action was to meet with the commanders of other units with whom Detachment 101 
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had liaison, namely, the aviation units.  Their reception was favorable and these groups 
pledged assistance to Detachment 101 when possible.   
Peers also ordered the reorganization of the field operations and the 
decentralization of Nazira’s control.  It was, according to Peers, “perhaps the biggest 
single step taken by 101 toward the improvement and expansion of operations during the 
entire Burma campaign.”321  Instead of staging individual operations, as had been the 
case under Eifler, Peers split the north Burma area of operations (AOR) into four sub-
areas.  Each area had a commander, who then had a number of sub-units under their 
control.  Area commanders were responsible for operations in their sub-areas, and served 
as the first filter for intelligence reports and radio communications.  This greatly eased 
command and control as, in large part, Peers only had to direct Area commanders as 
opposed to a myriad of smaller groups.  In turn, the Area commanders had greater 
responsibility and latitude in directing operations.  Although Nazira still handled the 
communications from the long-range agents, the new arrangement clearly signaled a 
shift in Detachment 101’s operation to the shallow penetrations as opposed to the long-
range operations favored by Eifler.  In a nod to the growing importance of the 
Operations Section, in March Stilwell directed Peers to increase the number of his 
indigenous troops to 4000.  Stilwell also directed that the contingent of Americans in V-
Force become part of Detachment 101.322  This was a boost for the Detachment.  Not 
only did they get experienced personnel, but they also gained from their operating 
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methods and information networks.  This immediately had an impact as the former V-
Force area in which they worked was now codenamed Operation TRAMP, and their 
operations covered the India/Burma border in north Burma.  Combined with 
FORWARD, KNOTHEAD, and PAT, TRAMP created a fourth operating area for the 
Detachment.   
Conclusion 
Peers’ spring 1944 reorganization strengthened barely functioning sections, such 
as Finance and Air Drop, and allowed the group to incorporate new OSS assets.  The 
creation of an Operations Section allowed the unit to coordinate its groups effectively 
and better develop standard operating procedures.  The establishment of a central 
intelligence staff allowed the group to evaluate, analyze, and disseminate its profuse 
intelligence collection to the best end user.  While some OSS Washington had not yet 
introduced some of its branches to Detachment 101, others, like MU and MO, remained 
unproven.  Nonetheless, they tried to integrate themselves into the unit.  MU in 
particular, had gotten off to a great start, but weather and a lack of proper staging 
facilities had slowed its growth.  The role of MO, which remained unproven throughout 
the OSS, was more problematic.  While its ideas—and the promises—were great, the 
results were not.  It is important to note, however, that the inclusion of MO meant that 
the Detachment was able to look beyond its immediate tactical needs and now delved 
into operations that might not have an immediate return.   
The reorganization also allowed greater reflection on the Detachment’s role in 
the Burma campaign.  As Major Shelby, the Operations Officer put it in March, 
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“Colonel Peers has for a long time been forced to run the ‘Show,’ by himself, but now 
that a few new officers have been assigned to him he is setting the organization up as a 
Battalion, with different sections and that is going to relieve his mind for the ‘Big,’ 
picture.”323  Peers was moving as rapidly as possible to incorporate new OSS branches 
into the Detachment 101 force structure to give the unit greater utility.324  He wrote back 
to OSS Washington in May, telling a prior visitor who had come to the Detachment 
when Eifler had been in charge, “You would never recognize the unit at present.”325  In 
this, Peers was correct.  The next chapter will detail the organization as it moved into the 
period from June though August 1944. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
PEERS CONTINUES HIS REFORMS:  JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
 
 Although the Myitkyina Airfield was now in Allied hands, the Myitkyina 
campaign had entered an unplanned phase when the Chinese had filed to capture the 
airfield.  This meant that Detachment 101 had to be even more flexible and do all that it 
could to help.  This forced Peers still to envision how to position his unit to keep it 
relevant.  His efforts centered on transforming Detachment 101 into an even more 
effective tactical intelligence collection and guerrilla warfare organization.  Once again, 
Detachment 101 headquarters experienced the greatest change.  The early part of the 
year had seen the critical reorganization of the core sections of the Detachment, as well 
as the inclusion of new OSS branches.  Detachment 101 could now begin greater 
integration of the remaining OSS branches present in Washington.  In theory, they would 
improve the unit’s ability to wage war against the Japanese in Burma.  This was timely 
because the war was taking a turn for the Allies. 
 By June, the Allies had the Japanese besieged in Myitkyina.  Merrill’s 
Marauders, also know as the GALAHAD force, and the Chinese were doing their best to 
seal off the Japanese garrison there from outside assistance.  The Marauders, like the 
British Chindits, were one of General Stilwell’s few reliable units.  Even though they 
had suffered tremendous casualties just in getting to Myitkyina, Stilwell used them long 
after they had ceased to be operationally effective.  Like the Chindits, the Marauders 
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never forgave Stilwell.  Some 2,600 mostly green replacements with minimal training—
derisively dubbed “New GALAHAD”—was flown in to fill out the unit.  They too 
suffered heavy casualties from disease and the Japanese.  By the time Myitkyina fell on 
3 August 1944, the Marauder battalions were down to company-size.  As such, the 
5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was inactivated on 10 August 1944.  At the same 
time that the Marauders were helping to secure Myitkyina, the Chindits were working 
south of the city to cut Japanese movement along the rail lines leading north.  The light 
force suffered heavy losses but prevented enemy forces from reinforcing Myitkyina.  By 
the time the Chindits were withdrawn to India in August 1944, they had suffered 1,400 
killed and 2,500 wounded out of 12,000 that had gone into the field.    
Specifically for Detachment 101, the OSS had aided Merrill’s Marauders in their 
effort to secure the Myitkyina airfield in May.  Since the Allied conventional forces were 
unable to secure the city, Detachment 101 units slipped south.  They did this to get 
farther behind Japanese lines.  There they disrupted the enemy’s rear areas, and cut 
Japanese lines of communication to Myitkyina.  The Detachment’s emphasis on guerrilla 
warfare meant that the unit’s focus on intelligence decreased.  The Detachment’s efforts 
from February through August 1944 in the Myitkyina Campaign are the second case 
study, and are discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
Existing Force Structure 
The existing elements of Detachment 101 did not remain static.  In the period 
from May to August 1944, the operational elements underwent some of their most 
dramatic organizational shifts of the war as they rapidly became a crucial part of the 
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Allied effort.  Other elements were not so readily integrated.  Although the Morale 
Operations (MO) Section made progress, it continued to have significant problems.  The 
OSS chiefs in Southeast Asia (Peers, Colonel John G. Coughlin, Major Harry W. Little, 
and Colonel Richard B. Heppner) arrived at an agreement in May that the first MO 
printing press would go to Calcutta, where Detachment 101’s supply center was 
headquartered.  Getting the equipment and personnel was another matter.  By July, the 
OSS had identified several officers for the post, but secured none.  At that same time, 
and indicative of the lack of effort shown by OSS Washington, Calcutta learned that they 
were finally to get MO items ordered more than six month previously.  By August, the 
additional personnel still had not arrived, even though plans were made for groups of 
Japanese Issei [first-generation Japanese immigrants to the United States] to go to 
Calcutta for translation work on MO material.326   
While plans—even if delayed—were in place to establish MO at Calcutta, the 
branch remained nearly non-existent at Nazira.  It had not had continuity of personnel or 
direction.  The Detachment 101 MO Section’s third director in seven months, Robert 
Wentworth, had no background in the field.  OSS Washington recognized that any MO 
personnel sent to Nazira needed to be for the duration and not as temporary fill-ins.  OSS 
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Washington had created a MO unit specifically for Detachment 101 code named the 
“GOLD DUST team,” but it remained in training.  It would not arrive until late 1944.327   
At Nazira, frustrations with MO were high.  Wentworth wrote to his Detachment 
303 counterpart, Elizabeth P. MacDonald, “Frankly the whole MO show at Detachment 
101 has been completely muffed by the powers that be back in Washington in that they 
neglected to fill all their promises for both men and material.”328  He later cynically 
wrote, “Due to a lack of personnel and equipment MO activities at Detachment 101 
continue to revolve on the problem of how to get things done with only a typewriter.”329   
The relationship had also soured with the Office of War Information (OWI).  
While willing to print one or two leaflet products a month for the OSS when they were 
not busy on another project, OWI was wary of these leaflets being traced back to their 
source.  Even so, just to arrange for the printing of one leaflet, the OSS personnel had to 
drive some five hours to reach OWI.  In an effort to assist, the MO section in New Delhi 
[Detachment 404] reached out and offered to produce propaganda products for 
Detachment 101, as long as Nazira told them what the Section needed.  Though it could 
not solve all of the Section’s needs, the offer was one of the first examples of OSS 
branch inter-theater cooperation.330 
The Detachment 101 MO Section tried to capitalize on sample leaflets and rumor 
suggestions sent from OSS Washington.  This Section sent out questionnaires to the field 
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to determine their needs and what kind of products might best work.  New personnel 
arriving to the Detachment were given a one-hour lecture on the utility of MO 
products.331  This lecture had the alternate purpose of trying to get non-MO personnel to 
think of possibilities they might encounter that might make for good MO material.  The 
MO staff followed up their previous lecture with another quick briefing just prior to 
personnel going into the field.  In July, the responses came back from the questionnaires 
sent into the field.  The MO Section received requests for specific products only from 
the groups that the Section briefed on MO methods.  The groups that had been in the 
field longer, like FORWARD, were much slower in responding.  Clearly, from the MO 
perspective, their limited briefing of personnel before they went into the field was 
having an effect.332   
The MO Section had to deal with a number of problems.  Black propaganda was 
not too effective in the area where Detachment 101’s teams were operating, as the 
populations were already largely friendly toward the Allies.  The MO Section sought 
additional opportunities to expand its liaison efforts with OWI, because many of the 
products that could be used in north Burma were white propaganda.  An example of this 
occurred when a field team requested that MO produce a leaflet aimed at trying to keep 
the local population from moving south with the retreating Japanese.  By August, MO’s 
situation was becoming worse.  The Section was barely functioning and was not 
providing much assistance to the field units.  Peers was completely disenchanted, and 
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wrote to Donovan: “the confusion created by this one branch has been greater than all 
the other branches combined and despite all promises to better the situation it has had a 
turn for the worse.”  He further insisted, “An officer for Morale Operations must be sent 
to this theater at once if that branch is to be represented at Detachment 101.”333    
The Secret Intelligence (SI) Section was even worse off than MO.  The Section 
had all but been dissolved and its functions relegated to other sections.  Its security 
function split off in July to form its own section, which assumed the duties of vetting 
indigenous personnel, counter-intelligence, censoring letters, securing classified 
material, fire prevention, and physical security of the Detachment’s facilities.  SI’s 
intelligence gathering function had already been absorbed by SO SI’s intelligence 
function was given over to Research and Analysis (R&A), which was coming into its 
own as an OSS-unique function embedded in Detachment 101’s force structure.  In June, 
R&A served to edit and route on intelligence material received from the field.  The 
Section then encompassed the reports in the weekly intelligence summaries, used them 
to make maps of enemy positions, and to brief new arrivals to Detachment 101.  
Additionally, the team completed surveys of roads in Burma, and passed them to the 
field.  The group also served a strategic function.  For instance, in July it answered 
eleven requests for information and prepared twenty-one maps to send to OSS 
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Washington.334  Other OSS branches also brought Detachment 101 to Washington’s 
attention. 
Back in Nazira, Field Photo was hard at work.  They were continuing work on 
several films, including the Myitkyina campaign, and individual photographers were 
recording multiple aspects of the struggle.335  To further speed production, Field Photo 
began work on building a dark room in Myitkyina that would be capable of processing 
and printing still photographs.  Such documentation helped to show OSS Washington the 
efforts begin put forth by Detachment 101 and the environmental difficulties of 
operating in Burma.  On the operational side, Maritime Unit (MU) and Field Photo 
jointly conducted Operation SUGARLOAF II in June.  It was a seaborne reconnaissance 
of Simalur Island off Sumatra, their first Ceylon-based mission.336  
Detachment 101 enhanced field supply operations by establishing a supply depot 
at Taro in the TRAMP area of operations and planned to make Myitkyina a supply base 
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for the storage of radio spare parts.  In June, the unit sent two personnel to the airstrip to 
establish a cache for supplies that could not be dropped into the field because of weather 
or enemy activity, rather than have full planes return their loads to Dinjan.337  They were 
able to enhance the amount of supplies able to be to groups in the field.  In July, the 
USAAF allotted Detachment 101 the daily equivalent of 2.3 planeloads of supplies out 
of their main airfield at Dinjan.338  With the Myitkyina arrangement, and if the weather 
allowed, additional trips—that did not count toward the daily quota—could be 
conducted.  However, since the fighting from May to August 1944 had largely destroyed 
Myitkyina, a large forward base could not be maintained there.  In order to build up 
stocks of critical items back at Nazira, the group once again resorted to the tactic of 
having incoming personnel individually carry items that they then turned over to supply.  
Although ad-hoc, the method worked once again.339 
The increase in the operational tempo since the beginning of the year and the end 
of the monsoon meant that the pace of airdrops would increase.  The number of aircraft 
allowed the Detachment was not enough to support the growing necessity, leading the 
group to request more carrying capacity.  In July alone, the group dropped 310,000 
pounds of supplies into the field, requiring sixty C-47 loads and four from B-25s.340  
Despite the monsoon rains, August provided no let-up with 650,000 pounds of supplies 
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dropped out of Dinjan and another 200,000 out of the advance airbase at Myitkyina.  
This required 102 C-47 flights and five of B-25s.341  As can be seen from this number, 
the USAAF’s commitment to Detachment 101 was not small, nor was the overall cost of 
the groups operations insignificant.  The fast pace of drop operations did have some 
impact in the field as one man reported that “machine guns were dropped without ammo 
belts, [submachine guns] without magazines … valuable equipment was destroyed in 
drops because of careless packing.”342   
Ironically, the tempo of operations and the rapid pace at which the Allies were 
pushing forward in Burma made the Finance Section’s job easier.  While they had to pay 
a much larger number of local recruits, the Allied advance made the previous form of 
payment, pre-war rupees, no longer as critical a necessity.343  Nevertheless, the cost of 
operations had increased by August to 470,000 rupees or nearly $200,000, and it became 
necessary to forward base a finance officer at Myitkyina so that the pay of the 
indigenous recruits could be more effectively and speedily handled.344   
In terms of personnel, the Detachment was in better shape that it had ever been.  
OSS Washington was ensuring that even with the “D-Day pressure on the European 
Theater” that it was doing everything possible to keep men flowing into the 
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Detachment.345  The personnel situation had so improved that in June, Peers was 
imploring OSS Washington only to send him men that were adequately trained and 
physically able to handle the vigor of fieldwork in Burma.  This was very different from 
1943 when the Detachment was begging for personnel of any type.  In parachute-
qualified personnel alone, it had twenty officers and nine enlisted men.  This was eight 
more than was available to the entire Detachment for most of 1942.  In July, the table of 
organization and equipment of the unit stood at 124 officers, 322 enlisted men, and 210 
civilians serving at headquarters.  This does not count the several thousand indigenous 
troops and agents serving in the field.346  This is a dramatic contrast for a unit that had 
arrived in mid-1942 with only twenty-one men, but some deficiencies remained.   
One significant problem for the Detachment was its lack of pilots for the liaison 
aircraft.  In August, the unit only had two pilots—and seven aircraft.  A few additional 
pilots were on detached service from the 71st Liaison Squadron, but they could be 
withdrawn at any time, and, as a result, the Detachment continued to press OSS 
Washington for more pilots.347   
Local recruitment netted additional personnel.  To better help secure agents, 
through its liaison efforts, Detachment 101 secured access to intelligence dossiers 
complied by the British.  The OSS then used the dossiers to vet potential agents for both 
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Detachments 101 and 404.348  The system was first put to use on a large scale in August 
when Detachment 404 requested that Detachment 101 assist with the recruitment of 
ninety Gurkha guards and six indigenous personnel for operations.  In addition, the 
group was in the midst of processing seven agents for Detachment 101, nine for 
Detachment 404, and seven for the Calcutta office.349  Before the OSS even approached 
these potential recruits, undercover agents had already investigated their backgrounds.  
They tried to ensure that the potential recruits were not Japanese agents and that they 
were willing to conduct operational parachute jumps.350     
Having more personnel required that the Detachment ensure that they were taken 
care of properly.  In July, the unit requested that it needed ten additional clerks just to 
cover the administrative needs and the “tremendous amount of paperwork” of the 
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incoming personnel.  To see that the personnel had their professional needs catered to, 
the group established a citations and promotions board that held its first meeting in 
August.  This provided a formal way to evaluate personnel and a way to see that 
individuals received recognition.  It was a major improvement as under Eifler’s 
command, the lack of promotion for field personnel was a significant source of poor 
morale.351   
The third change needed was for upgraded medical facilities.  At the time, Peers 
estimated that there was a twenty-five percent decrease in efficiency because of 
illness.352  In July, the group was making plans for the establishment of a fifty-bed 
hospital facility that had surgical, convalescent, laboratory, dental, and X-ray 
capabilities.  One of the main reasons for this expansion was to better care for the 
increase in malaria cases that more personnel would create.  The lack of medical care 
already shortened to seven the number of days that the staff could devote to each patient, 
from the necessary ten.353  To oversee the building and running of the large facility, 
Peers recalled James C. Luce from command of FORWARD.  Once again, he proved 
instrumental.  Through his connections, he secured several Burmese nurses that the 
famed Burma surgeon, Gordon Seagrave had previously employed.  In the time prior to 
the hospital’s completion, Luce instituted strict methods to prevent malaria infection.  
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This included filling in gullies to eliminate breeding grounds and enforcing greater 
precautions after dusk to prevent mosquito bites. 354 
Like operations, the Communications Section was also in a much better position.  
The Section simplified the ciphering of messages in such a way that receiving and 
transmitting communications became easier and faster.  Even so, the Cryptographic 
subsection handled 235,000 message groups in August.355  In line with improvements in 
encryption, the Communications Section as a whole reorganized.  It pushed to Gelakey, 
India, the communications duties of several field stations, as well as reorganizing the 
way that it handled field communications.  The Section installed a larger transmitter at 
Nazira, which permitted the section to maintain contact with “all stations regardless of 
conditions.”356  Although there was still a shortage of spare parts for field sets, supply 
was somewhat alleviated through coordination with the U.S. Army Signal Corps and an 
arrival of supplies from OSS Washington.  The situation had so improved that August 
was the first month since 1942 that the Communications Section reported that it had 
enough sets to supply field needs.357  Other sections also tried to improve their utility. 
The Schools and Training Section sought a link with Special Operations (SO) by 
debriefing individuals returning from the field, and where possible, incorporating the 
results into training.358  Troops arriving from the states were conditioned during a two-
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week introduction and field instruction course, which incorporated the lessons that the 
Detachment had learned in the field.  This course gave every new recruit a window into 
each section of the Detachment 101 organization, the ethnicities of Burma, and a general 
idea about how to live in the field.  A multi-day jungle hike capped off the course, in 
which students would have to live off the land under field conditions.  If possible, the 
training group arranged a supply drop while out on the hike, thereby doing as much as 
possible to prepare their students for when they actually went to their respective 
operations.  Detachment 101 considered this course crucial because the staff did not 
think that the normal OSS training was adequate.  Peers wrote to Donovan that he 
wished to discuss the matter with him when he visited OSS Washington in September.  
Specifically, he mentioned that a parachute group undergoing training at one of the main 
OSS bases located at Catalina Island, California, would “be in for a rude awakening 
when they hit Burma.  The terrain at Catalina is no more comparable to the jungles of 
Burma than Central Park is to a sand lot.”  He suggested that the closest one could get to 
simulate the terrain of Burma in the U.S. was to conduct training in the Everglades or the 
Mississippi bayous.359   
New OSS Branches Arrive 
On 30 May 1944, a recovered Eifler briefly returned to Detachment 101, 
officially for the purpose of showing off newly-produced OSS specialized equipment.  In 
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reality, he was on a recruiting trip to identify personnel for a new secret mission, the 
Field Experimental Unit (FEU).  This was a new group that was to carry out special 
assignments under Donovan’s direction.  Instead of introducing Research and 
Development (R&D) devices to the Detachment, Eifler took with him some of its most 
experienced men.  It was not until the next month that the first true personnel of the 
R&D Branch arrived at Nazira.360   
Although other branches like Communications and MU participated in the 
development of their own specialized equipment, R&D was an OSS-specific branch 
whose purpose was to develop or contract for specialized weapons and equipment for 
guerrilla warfare, special operations, and clandestine intelligence collection.  The Branch 
was also charged with keeping track of potentially useful equipment developed by non-
OSS organizations.  This specialized equipment was of most interest to the SO and SI 
Branches, and, in popular culture, was much like “Q” in the James Bond series.  It was 
formed as an independent branch on 17 October 1942, but it was not until April 1944 
that representatives first went to overseas positions.361   
R&D got off to a quick start at Detachment 101.  With only a two-man staff, the 
Section laid plans to assist the field groups.  They established a laboratory and used it to 
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help tackle the problem of how to camouflage radios and equipment so that they might 
be of more use.  In August, the R&D staff was capable enough to develop items for the 
Air Drop and MO Sections of Detachment 202.362  Items included a booby-trapped 
exploding parachute container that would appear to have been accidentally dropped to 
Japanese troops.  The R&D Section’s only comment on the item was “Won’t they be 
surprised!”363  Other weapons undergoing testing included an adapter that would allow 
the M-3 submachine gun to shoot rifle grenades and explosive fake firewood that could 
be infiltrated into the fuel stocks used by enemy locomotives.  The staff, increased to 
five by August, provided the additional service of teaching a short class to incoming 
personnel. 
Other new branches, such as X-2, the OSS counter-espionage Branch, were not 
as well received at Detachment 101.  Peers wrote back to OSS Washington that “so far” 
the Section “has done more harm than good.”364  The beginning of X-2 was with the 
British.  They had agreed to provide the OSS copies of their counter-espionage files and 
to train agents.  In return, the OSS had to form an organization capable of greater 
security and stricter handling of classified information.  As a result, the OSS established 
the Counter-Intelligence Division of SI on 1 March 1943.  Having counter-espionage 
under SI was not completely satisfactory, so on 15 June 1943, the OSS established X-2 
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as a separate branch.  In part, this separation from SI allowed cooperation with the 
British without also giving them complete access to SI holdings.365 
The newly-founded X-2 Branch was in charge of managing security procedures, 
uncovering penetrations of OSS by other intelligence services, and ran penetration 
operations of its own.  Of all the OSS branches, X-2 was the most secretive.  With few 
exceptions, X-2 was not a branch that could be molded to fit an operational situation, nor 
were personnel generally shifted into the X-2 Section as needs dictated.  Although the 
OSS had better established the X-2 Branch in the European Theater, the X-2 station at 
New Delhi, India, was particularly active.  In China, the ubiquitous presence of agents 
from Chiang Kai-sheck’s intelligence chief, Tai Li, prevented the X-2 Branch from 
being very effective.  Burma had few such hindrances.    
In Detachment 101, X-2’s duties primarily revolved around personnel security 
and uncovering enemy agents.  Before the group could concentrate on its eventual role, 
however, it first had to arrive at how it would conduct business at Nazira.  Then it would 
try to determine how it could best serve the field operators and OSS Washington.  
Unfortunately, this was not an easy process.  Although X-2 had worked out an 
agreement with the Indian and British governments in February, the actual start of X-2 in 
Burma was in March.366  An X-2 representative arrived at the Northern Combat Area 
Command (NCAC) and met with senior members of General Stilwell’s staff, including 
his son.  The representative managed to convince NCAC that a serious problem existed 
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with enemy agents who were reporting on Allied troop movements.  This occurred right 
at the time that the drive to take Myitkyina was underway.367  NCAC requested 
immediate assistance, but the X-2 representative had spoken too soon.  Although he had 
discussed possibilities, he had no solutions as X-2 had no plans to provide personnel.  
All that he had managed to do was to raise Stilwell’s fears to a fever pitch.  Stilwell 
feared that enemy reporting on NCAC movements was holding up his units.  He thought 
that X-2 had promised a Special Counter-Intelligence (SCI) team, but the X-2 
representative was not aware that he had made such a promise.368  On 30 April, Stilwell 
asked for a five-man X-2 SCI unit and stated that if the OSS did not respond, he would 
take the drastic step of asking the British for help.369  When OSS proved unable to 
provide this team, an exasperated Stilwell turned their mission over to the U.S. Army 
Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC).  The rivalry created between CIC and X-2 by this 
move would later prove almost crippling to both services. 
Stilwell’s move was an embarrassment for Detachment 101.  Peers reported to 
OSS Washington that “had it not been for our own very close personal contact with the 
General, and his staff plus the success of our other operations, our entire program might 
have collapsed because of X-2’s unwillingness to operate as part of our unit rather than 
an individual branch.”  He noted that X-2’s conduct was not typical for Detachment 101; 
“the operation of Detachment 101 depends solely on its operation as a unit rather than 
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operating as branches individually.”370  In May, the Detachment 404 X-2 Section again 
warned that there were many security threats from loose-lipped Chinese, Tibetans or 
Afghans who might be working for the Japanese.371  This further inflamed fears that 
there was a critical need for counter-intelligence personnel in Burma and India.  At the 
end of July, the OSS finally named Major George H. White as the X-2 representative to 
Detachment 101, although he never ended up serving in Nazira.372     
Peers still allowed X-2 an opening in Detachment 101 and in August, placed a 
substitute officer, Lieutenant Robert E. Adams, in Myitkyina under the cover of an 
engineering officer.  Adams bridged the gap until a true X-2 representative, Major Baird 
Helfrich, arrived from Washington.  Helfrich was given a list of suggestions to follow 
when he arrived.  This included using Kachins to ferret out Japanese agents among 
refugees, but in reality, the X-2 Section had little idea of how it would operate in Burma, 
or even in which direction it should go.  Even more so than MO, X-2 was off to a poor 
start.  OSS branches without an immediate tactical use were difficult to absorb into a 
unit that was increasingly focused on combat operations.373  
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Conclusion 
By August 1944, Peers had eight months of command under his belt.  
Detachment 101 was barely recognizable as the same organization that Eifler had 
created.  True, some aspects had remained the same.  Eifler had instilled a sense of 
purpose that pervaded the unit until the end of the war of getting the job done no matter 
what it took.  Peers, however, had made the changes that permitted Detachment 101 to 
take on these tasks.  Included in these changes was the addition of virtually all the major 
specific branches and functions that the OSS had to offer, as well as an organic air and 
maritime capacity.  While there still largely remained a lack of true branch distinctions, 
at least in the field, the inclusion of various OSS elements had improved the unit’s 
utility.  Especially important were the improvements in the core areas of disseminating 
intelligence and the operations center.  These had permitted the centralized acquisition 
and analysis of both operations and intelligence, which, in turn, allowed headquarters to 
better manage both functions.  
Yet, gone completely was the sense of drama and amateurism that had marked 
Detachment 101’s early days.  Instead, Peers had taken the unit as his own and molded it 
into an organization that had two purposes: to supply intelligence and to conduct 
guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.  The following chapter, a case study of 
Detachment 101’s contribution to the campaign for Myitkyina, will examine how the 
unit was able to assist Allied forces from February through August 1944.  This campaign 
will show how far the unit had come from its 1943 operations and how it was at this time 
regarded as a reliable organization able to accomplish its mission. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
DETACHMENT 101 AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR MYITKYINA:  FEBRUARY-
AUGUST 1944 
 
 The crowning achievement in General Stilwell’s north Burma campaign was the 
hard-fought battle for Myitkyina, which began in late February 1944 and did not end 
until the provincial capital fell on 3 August 1944.  Capture of the city allowed a more 
direct air route to China, and its use as a major depot along the Ledo Road.  The 
campaign involved American, Chinese, and British forces, but the participation of the 
5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), popularly known as Merrill’s Marauder’s, receives 
the most attention.  Detachment 101 also played a significant role.  Before the Allied 
offensive had even begun, the unit had thoroughly infiltrated north Burma and was 
conducting limited guerrilla attacks and collecting tactical and strategic intelligence for 
the U.S. Army and OSS Washington.  Detachment 101 had achieved excellent rapport 
with the dominant local ethnic group, the Kachins, and had become the eyes and ears of 
the campaign.  By assisting all of the major Allied organizations involved, Detachment 
101 was the only organization that was involved in all facets of the campaign.  More 
importantly, it was Detachment 101’s service in this campaign that highlighted the 
organization’s maturity and its indispensable role to the Allied effort.374    
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 Operations in north Burma still involved the complexity of coordinating the 
forces of three Allied powers that had to compromise if they wanted to succeed against 
the Japanese.  Nationalist Chinese and American forces were limited to operating in the 
north under the TRIDENT Conference of May 1943.  The British 14th Army (the 
equivalent of thirteen divisions and seven independent brigades) composed of Indian, 
British, and Commonwealth units, was in India and the upper Arakan region of Burma 
preparing for offensive operations in Burma.   
Opposing the Allies were nine Japanese infantry divisions and two independent 
brigades engaged on three fronts.375  While the combined Allied forces were preparing 
for the offensive in north Burma, the Japanese Army was launching the three-division 
15th Army in an attack against India.  The Japanese intended for their offensive, 
Operation U-GO, to capture the British military rail and supply centers in northern India, 
specifically the towns of Kohima and Imphal.  Thus resupplied, the Japanese planned to 
sustain a further push into the Indian plain to cut the Allied logistical lines to north India 
and Burma, which included the USAAF airfields used to supply China.  They hoped that 
their success would stimulate the Indian nationalist movement and prompt a general 
revolt against British rule.   
The Japanese offensive began in February 1944 with Operation HA-GO, a 
diversionary attack in the Arakan by the Japanese 28th Army that the British defeated in 
the Battle of the Admin Box.  Undeterred, the Japanese 15th Army advanced on the 
central Burma front, but when they did not capture the supply dumps, their offensive 
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turned into a battle of attrition that lasted until July.  While besieged British and 
Commonwealth troops relied heavily on aerial supply, the Japanese had paid scant 
attention to their logistics requirements.  Between March and July, the British forces 
under Lieutenant Generals William Slim and Geoffrey Scoones first halted and then 
decisively defeated the Japanese at the twin battles of Kohima and Imphal.  In tatters, 
starving, and leaving behind their wounded, they retreated back into Burma.  It was a 
defeat that broke their offensive capability in Burma, and with more than 55,000 
casualties, was the largest defeat suffered by the Imperial Japanese Army to date.  
Lieutenant General Kotoku Sato, Commander of the Japanese Thirty-First Division, 
signaled to the 15th Army, “our swords are broken and our arrows gone.”376  He retreated 
contrary to orders.  It was against this strategic picture that the Allied offensive in north 
Burma was taking place.   
Although they considered it a tertiary front, the Japanese maintained a substantial 
presence in north Burma.  The most important was the elite battle-tested 18th Japanese 
Division, headquartered at Myitkyina.  It had achieved a long succession of victories; 
from the sacking of Shanghai and Nanking the late 1930s, to the invasions of Malaya 
and Singapore in late 1941 and early 1942.  These last two campaigns had garnered the 
largest number of British Empire prisoners of war—some 130,000.  Like many Japanese 
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units in north Burma, the 18th Division was severely under strength.  In January 1944, it 
only had some 6,300 men, of which only 3,000 remained by late June 1944.  The veteran 
56th Division was also present in north Burma, which like the 18th, had fought in the 
1942 invasion of Burma.  Elements of the 15th, 53rd, and 33rd Divisions, and the 24th.  In 
all, they had more than 50,000 troops in the area.377 
Facing this force were an array of Allied units from three nations, that comprised 
General Stilwell’s Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC).  The Chinese Army in 
India contributed the well-equipped and trained, but not necessarily well-led 22nd and 
38th Divisions.378  The largest American unit was the GALAHAD force under Brigadier 
General Franklin D. Merrill.  Unlike Detachment 101, the three battalions of the 
Marauders were not familiar with the operating environment; even though they were 
primarily formed from jungle trained or tested troops.379  Designed after the British 
Chindits, the 5307th was lightly armed and mobile; its only heavy weapons were mortars 
and 75mm pack howitzers.  The British Chindits were officially the Indian 3rd Infantry 
Division and consisted of six brigades.380  Named after the Chinthe, the mythical lion-
like beast that guards Buddhist temples in Burma, the second British long-range 
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penetration group was formed around those of the 77th Infantry Brigade under Brigadier 
General Michael Calvert that had survived the first Chindit expedition of February 1943.   
The American 10th Air Force was assigned to support the Allied offensive and 
provide aerial resupply.  Number 1 Air Commando was to infiltrate 9,250 Chindits 
behind enemy lines, keep them resupplied, and extract wounded personnel.  Another 
3,000 Chindits of Brigadier General Bernard E. Fergusson’s 16th Infantry Brigade, 
walked into Burma.  Stilwell’s remaining major Allied unit was OSS Detachment 101.381 
Prior to the Myitkyina Campaign, Detachment 101 had three main priorities:  
intelligence collection on Japanese forces and dispositions; rescuing downed Allied 
pilots; and least important, conducting guerrilla warfare.382  The Myitkyina campaign 
marked a substantial shift, for thereafter, guerrilla warfare became the unit’s most 
important role.  Detachment 101’s involvement in the campaign was in three phases:  
Phase One (May 1943 until February 1944) was the pre-offensive period,  Phase Two, 
(February until May 1944) ended with the Allied capture of the Myitkyina airfield; 
Phase Three (May to August 1944) ended with the capture of the city and harassing the 
Japanese retreat.   
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The Myitkyina campaign built on the Detachment’s previous work in north 
Burma in 1943 and 1944.  In this time, the Detachment had increased its intelligence 
gathering abilities, which was critical to Stilwell and his planners because it confirmed 
the state and locations of enemy forces in north Burma.  Detachment 101 groups also 
provided a screen to alert NCAC about pending Japanese counter-offensives.  Even in 
areas where their patrols did not operate, the so-called jungle grapevine provided 
information on enemy movements and helped to rescue downed Allied airmen.  Captain 
Vincent Curl, in command of the KNOTHEAD group, reported in February 1944 that 
“We have this whole area pretty well organized and if [the pilots] will tell [the Kachins] 
that they are Americans there is only one chance in a thousand against their being 
brought to this Hq, [sic] or to one of our other units.”383  Detachment 101 groups had 
also blanketed the area north and west of Myitkyina with agents that sent a constant 
stream of intelligence to Nazira, India, and from there, to Stilwell’s headquarters at 
NCAC.  This information ranged from tactical to strategic and included Japanese troop 
movements and order of battle.  The Detachment also radioed map coordinates of targets 
to the 10th USAAF, who then bombed them through the jungle canopy.  The OSS groups 
reported the adverse affect on Japanese morale.384  This was particularly stinging when 
the hidden targets could only have been found by ground observation, such as a bridge 
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near Myitkyina that was constructed with its roadbed hidden just under the surface of the 
water.385  The combination of intelligence and bombing crippled Japanese transportation 
so that by the beginning of the campaign, only three locomotives remained operational 
west of Myitkyina.386  
By recruiting Kachins and other ethnic minorities, Detachment 101 also begun to 
build what would become a considerable guerrilla force of nearly 4,000 by mid-1944.  
Curl went a step farther by incorporating the Myihprap Hpuing, [Lightning Force] of 
Kachin leader Zing Tawng Naw, to serve as the nucleus for his offensive operations.387  
Although Zing Tawng Naw’s guerrillas inflicted relatively few casualties on the 
Japanese by the start of the Myitkyina Campaign, they had a great psychological effect.  
According to a captured Japanese soldier, Japanese patrols did “not mind working in 
American or Chinese occupied territory but never volunteered for assignments against 
the Kachins as casualties were always about 50 percent."388 
 As soon as he learned of the upcoming north Burma offensive, Lieutenant 
Colonel Peers tried to demonstrate Detachment 101’s utility to other Allied elements in 
the campaign.  He assigned Chief Warrant Officer Robert Rhea and Lieutenant Martin J. 
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Waters as liaison officers to Merrill’s Marauders; Lieutenant Charles C. Stelle to the 
Chindits; and Captain Peter S. Joost to the 1st Air Commando.  Peers cited Joost 
specifically for “doing a magnificent job” and building up “OSS in the eyes of General 
Wingate and Col. Cochran.”389  All groups had Kachin teams to accompany the liaison 
elements.  Captain Chester R. Chartrand of the SI Section, at NCAC headquarters, 
transmitted Stilwell’s specific intelligence requests to the liaison elements.390   
 On 20 February 1944, Detachment 101 entered Phase Two of the offensive when 
Curl was ordered to meet with Merrill and offer the assistance of KNOTHEAD.391  The 
slow pace of the Allied advance delayed the meeting and the first direct contact with 
Allied forces was on 8 March when runners arrived from Chinese units.  Not until 15 
March did Curl meet with Merrill, whom he briefed on the local situation.  Father James 
Stuart, an Irish Catholic priest working with KNOTHEAD, conducted services for the 
Marauders.  KNOTHEAD was of more immediate assistance when one officer and 
sixty-seven enlisted casualties were flown out of their improvised airstrip by light plane.  
Kachin guides were invaluable by pointing out the easiest and most direct paths through 
the area.392  KNOTHEAD reported that “A group [of Marauders] would be advancing 
down the trail, when the Kachin out front would spot and point (rather like a bird-dog), 
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since he could not talk to them.  They invariably found a [Japanese] position … which 
they never would have seen otherwise.”393  Kachins also had the ability to tell friend 
from foe as “to the inexperienced eye … there is no difference in a Burman and a Kachin 
… a Japanese out of uniform is almost as difficult to recognize.”394  The Kachins also 
identified friendly villages, river crossings, and potable water sources.  The other 
KNOTHEAD groups positioned further away reported on Japanese troop movements 
and concentrations facing the Marauders. 
Curl’s strike forces were also stirring up the Japanese, and on 22 February, 
Stilwell directed that the Lighting Force stop ambushing Japanese patrols so as not to 
alert them of the upcoming offensive.395  The order was revoked on 5 March.  Lieutenant 
James L. Tilly, the American advisor with the Lightning Force, was told to get into the 
act harassing the Japanese and to disrupt them “in every way possible.”396  Peers directed 
Curl to make sure that Tilly had at least a hundred men and to keep Nazira informed 
when and where the Lightning Force would attack.   
On 6 March 1944, a failed attempt at a roadblock by the Lighting Force 
heightened Japanese awareness of the guerrilla threat.  Retaliation came on 10 March 
when the Lightning Force ran into a Japanese ambush.  The entrenched Japanese troops 
allowed the Lightning Force to enter their kill zone before firing, but their marksmanship 
was poor and they did not hit one Kachin.  With no other option, the Kachins charged 
the Japanese and sprayed them with automatic weapons fire.  The Japanese counter-
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attacked.  The OSS reported that “One [Japanese soldier] thrust his bayonet into the 
leading Kachin … this Myihprap Hpung then smashed his Tommy gun over the 
[Japanese soldier’s] head, and the man beside him calmly blew off the [Japanese 
soldier’s] head with a shotgun … another [Japanese soldier] charged, he was brought 
down with the other barrel of the shotgun.”397  Then, the Lightning Force withdrew to 
reorganize. 
The next day the Kachins routed the Japanese force.  The Kachins crept to within 
twenty-five feet of the Japanese and so surprised them when they leapt forward to 
assault that the enemy abandoned their weapons and equipment and fled.  The Japanese 
response was to retaliate on the civilian population.  Tilly reported that “One old Kachin 
was captured … he was tortured ... to reveal our location … he did not talk … and was 
put to death with the bayonet.”398 
 Poor communication and the movements of Allied forces were confusing.  On 16 
March, a Lightning Force patrol was lying in ambush on a trail near Hkawnglaw Hka, 
when a large body of soldiers (200) approached.  Thinking that they were Chinese from 
a nearby element, the Kachins challenged them using “O.K.,” which was one-half of the 
sign/countersign for the area.  The Japanese soldiers responded by raising their weapons, 
which was “definitely the wrong password.”399  This fight enabled the Marauders, who 
were also engaged with this force but who did not yet know of the OSS presence, to 
disengage and slip around the contested area.  Chinese forces later relieved the Lightning 
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Force and dealt with the remaining Japanese.  Unsure of the assistance that Detachment 
101 could offer, the Marauders refused to rely upon them at first.  Tilly commented that 
the worse part of this was the “unnecessary nerve strain on the leading American 
soldiers,” who were blazing their own trails and “sweating out [Japanese] fire at every 
turn.”400  Fortunately, Merrill came to realize the value of working with Detachment 
101. 
By the end of March 1944, Detachment 101 credited the Lightning Force with 
160 Japanese killed.  Some 160 Lightning Force Kachins were serving as Marauder 
guides and scouts.  Merrill conferred several times daily with Father Stuart and Zing 
Tawng Naw.  Stuart was especially valuable as he spoke fluent Kachin, and was attached 
to the Marauder command post.  Detachment 101 elements speeded up the Marauder 
advance by providing so much information on Japanese troop movements that it reduced 
the necessity of sending out reconnaissance patrols.  The Kachin guides became 
indispensable and each battalion had two point guides, while an additional pool of ten to 
fifteen guides was maintained at the regimental command post.  Detachment 101 patrols 
operated even farther ahead of the Marauders lead element—itself a day’s march away 
from the main body.  They improved or cut new trails to allow easier passage for pack 
animals.  Because of their valuable assistance, Peers ordered KNOTHEAD to move 
further south and to recruit more Kachins.401   
Peers placed Lieutenant Jack C. Pamplin in command of KNOTHEAD after Curl 
left for another OSS assignment with former commander Carl F. Eifler.  Pamplin visited 
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Merrill at Nhpum at the end of March and reported to Peers at Nazira that Merrill was 
“quick to realize the actual and potential value of our Kachins” and lavished praise on 
Father Stuart and Zing Tawng Naw.  Pamplin radioed that the Marauders now had the 
“greatest respect” for the Kachins and their fighting methods.  He often heard them say, 
“I’m damn glad they’re on our side.”402  Pamplin also noted that the American forces 
have come to realize that the organized Kachins have “… been just as important a factor 
in their own preservation as it has been in their success against the [Japanese] forces.”403 
At the end of March, the Marauder’s 2nd Battalion, one of the three separate 
Allied columns, barricaded itself at Nhpum Ga to fight a rear-guard action.  There the 
Japanese besieged it for two weeks.  The situation became dire and only airdropped 
supplies prevented them from being overrun.  Elements of the Lightning Force led by 
Father Stuart conducted harassing attacks on the Japanese surrounding the 2nd Battalion 
and their cumbersome logistics train, distracting the Japanese sufficiently to enable the 
Marauders to regroup.  The 5307th’s acting commander, Colonel Charles N. Hunter, 
(Merrill had been evacuated after suffering a heart attack) praised Detachment 101’s 
Kachins for “saving over two-thirds of Merrill’s forces.”404 
Other Detachment 101 forces made significant contributions to the Myitkyina 
campaign.  Lieutenant Charles Stelle, after meeting with Major General Orde Wingate at 
Imphal, India, was asked to join the 77th Brigade.  Though Stelle’s initial duties were 
channeling the Chindits’ requests to the 1st Air Commando, Wingate expanded his 
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role.405  When the first planeload of Kachin guides were lost in a CG-4A Waco glider 
accident, Stelle arranged to replace them with six Detachment 101 Kachins.406  On 19 
March, they went into BROADWAY, the Chindit landing zone, and sent on patrol four 
days later.  They identified, apprehend, and brought local Kachin collaborators back to 
British lines, and helped to repulse Japanese attacks.407  Reverting to his original 
Research and Analysis (R&A) function and using his knowledge of Japanese, Stelle 
identified several Japanese units and enemy agents from captured documents.  These 
agents were swiftly dealt with:  “A five minute scanning … provided a really definitive 
translation—definitive by reason of the fact that its bearer was shot ten minutes later.”408   
Stelle’s most important contribution was liaison between the Chindits and 
Stilwell.  Wingate was loath to send information through channels.  In January 1944, 
Joost, the Detachment 101 liaison officer with the 1st Air Commando, commented that 
“abysmal ignorance existed regarding Intelligence and Plans between the Americans and 
British.”  Thus, Wingate’s liaison officer at NCAC was never “really up-to-date on the 
plans and position” of the Chindits.409  Stilwell had no liaison officer with the Chindits, 
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making Stelle the de facto link between the two organizations.  In turn, Wingate gave 
him carte-blanche access to their message traffic, and encouraged him to forward what 
messages he saw fit.   
 The north Burma campaign was in full-swing at the end of March 1944.  As the 
Marauders pressed further into Japanese held-territory, they left KNOTHEAD’s area of 
operations and moved closer to Operation FORWARD’s area.  Lieutenant Commander 
Luce, commanding FORWARD was a rare breed.  By training, he was a surgeon but he 
was an equally outstanding guerrilla leader.  In an early version of Civil Affairs, Luce 
conducted a medical clinic and gained the trust of, and recruits from, the local 
inhabitants.  On 5 March, much to the incredulity of the locals, he performed a 
successful brain surgery on a Kachin soldier under the most primitive of conditions.  
During the Myitkyina operations, Luce commanded eight guerrilla companies and ten 
radio operators; in all some 1100 men.410  They were organized into 154-man 
companies, and like all the Detachment 101 guerrillas were lightly armed but their large 
number of automatic weapons allowed great firepower.411  Much like KNOTHEAD had 
done, these forces screened the flanks of the Marauders and waylaid Japanese forces 
moving to confront the separate Allied columns.  
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 Advancing Allied troops, however, overran several of these Detachment 101 
groups.  In April, Peers reported to Washington that RED (another element led by “A” 
Group veteran Patrick “Red” Maddox) and PAT had to “abandon their positions … or 
penetrate still deeper into Japanese-held territory.”412  Moving forward was not a bad 
strategy.  The groups could continue their mission, and as a later Detachment 101 unit 
found out in 1945, it was a good operational practice.  
The closer you got to your own lines, the denser the concentration of regular 
enemy troops … What you met deep in enemy territory were police … trained to 
fight one on one … two platoons of regular soldiers could have defeated my 
whole battalion with no difficulty.  But one of our platoons of forty men could 
have defeated a force of over one hundred policemen.  And our battalion could 
have taken on a police force of close to a thousand for at least several hours.413 
 
In PAT’s case, their move south enabled the group to wreck a train on the Myitkyina-
Mogaung railway on 24 April.414   
 The increased requirements brought on by the Allied moved south meant that the 
Detachment had to get more personnel into the field as soon as possible.  Many were 
radio operators and medics who were necessary to support the field groups.  U.S. Navy 
Pharmacist’s Mate 1/C Lysle Wilson recalled during his first C-47 trip into Burma; “I 
realized how much my new job meant.  I could visualize one of these very boys in the 
plane with me, being wounded and everything for his safety on my hands … I made up 
my mind at that moment to work hard and do my best.”415 
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Providing tailored support to the combat forces had drawbacks.  In April 1944, 
Peers relayed to Donovan that intelligence collection took a backseat to the “sharp 
increase in the actual combat functions of our patrols.”416  Still, there were some 
successes.  British Brigadier General Michael Calvert asked for two OSS Nisei to help 
the Chindits exploit the intelligence scored from a tapped Japanese telephone cable.417  
The DAVIS group, operating out of the BROADWAY field, provided such opportune 
intelligence on Japanese troop movements that NCAC headquarters told the group to 
treat all messages as urgent and to send some without taking the time to encode them.418     
May 1944 saw Detachment 101 further assisting the Allied offensive.  
FORWARD commenced clearing villages to the east of Myitkyina and on 10 May, 
staged a successful diversionary attack east of Myitkyina to shield the Marauders’ 
advance from discovery.  The attack tied down three Japanese battalions to the loss of 
three Kachins killed.  On 15 May, FORWARD’s Kachins directly assaulted the village 
of Sadon, killing half of the sixty-five defenders and suffering three killed and twelve 
wounded before withdrawing.419  The Kachins sniped at the defenders until 29 June, 
when they took control of the town.420 
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 Particularly active in Detachment 101’s role to take the Myitkyina was a RED 
subgroup under Lieutenants William J. Martin and William F. Hazelwood.  As the 
Marauders made ready for the final leg of the trek to capture the airfield, Martin’s 
element prepared a resupply drop zone.  After that, fourteen year-old N’Naw Yang Nau 
led the Marauders along a hidden trail to the Myitkyina airfield on the night of 15 May 
1944.  Along the way he was bitten by a highly poisonous krait, but he was the only one 
who knew the local trails.  Martin pulled out his poncho, and covering himself and the 
injured Kachin, pulled out a flashlight to examine the wound.  “Sure enough there were 
two fang marks right behind his toes.”  Martin sent word back that a snake had bitten the 
scout and then applied a tourniquet to the leg.  “But the [scout’s] solution for this while 
the medics were coming up [was] dig a hole, pour silver rupees in it, put his foot in 
there, and bury it … And he would sit there till he either lived or died.  So we proceeded 
to calm him down, dig the damn hole, put a bag of rupees in there … put his foot on top, 
and start to fill the hole back up.” 
Meanwhile, Hunter and the medics came to the front of the column, brushed 
away the dirt, and tried to suck out the poison.  After about forty minutes, N’Naw Yang 
Nau was “woozy,” and unable to walk.  He was strapped on Hunter’s horse and led the 
Marauders with “bleary eyed directions.”421  The critically ill Kachin had to walk the last 
mile but managed to lead the group to their bivouac, which was a mile from the airfield.  
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Martin’s group then left to blow up a Japanese train, but unable to get to the tracks in 
time, infiltrated to the edge of the airstrip and observed the enemy working at night.  
The next morning, 17 May 1944, the Marauders followed the route pointed out 
by the Kachins, and surprised the Japanese—who did not know Allied forces were so 
close.  They quickly captured the airfield.  Martin reported that “C-47’s were landing on 
the strip by afternoon.”422  In recognition of Detachment 101’s assistance, Hunter, wrote 
to Peers; “Thanks to your people for a swell job.  Could not have succeeded without 
them.”423  However, Hunter spoke too soon.  The Chinese regiments, given the “honor” 
of taking the city, bungled the attack.  The two attacking columns mistook each other for 
the Japanese and nearly annihilated one another.  This debacle enabled the vastly 
outnumbered Japanese to pull in reinforcements from the surrounding area.  Within 
days, the Japanese outnumbered the Allied attackers.  The siege of Myitkyina had begun.   
Martin’s work was far from over.  His group of Kachins remained to scout in the 
vicinity.  Two days after the fall of the airstrip, he reconnoitered the Namkwi bridge—
site of Detachment 101’s first operational mission in 1943.  They managed to surprise a 
section of Japanese troops eating breakfast before attacking the airfield.424  That same 
day, Hazelwood was not as fortunate near Charpate, when a Japanese patrol attacked 
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them from behind.  Well beyond getting assistance, they managed to break contact and 
after three attempts extricated their wounded.425   
Even though the Allied siege lines around Myitkyina were porous, once the 
Japanese were “bottled up,” they intended to keep them there.  Detachment 101 teams 
covered escape routes all the way south to Bhamo; FORWARD to the east, PAT to the 
south, and KNOTHEAD to the west.  These groups cleared out Japanese garrisons in the 
outlying towns and covered the Irrawaddy River, which flowed south past Myitkyina.  
The Japanese tried to evacuate their wounded by floating them down the river, but soon 
discovered that the Kachins fired at anything suspicious.  The sharp-eyed guerrillas even 
discovered and killed submerged Japanese troops breathing through reeds and those 
clinging to logs and hoping to pass as driftwood.  The Kachin then recovered the bodies 
to glean for useful intelligence. 
To the south, Detachment 101 forces were working with the Chindits.  Renamed 
the Group #10 Operation, that Detachment 101 unit had grown to four radio teams.  
Stelle, the assigned liaison officer, returned from the field to join the DIXIE mission, the 
liaison effort to the Chinese Communists.  Other Detachment 101 personnel from 
Stelle’s group remained to recruit locally and formed the MATES, ADAMS, BARNES, 
and DAVIS groups.  These teams reported on Japanese troop movements, engaged in 
guerrilla warfare, and organized villagers to report on and defend themselves against the 
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Japanese.426  The intelligence they gathered alerted the Chindits of anticipated attacks 
and enabled them to avoid Japanese formations.  Chindit decisions, however, had 
unintended consequences.  Because the group could not carry excess supplies, when they 
moved north from Mawlu in late May they abandoned uniforms and weapons that the 
Japanese then recovered.  As a result, Detachment 101 elements repeatedly encountered 
Japanese patrols “dressed in these British uniforms.”427  Not all groups got into action.  
Private Tom Davis, leading the DAVIS group reported on 31 May that he had “shot a 
mule, a monkey, a squirrel, and a fish, but no [Japanese].”428   
After the seizure of the Myitkyina airfield, Detachment 101 began Phase Three, 
which ended in August when the city was captured and the surrounding area secured.429  
Impressed by the results, Stilwell told Peers to raise its number of guerrilla forces from 
some 4,000 men to 10,000.  In order to stay relevant, Peers also ordered his forces 
further south “to keep our units in positions where they can watch and report on every 
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move of the enemy … our information is now supplied to twenty-five military branches 
… which otherwise could not get this intelligence.”430 
Kachin guerrillas, however, only served of their own volition and occasionally, 
for lack of a better term, deserted.  An example of this occurred in June 1944 on the 
Chinese border to the east of Myitkyina.  Japanese troops had withdrawn from the town 
of Hpimaw because of the pressure at Myitkyina, and Chinese troops had moved in.  
They were not liked by the Maru, a minor Kachin ethnicity, because of long standing 
bad relations.  To make things worse, the local populace accused Chinese troops of 
looting.  Luce tried to get FORWARD’s Marus out of the area, but during the first day’s 
march south, 110 of them deserted with their equipment and weapons.  For the next three 
weeks, these Marus waged their own war against the Chinese.  The Chinese reported that 
seventy-five of their troops killed, although the number is likely much higher.431   
 One of the first groups to move south was FORWARD.  The advance party flew 
by light plane fifty miles south to Kwitu, while the main body made the eight-day trek 
on foot.  They expanded from eight to ten companies.  Many new recruits were veterans 
of the pre-war Burmese Rifles, many of whom had fought against the Japanese in the 
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1942 invasion of Burma before disbanding.  Another 2,300 recruits waited to be armed, 
but the monsoon rains hampered airdrops and prevented them from being equipped.  
Throughout June, these forces were active deep behind Japanese lines, and were 
particularly successful ambushing troops trying to escape down the Irrawaddy.  In June, 
FORWARD claimed nearly half of the Detachment’s total enemy killed in action, which 
was 219 Japanese killed and two captured.  Meanwhile, the guerrillas of PAT were busy 
blowing bridges and cutting rail lines cut south of Myitkyina.  Detachment 101’s losses 
for June were five indigenous troops killed and seven wounded.432   
Detachment 101 continued its policy of conducting for the Allied forces what 
Peers referred to as “all operations which they are not prepared to undertake.”433  
Assisting with this task was the Detachment’s small air force, dubbed the Red-Ass 
Squadron, which was formed to conduct observation flights, evacuate wounded, drop 
supplies, and effect liaison.  These planes landed on airstrips hacked out of the jungle or 
on sandbars and in open fields.  They proved invaluable by evacuating forty-nine 
wounded Chindits from the Mogaung area.  Landing these small planes on makeshift 
airstrips could be harrowing, such as on 6 July in the rescue of the survivors of a B-25 
crash some eighteen miles from Myitkyina:  “The field was a clearing about 600’ long, 
she looked terrible from the air.  There were fox holes on either side (dug by Merrill’s 
Marauders) … looking over the whole thing [the pilot] said over the radio “Well here 
goes but were liable to have to walk back to Myitkyina”… on the seventh [pass] we 
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dropped in so close over the trees I thought the wings would hit.”434  Because of the 
small carrying capacity of the plane, the pilot required six trips to evacuate the crew.  In 
the midst of the rescue, the pilot had to make a field-expedient repair to a broken tail 
wheel.   
The unit relied heavily on their Stinson L-1 Vigilants.  They were ideal for the 
task because their size and durability, and had a larger carrying capacity than the more 
common Stinson L-5 Sentinel.  Although the U.S. Army considered the L-1 obsolete, the 
Technical Sergeant Blaine Headrick recalled, “it was a very safe airplane to fly … it had 
quite a bit of power … I even had three guys in the backseat at one time.”435 
 By July, Detachment 101 was pushing its forces even further south.  Stilwell 
needed information on Japanese dispositions in north central Burma for the Allied push 
that would resume after Myitkyina’s fall.436  Detachment 101 guerrillas used the cover 
accorded by the monsoons and the subsequent relative inactivity of regular forces.  One 
unfortunate aspect was that patrols were sometimes mistaken for the enemy and attacked 
by Allied fighter aircraft.437   
The push south coincided with a reorganization of the operational elements when 
Detachment 101 headquarters simplified its command and control.  Instead of five 
operational areas, the Allied advance allowed the consolidation of KNOTHEAD and 
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PAT with the teams working in the Chindit area.  The groups were redesignated:  
FORWARD became “Area #1;” PAT and KNOTHEAD became “Area #2;” and 
TRAMP became “Area #3.”  The three areas reported directly to the headquarters 
Operations Section.  The Communications Section also followed suit.  Before, individual 
groups and even teams had independently contacted headquarters or their designated 
subordinate radio substation.  During July, the individual elements routed all 
communications to their Area headquarters.  The three area substations then 
communicated with one forward-based communications section.  This reorganization 
also provided redundancy; the constant relocations of area headquarters forced by enemy 
action did not sever communications.  If any area substation was out of service for more 
than twenty-four hours, the forward Communications Section could pick-up that area’s 
message traffic in addition to its normal load, until that the area substation came back on 
line.438  Additionally, the Detachment headquarters set up a chain of aircraft warning 
stations, as it had done in early 1943 in the Fort Hertz area.  This time, instead of 
providing alerts that Japanese bombers were coming to attack the Assam airfields, the 
nine stations warned of the presence of Japanese fighter aircraft operating in hunter-
killer groups.  These stations reported directly to the Allied fighter control center at 
NCAC. 
 These organizational changed helped the Detachment increase efficiency.  July 
was even more successful with 259 enemy killed, an indeterminate wounded, and 26 
captured.  Area #1, under the command of Major Peter Joost after Luce returned to 
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Nazira to establish a fifty-bed hospital, established two roadblocks south of Myitkyina; 
Kazu, twenty miles south; and Dumbaiyang, forty miles south.  In this period alone, 
Area #1’s “D” company killed 94 Japanese who were attempting to float down the 
Irrawaddy from Myitkyina.  Area #2 was likewise embroiled in the campaign.439   
 Since much of its former area was now free of the enemy, Area #2 groups moved 
south and acted as a screening force for the Chinese and Chindits attacking Mogaung.440  
After receiving a message from the worn-out Chindits that if Chinese troops did not 
arrive in two days then they would pull out, agent “Skittles,” in charge of an Area #2 
unit, ensured that the Chinese met the timetable.441  He led the 114th Regiment of the 38th 
Chinese Division on a flanking move that completed the encirclement of the town.  
Since Detachment 101 agents were embedded with both the Chindits and Chinese, they 
facilitated a link up.  Although the Chindits accomplished much of the fighting, on 
Stilwell’s orders the Chinese were officially given the credit for taking the town.  In 
response, Brigadier General Calvert signaled in protest, “The Chinese having taken 
Mogaung 77 Brigade is proceeding to take Umbrage.”442  With Mogaung’s capture, the 
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last potential link that the besieged Japanese in Myitkyina had to supply, reinforcement, 
or relief was severed.443    
Since the Myitkyina siege lines remained porous, Detachment 101 guerrillas 
under Lieutenant Lee E. West patrolled the Mogaung-Myitkyina rail line until regular 
Allied forces secured it in August.444  Other Detachment 101 elements, such as that 
under 1st Lieutenant Ted U. Barnes, remained to “police up” Japanese stragglers who 
were “badly organized, badly equipped, and trying to get through to the south … We 
spent a good deal of our time trying to organize groups to wipe out as many of these 
Japanese as possible.”445  Even further south, PETE had moved in from the west to target 
the Katha-Mogaung rail line.  The group’s self-sufficiency was possible because of the 
capture of three load-carrying elephants and twenty-five oxen, which enabled PETE to 
carry large quantities of Japanese supplies captured during raids on enemy supply 
dumps.446  
In early August, in the middle of the monsoon, the Allies finally took Myitkyina.  
Despite washed out roads and trails, Detachment 101 continued to harass the Japanese 
fleeing south from north Burma.  The worn-out Japanese resorted to using the rivers as 
avenues of retreat, but Detachment 101 covered the east bank of the Irrawaddy as far 
south as Sinbo.  Peers reported to Donovan that this left the enemy “more or less like 
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clay pigeons for our marksmen on the banks.”  The situation was almost surreal for First 
Lieutenant James Ward, who simply occupied a balcony overlooking the Irrawaddy and 
“sat in it [a chair] with a carbine across the knees, fresh fruit and cigarettes within easy 
reach, fanned by an attractive native girl, and would take pot shots at the [Japanese] who 
were trying to escape.”  Martin had another experience, when his group of Kachins 
spotted a Japanese soldier on the banks of the river that they wanted to capture.  But, the 
soldier “didn’t want any part of it” and “fired one round,” hitting a Kachin “right in the 
head,” killing him.  Martin’s Kachins “just blew him [the Japanese soldier] apart.  That 
was the only man I lost in the river blockade.”  First Lieutenant Thomas B. Leonard’s 
group caught a party of 300 Japanese that were either “bathing or sleeping” on 3 August.  
They “were completely surprised” and “Little return fire encountered,” with thirty 
Japanese killed for the loss of one Kachin.447   
The groups in Area #2 accounted for the most damage inflicted in August on the 
Japanese.  Fifteen Allied officers and twenty enlisted men led over a thousand Kachins.  
Communications were handled by fourteen locally-recruited radio operators.  This group 
managed to kill 350 Japanese and capture another 22 at the cost of just a few Kachins.448 
As Detachment 101 moved south, some of the region assigned to Area #3 fell 
outside the Kachin tracts, and was the furthest south that non-air-dropped elements had 
progressed.  This became problematic because the Kachin troops had only agreed to 
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fight in their home region.  The move south invalidated their contracts, and some went 
home, but local recruiting refilled the ranks.449  They remained able to attack the 
defeated Japanese forces retreating from Imphal.  Peers told Area #3 in August, 
“headquarters (at Tailum) will [soon] be out of the war as much as Myitkyina is … as 
soon as the [Japanese] flow ceases.”450  That meant the groups had to work their way 
even farther south in the coming months, risking even more Kachins to leave for home. 
August was another record month for Detachment 101, with another 396 enemy 
killed and 33 captured.451  Although the group only kept a strict tally of enemy casualties 
from May to August, this still left them with a total of 1081 enemy killed, to a loss of 
sixteen Kachins and thirty wounded.452  They were also the only American or British 
ground force that participated in the campaign to remain intact and capable of operations 
as both the Chindits and Marauders were disbanded after Myitkyina fell.  The 
intelligence supplied by Detachment 101 had indirectly led to many more enemy killed 
through air action, which had also lowered Japanese morale and expedited Allied ground 
actions.  Considering the small number of American personnel involved, Detachment 
101 and its Kachins were a significant “force multiplier” for NCAC.   
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With the capture of Myitkyina, the Japanese would thereafter be on the 
defensive.  Although its participation in the Burma campaign was not over, Detachment 
101 had demonstrated its value to the Allied effort and received several accolades.  
Major General Howard Davidson, commanding officer of the 10th USAAF, wrote about 
the intelligence provided by Detachment 101:   
OSS furnished the principal intelligence regarding Japanese troop concentrations, 
hostile natives, stores and enemy movement.  Up to 15 March 1944, some 80% 
of all combat missions were planned on the basis of intelligence received from 
this source.  Since then the percentage of direct air-ground support missions and 
missions based upon OSS intelligence now average about 60% of the total.453 
 
The reputation of the Detachment was so good that when the Marauders disbanded, 
several veterans asked to join Detachment 101.  Their experience proved invaluable in 
the ten bitter months of fighting that laid ahead before the Japanese were finally defeated 
in Burma in July 1945. 454 
Conclusion 
 Detachment 101 had made great progress since their early operations in 1943, but 
how much had Detachment 101’s efforts at reform aided in the campaign?  The answer 
is found in what they accomplished in two areas: operations, and command and control.  
Following several unsuccessful attempts at long-range penetrations throughout Burma, 
Peers concentrated on the north.  These operations involved less risk of valuable 
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resources and capitalized on collecting tactical intelligence, such as identifying targets 
for the USAAF and identifying key elements in the Japanese order of battle.  Through 
gaining the trust of and recruiting the Kachins, Detachment 101 was able to ambush 
Japanese troops, screen the flanks of Allied forces, collect intelligence, and have a ready 
reserve of guerrilla troops.   
The operations in 1943 had benefited Detachment 101.  The group was able to 
thoroughly blanket the area with agents and these teams had months in the field to learn 
the operating areas and the local peoples.  That the conventional troops of other Allied 
units involved in the planned offensive were mainly unaware of Detachment 101’s 
efforts mattered little.  What mattered is that Detachment 101 was in place, was building 
intelligence nets, and was recruiting and training guerrillas.  Detachment 101 was ready 
to assist these other major conventional forces when the Myitkyina offensive began in 
February 1944, and in so doing, became the strategic theater asset envisioned by 
Donovan when sent the group to Burma in 1942. 
Detachment 101’s impact far outweighed the small numbers of personnel it had 
committed.  This was in large part because of the organizational changes made by Peers 
after he took command.  His creation of a Secret Intelligence (SI)-like evaluation system 
enabled his staff to ask the pertinent questions, evaluate its intelligence, and then 
distribute that information in a timely manner to the Allied force that most needed it.  
The formation of an operations cell to coordinate all the Detachment’s offensive 
operations was likewise a major accomplishment.  For the first time, Nazira could 
accurately measure its effectiveness.  This allowed it to make the necessary changes 
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while maintaining the offensive, such as simplifying the operations and communications 
command and control.  Also, by having dedicated aircraft under its control, Detachment 
101 ensured that its operational groups were supplied when and where needed.  This 
function permitted the large-scale raising, training, and employment of guerrilla forces.   
Other reforms of 1944, particularly those not of an immediate tactical need, were 
less critical.  Morale Operations (MO) never played a significant role, even though their 
white-propaganda producing Office of War Information (OWI) counterparts had.455  
R&D had not been integrated into the unit long enough to make a measurable impact.  
X-2, the OSS counter-intelligence Branch, had little effect on operations.   
Perhaps the most important result of Detachment 101’s effort in the Myitkyina 
campaign was that it validated the OSS mission in Burma and ensured continued support 
from the U.S. Army and OSS Washington.  Peers had calculated well in this regard.  
Detachment 101 sent detailed monthly reports to both NCAC and to OSS Washington 
beginning in November 1942.  In April 1944, however, Peers further directed his field 
units to keep a detailed daily log of activities that he then forwarded to headquarters.  
This hard evidence to OSS Washington revealed how much Detachment 101 was 
contributing to the success of the offensive.456  One thing, however, was impossible as 
the Field Photo Section reported, “As for action snapshots, action against the [Japanese] 
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is-almost without exception-always in the dark and cannot be photographed …”457  
Nevertheless, the daylight photography stills and movies gave OSS Washington a taste 
of the Burmese operational environment, and Peers’s efforts to document Detachment 
101’s activities paid off.  If Detachment 101 needed any more reassurance about their 
intra-theater role, it was an understanding with Stilwell to raise the number of Kachin 
guerrillas from some 3,000 to 10,000.458  The next chapter will detail the Detachment’s 
organizational changes as it moved to support the Allied offensive to secure the Burma 
Road; through the Bhamo campaign.  
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CHAPTER IX 
 
REORGANIZING AFTER MYITKYINA:  SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1944 
 
With Myitkyina under Allied control, the Allies could congratulate themselves 
on a hard-fought joint victory, and with the monsoon not yet over, they could 
momentarily regroup and reflect upon the accomplishment.  This was not true for 
Detachment 101.  As the unit charged with gathering intelligence and conducting 
guerrilla warfare behind Japanese lines, it had to continue pressing the enemy and push 
deeper into its rear areas.  The Detachment could also not allow the new strategic 
situation to negatively affect its operations.  It could not ignore that it needed to 
reorganize and rebuild.  This chapter will examine the administrative and organizational 
changes of the Detachment’s various elements from September 1944 until the end of the 
year.  This coincides with the fall of Bhamo.  Because the unit’s emphasis shifted from 
intelligence to operations, sections that were operationally focused are covered first, 
followed by intelligence functions, then sections that still had to find a role for 
themselves.   
Detachment 101 was not a standardized unit in any sense and had a constantly 
changing table of organization and equipment (TO&E).  Because of this, Detachment 
101’s various sections could not remain static even though they faced increasingly 
greater tasks than ever before.  They had to improve efficiency while at the same time, 
help increase the Detachment’s overall pressure on the Japanese.  As a result, this period 
  
190 
was one of rebuilding existing elements, in which OSS Washington slowly addressed the 
lack of personnel.   
In the field, the unit still had to act on its previous, but unwritten, understanding 
with General Stilwell, that following the conclusion of the Myitkyina Campaign, it 
would increase the number of guerrillas to 10,000.  In the field, Detachment 101 was the 
only Allied formation in contact with Japanese forces south of Myitkyina from August 
until 15 October.459  By November, however, Operations Section chief Major William E. 
Cummings was reporting that the pace of Allied progress was so great that “our units 
have had difficulty keeping in advance of it.”460  This meant that the unit had to work 
even harder than before to make sure that it stayed deep behind enemy lines.  Only in 
this fashion could Detachment 101 retain the utility that it had demonstrated during the 
Myitkyina Campaign.   
The Japanese forces were reeling from the beatings they had taken in north 
Burma and from the effects of the failed Imphal offensive.  They were no longer capable 
in holding all of Burma.  Their actions in north and central Burma now were designed to 
buy time so that they could prop up their defenses in southern Burma.  For their part, the 
Allies recognized that they had finally turned the tide of the war in Burma, and sought to 
exploit their advantage.  In the west, the British 14th Army had crossed the Chindwin 
River.  They were advancing against the shattered units of the Imphal/Kohima retreat.  
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By the end of 1944, they were nearing the Irrawaddy River, and had linked with British 
forces under NCAC. 
In north Burma, NCAC briefly paused, but built up its force.  It now had five 
Chinese divisions and the British 36th Division.  Merrill’s Marauders had been 
effectively destroyed in the Myitkyina fighting, but a new and much larger long range 
penetration unit, the 5332nd Brigade, called the MARS Task Force, was formed in its 
stead.  The British began the renewed offensive first.  Since the 36th Division was fresh, 
it moved to take over the Chindits’ positions.  From there, it pressed south along the rail 
corridor to Pinwe.  In October and to the east of the 36th, the combined American and 
Chinese forces began to move south along the route of the Ledo Road.  Their objective 
was the city of Bhamo.  Although the Japanese briefly resisted, their lack of numbers 
could not stem the Allied tide.  By mid-December, Bhamo was in Allied hands.  In this 
action, the Chinese forces involved had shown a remarkable improvement over their 
efforts at Myikyina just six months prior.   
The China-Burma-India-Theater was also experiencing great change.  On 18 
October, at Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s insistence, President Roosevelt recalled 
Stilwell.  With his recall, the China-Burma-India Theater was reorganized into two 
theaters.  The India-Burma Theater, with NCAC intact, was placed under the command 
of Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan.  It was his duty was to see that the north Burma 
offensive continued.  Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer was placed in command of 
the China Theater. 
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Existing Force Structure 
Peers determined that the best way to serve the Allied forces was to have his men 
push deeper behind enemy lines.  This necessitated a mobile headquarters to serve their 
needs.  One of the first to act on this was the Operations Section.  Its personnel had taken 
advantage of the monsoon to infiltrate more deeply into Japanese-held Burma.  Since 
operations were now even farther from Nazira, the headquarters Operations Section 
relocated on 27 September to Myitkyina.  The Operations Section was the pathfinder 
element; soon followed by the Communications Section and a representative, Sergeant 
Edward S. Pendergast, of the Finance Section.  The Air Section followed suit and by 
September, had six planes (out of nine total) forward based at Myitkyina.  The Research 
and Analysis (R&A) Section sent a forward party, but did not officially open their 
Myitkyina office until 24 October.  Within months, the only sections remaining at Nazira 
would be non-combat related, such as the school and the hospital.461 
The move put the headquarters elements closer to the operating area, but it also 
permitted timely intelligence dissemination.  With Myitkyina finally under Allied 
control, the Operations Section could revisit earlier ideas and incorporate new ones.  In 
October, the Detachment once again tried its hand at an older idea by parachuting three 
teams of indigenous personnel deep behind Japanese lines, much like the initial 
operations under the previous commander, Colonel Carl F. Eifler.  Not attached to any of 
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the operational areas, this time, these teams were mostly composed of experienced 
agents.  They were sent in to become the nucleus of additional operating areas that 
would expand as the Allied forces moved closer to their areas.  Even though most 
Detachment 101 units were engaged in guerrilla operations, these teams served to 
reinforce intelligence collection.462   
In the field, Stilwell’s directive to increase the number of indigenous troops to 
10,000 resulted in the rapid growth of individual companies.  This was particularly so of 
Area #1 (former FORWARD) which created five numbered battalions out of its former 
companies.  The drive south resulted in Areas #2 and #3 being combined.  This left the 
operational structure of the Detachment as two areas and a number of agent groups that 
reported directly to Myitkyina.  Conversely, the drive south also forced several 
Detachment 101 officers to disband their units.  The groups were moving away from the 
Kachin areas, outside of which, their troops had not agreed to serve.463 
With the ending of the monsoon, Detachment 101 extended liaison to even more 
Allied formations.  Lieutenants Jacob Esterline and William Martin were assigned to the 
Chinese First and Sixth Armies, respectively, and Lieutenant Roger Hilsman to the 
British 36th Division.  Further arrangements were made with the British when 
Detachment 101 agreed that the former TRAMP units would patrol east of the 
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Chindwin, while the 33rd Brigade of the 14th Army would patrol to the west.464  For 
purely intelligence matters, the R&A Section established liaison with the NCAC G-2 
Photo Interpretation section.465  By November, the Detachment had officers permanently 
assigned to liaison duties with the 124th Cavalry Regiment (U.S.); the 475th Infantry 
Regiment (U.S); the 5332nd Brigade (U.S.); the First Provisional Tank Group (U.S-
Chinese); the 4th Corps (U.K.); the 36th Division (U.K.); the South East Asia Command, 
and the First and Sixth Chinese Armies.  Detachment 101 also attached groups of 
Kachins to some of these units.  The 124th Cavalry and the First and Sixth Chinese 
Armies had an attached Detachment 101 Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) platoon 
while the 36th Division and First Provisional Tank Group also had attached agents and 
guides.   
The liaison efforts increased the awareness and use of Detachment 101’s 
intelligence and guerrilla formations, but also proved to be a severe drain on available 
officers.  These demands in part dictated that officers already assigned to the field 
groups had to stay behind the lines longer and without replacement.  This helped to 
create what Peers termed a “relatively large number of cases of mental fatigue” because 
officers and men were in the field “too long according to any and all standards.”  He 
noted whereas   “Army Combat Units … rarely remain over two months in continuous 
combat before being withdrawn,” many in Detachment 101 had been in the field for 
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anywhere from seven to twenty months.466  Other Detachment 101 sections also had to 
deal with the high operations tempo. 
Previously, Communications had reorganized to increase efficiency and had laid 
plans to push its elements further into Burma to support operations.  After briefing the 
field commanders, on 30 September the Myitkyina section took over all field radio 
traffic.  The move to Myitkyina left only four communications positions at Nazira; one 
each to work U.S. Army circuits, traffic from southern India (Calcutta), China, and a 
backup for communications from Chabua, Dinjan, and Gelakey.  The lack of intense 
operations during the monsoon helped ease the initial impact of the shift.  Yet, in 
September, the Section still handled 217,000 code groups.  The move also built in 
redundancy by having the capacity to cover communications from all field areas, Nazira, 
the air warning stations, and a backup to take over the communications of any area that 
might go off the air due to enemy movements.  This happened frequently.  In September, 
former Area #3 temporarily lost communications because of a minor Japanese push into 
the area, and in November, a move south by Area #2 resulted in Myitkyina taking over 
their schedules for three days.  Claude V. Wadsworth, the Communications Section chief 
said, “It worked so smoothly that that the field [units] were not aware of the change.”467   
The Pigeon Section, a subset of Communications, managed to drop its first birds 
into the field in late September.  They were used for emergency messages, to signal that 
parachuted agents had landed successfully, or when patrols or agents could not 
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communicate via radio.468  The use of pigeons entailed some problems as there was a 
“tremendous temptation” for indigenous troops to “shoot everything that flys [sic] for 
eating purposes but to date casualties to pigeons from this source has been light.”  
Despite this, the success rate of the pigeons in returning was quite good at 99 percent.  
They even experimented by having pigeons fly from Myitkyina to Nazira.  The birds had 
to surmount mountain ranges and fly a distance of 225 miles, but managed it in fourteen 
hours.469  Pigeons proved to have other possible uses.  “Below-standard” birds were 
being considered for use by the Morale Operations (MO) Section.  These birds would 
carry a false message.  Not being trained to return, the hope was that they would end up 
in enemy hands.470   
It was necessary to have pigeons as the Detachment still did not have adequate 
field radio sets.  Those that arrived from the States were not suited to the climate, as they 
needed to be nearly waterproof.  This meant that the Communications Section still had to 
build its own transmitters for field operations, something for which the demands of 
monitoring radio traffic did not permit much time.  For October, Communications 
personnel in Myitkyina handled 1,514 messages (94,152 groups) while Nazira handled 
2,030 messages (124,003 groups).471  November’s load reflected that communications 
duties were shifting from Nazira; 2037 messages (130,216 groups) at Myitkyina as 
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opposed to 52,050 groups handled by Nazira.472  The increasing level of radio traffic 
also forced the Communications Section at Myitkyina to alter how the field groups could 
contact base.  Previously, field groups were on schedules of when they could transit to 
base.  Field conditions and emergencies, however, did not always permit the behind the 
lines groups to communicate on schedule.  The solution was to issue a common 
frequency to the field units and to leave it open for emergency traffic.473 
Fortunately, with operational successes came new personnel.  The 
Communications Section was one that greatly benefited from new recruits.  Many of the 
new arrivals had the benefit of training stateside at OSS training Area “C,” established 
for the sole purpose of training communication personnel.  By November, numbers of 
Area “C” trained personnel began to trickle into the Detachment and they “materially 
relieved pressure” on the over-worked Section.474 
But, additional personnel brought with them problems with how to have an 
administration system effective enough to deal with a rapid influx of personnel.  Nazira 
felt the effect, as Peers reported, “There has been a noticeable tightening of regulations 
and meticulous attention to detail is now required.”  Nazira also had to reassess how it 
handled the personnel of other OSS groups.  Previously all personnel for Detachment 
202 went through Detachment 101 headquarters.  With the OSS involvement in China 
expanding, it was no longer practical for Detachment 101’s limited staff to handle the 
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influx, and arrangements were being made for Detachment 202 to be in charge of 
processing their own incoming personnel.475 
An additional critical need was for medical personnel.  In October, Commodore 
M.E. Miles of SACO/U.S. Naval Group, China, requested that all the U.S. Navy medical 
personnel in Detachment 101 be released and sent to his command within three weeks.  
This “could not have come at a more inopportune time,” as the increased combat nature 
of Detachment 101’s work made medical personnel even more necessary.  As units 
moved deeper into enemy controlled-areas, they found that in order to prevent their own 
troops from getting ill, they had to treat the local population for such maladies as 
smallpox.  This effort required more medical personnel.  While Detachment 101 had 
asked for them, none had arrived over the previous four months.  Demands on the 
medical department in November were “approximately three times that of any previous 
month,” making keeping of adequate supplies on hand difficult.476  As it was, all the 
U.S. Navy pharmacists’ mates serving in the field were withdrawn by December and 
replaced by Army medical personnel who required time to acclimate.477  The fortunate 
recruiting of five nurses who had previously worked for the famed Burma Surgeon, Dr. 
Gordon Seagrave, eased the burden.  Four additional former Seagrave nurses arrived in 
December.  As these nurses were from Burma, they had the additional benefit of helping 
put indigenous casualties at ease and improving their morale.   
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By November, the increased level of operations—and subsequent casualties—
had filled the hospital to capacity.  The new fifty-bed hospital at Nazira allowed for 
major surgical procedures.  December’s hospital records reflect the cost of the increased 
operational activities and the improvement in the Medical Section’s capabilities.  
Seventy-five personnel were admitted to the hospital and forty-five discharged.  There 
were twelve major surgical procedures ranging from perforated intestines to plastic 
surgery to treating bayonet, gunshots, and shrapnel wounds.  The dispensary treated 186 
patients, conducted 131 physical examinations, and performed 481 immunizations, while 
the dentist saw 216 patients.  Medical personnel detailed to the field were likewise busy, 
with 107 emergency surgeries and 2596 cases of disease treated.478   
The Schools and Training Section of Detachment 101 also did its best to enhance 
cooperation with the U.S. Army.  In September, it furnished instructors to help train an 
Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) platoon for the 475th Infantry Regiment of the 
5332nd Brigade (Provisional).  In October, it established a jungle warfare instruction 
center in Myitkyina for the 475th and a two-week long OSS course at the forward 
training area at Taro, formerly occupied by TRAMP.  The Section also produced 
instructional booklets, such as primers on how to pick up foreign languages.479   
In September, the Section finished a reorganization.  At Nazira, it now had 
twelve different camps that were broken down into the type of personnel they could 
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handle: including one camp each for Americans, Karens, Burmans, Kachins, Shans, 
Thai, and females.  The reorganization included formulating standard operating 
procedures for incoming personnel.  When an indigenous recruit arrived, they were 
photographed, given a physical examination, sworn into the unit (under the legal 
penalties of the India Secrets Act), given dental care, and then sent on to the proper 
training camp.480  Even dental care had to be carefully administered because work on an 
indigenous agent had to resemble something that would have been done by a local 
dentist.  This meant that the Detachment 101 dentist had to use local materials and 
attempt to artificially age his work so that it did not appear as new.481  The photographs 
and records of the agents were the start of the Detachment advocating for a series of 
background checks and a central records repository that would prevent the rehiring of 
employees already deemed unsuitable by other U.S. Government organizations.482  New 
personnel in the field meant that enhanced logistical support was necessary. 
The continuation of the monsoon allowed the Air Drop Section a respite over the 
previous month.  Despite the weather, in September, the group dropped 542,384 pounds 
of supplies, delivered by 120 aircraft.483  To accomplish this feat, the drop planes in 
some instances had to make twenty attempts at finding a single field group.  The respite 
ended in October when the letup of the monsoon allowed for a greater number of flights.  
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The total weight of supplies dropped topped more than 1,000,000 pounds, requiring 217 
flights of C-47 and 18 of B-25’s that flew out of four airfields.  The Detachment now 
had seven C-47’s reserved for daily flights out of Dinjan and the USAAF allowed one of 
these to remain overnight at Myitkyina to allow either another flight in the early morning 
or late afternoon.  To save time, supplies were loaded directly from an airfield at Nazira, 
but it was only an interim solution while the Detachment moved its main supply depots 
to Dinjan airfield, where it had secured three warehouses.484   
By forward basing supplies at Dinjan, the Detachment reduced the time needed 
to transport materials the 110 miles from Nazira.  For additional storage, they secured a 
warehouse at Chalkhoa (eighteen miles from Dinjan), but had other improvements as 
well.  Dinjan had two officers and fifteen enlisted men assigned, while two officers and 
three enlisted men worked out of Chalkhoa.  Eight two-and-a-half ton trucks transported 
the supplies, a vast improvement over the previous months.  The supply situation was so 
improved that by December, the Section planned to move its Chalkhoa facilities to 
Dinjan, which had the additional benefit of reducing Detachment 101’s workload.  
Detachment 202 took over the Chalkhoa warehouse.  Thereafter, that OSS element 
worked with Detachment 505 to transit its own supplies over the Hump.485   
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These moves proved beneficial as by December, the total dropped again 
exceeded 1,000,000 pounds; 198 C-47 flights and from 6 B-25s dropped 1,132,028 
pounds, 90 percent of which originated from Dinjan.  An extra C-47 was secured (for a 
total of eight) with another on call for night drops.  B-25s were available from the 
USAAF when necessary for more dangerous missions.  As an aside, operations also 
heavily taxed the Detachment’s Red Ass Squadron.  With only 7 operational aircraft, 
they flew a total of 506 hours of combat flying in which they carried 356 passengers, 30 
wounded patients, and 24,495 tons of cargo.486  They conducted twice-daily flights 
between important locations that in addition to other duties, brought to Nazira the paper 
copies of all communications transmissions handled by the Myitkyina station.487   
Increased operations also meant that the Finance Section had more duties.  The 
larger number of indigenous personnel elevated the Detachment’s operating costs to 
620,000 rupees for the month of October.  Fortunately, newer recruits were more likely 
to accept either newer minted silver coinage, or even paper script.  This lowered the 
demand for the hard to obtain pre-war coins.  As units pressed deeper into Burma, 
however, the Section had different currency demands placed upon it.  New forms of 
currency required included Japanese occupation rupee notes, examples of which the 
Section sent to OSS Washington for counterfeiting, and British gold sovereigns.488  
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There remained, however, the problem of having enough personnel to make sure that 
everyone was paid.  To help ease the burden, beginning in November, the Detachment 
101 Special Funds Section no longer had to account for Detachment 505 in Calcutta.  
Instead, an officer there would handle that OSS Sections’ accounting.  Additionally, the 
Section sought to ease field payments by forward basing a finance officer in each of the 
three operating areas.489   
The way that the Detachment handled intelligence also changed.  After having 
taken over the Secret Intelligence (SI) role, R&A sought to repackage intelligence 
reports into products that might be better able to assist end-users.  Much as the Branch 
did with OSS Washington, the Detachment 101 R&A Section compiled lengthy reports, 
including a ninety-four page study entitled the “Namhkam-Hserwi General Area 
Intelligence Summary.”  Other useful products included illustrated booklets on Japanese 
rank insignia that could assist non-English speakers.  R&A personnel enhanced the 
usefulness of their reports by providing oral briefings to senior personnel when 
requested, such as to the Office of War Information (OWI), the 10th Air Force, NCAC 
Headquarters, and several British organizations.  The briefings, which lasted from one to 
six hours, were conducted on average every two to three days.490  R&A assisted 
operations by being the conduit from which to obtain maps (produced or secured by 
Detachment 303), and helped the MO Section by translating captured Japanese 
documents.  In December, R&A was rewarded for its efforts by receiving a 120 percent 
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augmentation in personnel.  With more personnel, however, came more work.  In 
addition to a greater number of oral briefings, the Section wrote fourteen reports that 
month, several of which came from material supplied by the Detachment 101 X-2 
(counter-intelligence) Section.  Map orders also had increased by 200 to 430 percent, 
depending on type, since October.491 
Other branches not yet considered core areas of the Detachment’s work were also 
improved as the group moved toward 1945.  One of these was the MO Section, which 
had little to show at the end of the Myitkyina Campaign.  The chief of MO at the 
Southeast Asia Command (SEAC, and the OSS element was Detachment 404) wrote to 
OSS Washington that “MO ended the moment Charlie Fenn was drawn out [in early 
1944].”492  To help remedy the situation, Peers directed Robert Wentworth, Detachment 
101 MO Section chief, to travel to New Delhi (Detachment 303) to confer with his 
colleagues in the hopes that they could assist with production.  Wentworth brought with 
him ideas and examples of products that might be of use to the Detachment 101 field 
groups.  He was assisted by Captain William Cummings, the Operations Section head in 
Myitkyina.  Due to limited resources and its integration into SEAC, Detachment 303’s 
solution was to make use of British facilities to assist with the translation and printing of 
MO leaflets.  Wentworth made the further step of traveling to Detachment 404 at Kandy, 
Ceylon, where he arranged for a small printing press to be sent to Detachment 101 for 
the small-scale production of leaflets.  Detachment 303 would handle larger production 
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efforts.  This effort switched the Detachment’s reliance on the OWI to OSS facilities.  In 
fact, in quite a reversal from the previous period, OWI now was pushing to place a 
representative with Detachment 101, so that the OSS could assist in distributing their 
products.  The coordination with OWI also allowed the MO unit to discover what 
practices best worked for that unit.  Weekly liaison meetings with OWI and NCAC 
facilitated coordination of propaganda in the area.493   
In November, the long-awaited five-man GOLD DUST team arrived in 
Myitkyina from OSS Washington.  GOLD DUST was the first “complete and self 
contained” MO unit for the Far East and served as a sort of pilot program.494  OSS 
Washington put the team together and put it through “the most intensive schedule” of 
preparation to make them “the best trained unit MO has ever sent to the field.”  The 
preparation included training in MO techniques as well as studying the situation in 
Burma, and also on Japanese vulnerabilities.495  They brought with them printing 
equipment and within a week of their arrival were conducting black operations.  Their 
first product was a pamphlet directed at Burmese soldiers serving with the Japanese 
forces.496  By December, the group had received two Nisei from OSS Washington to 
assist in translation.  Production delays due to a lack of equipment, however, were 
preventing the group from getting their products printed.  But, unlike what had been the 
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case for prior efforts at Detachment 101, they had extensive support from MO 
Washington, who supplied ideas for use in products and rumor campaigns.497 
The Research and Development (R&D) Section was also more firmly established 
and could devote itself to less-time sensitive projects.  In October, their two main 
projects were to develop a way to launch rifle grenades from an M-3 sub-machinegun, 
and how to use mortars and bazookas as a means of distributing propaganda leaflets.  
Other projects were parachute locators, bazooka-launched illuminating flares, message 
self-destruction devices, and ground illumination devices that would alert encamped 
field groups that the enemy was nearby.  As with most of the other sections at 
Detachment 101, the R&D Section’s main obstacle was in having enough trained 
personnel, but it also lacked laboratory space and tools.498  The Section also continued 
working on previous projects.  One that received the most attention was camouflaging 
explosive devices, so much so that this group became its own subsection at Detachment 
101 R&D.  This sub-section worked on using water jugs, bamboo, fake rocks and 
vegetables made of plaster, and a bamboo raft to conceal explosive charges.  It also 
worked on using common items as message concealment devices.  Examples of these 
items included shoes and belts.  Other members of R&D busied themselves with the 
preparation of smoke devices that would identify Detachment 101 units to aircraft flying 
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overhead.  This last item in particular was useful as Allied aircraft occasionally mistook 
Detachment 101 patrols for the enemy.499    
The X-2 Section found itself on firmer ground than in August 1944.  Major Baird 
V. Helfrich had arrived and completed a survey of the area.  He noted that although the 
British had made some efforts at identifying what were termed black (collaborators) and 
white (friendly) citizens, they had done little to keep the information current.  As a 
result, Helfrich made this an X-2 undertaking and coordinated with Detachment 101 and 
British forces in the operating area.500  He quickly came to understand that this was not 
going to be an easy task, and noted, “During early October it became apparent that there 
was no hope of building ‘current’ blacklists” because the available information was so 
dated.501  His solution was to travel behind the lines to a forward operating base, where 
the information was more readily available.  Thereupon, he devised a form to send to the 
field groups to log information on white and black citizens, known as “hats,” so that 
upon liberation of a town or area, both the friendly citizens and the collaborators could 
be separated.  “Black hats” included Japanese collaborators or those who had turned 
over Allied soldiers and airmen to the Japanese.  “White hats” were those who had not 
aided or had resisted the Japanese, while “grey hats” where those whose allegiance to the 
Allied cause was in doubt.  Helfrich tried to get the Burma Civil Affairs Service, the 
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Burma Intelligence Corps, and the Burma Police to help apprehend the black hats.  But,  
due to a lack of manpower, funds, transport, and supplies, these organizations had no 
means of securing collaborators or making use of the population that had remained 
friendly toward the Allies.  This resulted in little background checking into the 
indigenous personnel employed by the Allies.  Upon bringing this up to NCAC, Colonel 
Joseph Stilwell, Jr., head of the G-2 section, appointed Helfrich to cooperate with the 
Counter-Intelligence Corps to supervise the activation and coordination of combat 
interrogation teams (CITs).502   
These teams worked to sort out and detain black hats until authorities of the 
Burma government took responsibility for them.  In the past, and many times even with 
the CITs, suspected black hats would be taken by Kachins—with or without the 
knowledge of the OSS—and disposed of before a trial could be held.  The first of these 
five to seven-man CITs was activated at the end of October.  By November, two more 
CITs were operating with plans to acquire additional personnel to fill out three more 
teams.  Additional personnel came from the MO Section, as well as OWI.  Operations 
were quickly underway, and in November, the CITs interrogated 220 suspects and 
apprehended 39.503  By December, the CITs were able to provide the Detachment 101 
R&A Section with between fifty and sixty pounds of captured Japanese and Burmese 
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documents.  The teams uncovered, for the first time in NCAC, the existence of the 
Burmese Anti-Fascist League (AFL), a widespread underground organization based in 
Rangoon that was opposed to the Japanese occupation.  These teams also uncovered that 
the British SEAC had been working with the AFL for over a year.   Combat Interrogation 
Team #3 was able to exploit the Allied liberation of Bhamo by searching the city for 
intelligence just two days after it fell (the delay was because of enemy mines had to be 
cleared).  The CIT was able to procure six Japanese knapsacks full of enemy documents 
that they sent to the NCAC G-2 section.504  Additional CIT duties included reporting on 
the local situation, as well as collecting weapons back from the indigenous population. 
A New Organization … of Sorts 
Supplying intelligence remained a core function of Detachment 101 and by 
September, thirty-five separate organizations relied upon Detachment 101 intelligence 
reports.505  In November, Major Chester R. Chartrand, who had been the liaison to 
NCAC during the Myitkyina campaign, in effect reconstituted the SI Section when he 
returned to Nazira.  Much like he had been done before R&A had taken over the role of 
handling actionable intelligence, Chartrand prepared weekly intelligence reports, 
handled requests for information, forwarded items of interest to the field groups, and 
briefed NCAC daily.  This was done with the help of a large photomontage of the 
operating area, upon which was placed intelligence received from the field groups, such 
as the locations of enemy units.  The NCAC G-3 used this intelligence to task the 
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USAAF with their daily targets.506  Chartrand was able to report in December that 
eighty-five percent of the items in the U.S. Army weekly G-2 summaries originated from 
Detachment 101 intelligence, as did most of the bombing targets for the 10th USAAF.507 
Conclusion 
Although assisting with the fall of Myitkyina was the Detachment’s focus in 
1944, its actions after were demanding.  Not only did the unit have to work in a rapidly 
changing operating environment, but it also had to rebuild its sections to support the 
north Burma offensive in such a way that they could contribute to the campaign as 
efficiently as possible.  At the same time, the unit’s headquarters sections had to become 
mobile to best support the operating elements.  The Detachment’s work in the Myitkyina 
Campaign had given the unit visibility in theater and from OSS Washington.  This had 
translated into more resources, such as the GOLD DUST team.  The unit’s flexibility 
had allowed it to move its base of operations, build on its previous organization, 
incorporate new assets, and still be able to support a high operational tempo and recruit a 
larger pool of indigenous troops.  The next chapter will focus on how the unit adapted as 
it supported the NCAC drive for Lashio.  It was in this time that the unit transition from 
being a guerrilla organization to almost becoming the equivalent of a U.S. Army division 
in terms of personnel and impact.  
                                                 
506
 [Peers to Donovan], “O.S.S.S.U. Detachment 101 Monthly Report November 1944,” [1 December 
1944], NARA.  See Chester R. Chartrand to Chief, SI Branch, “SI Report for November.” 
507
 [Peers to Donovan], “O.S.S.S.U. Detachment 101 Monthly Report December 1944,” [1 January 1945], 
NARA.  See Chester R. Chartrand to Chief, SI Branch, “SI Monthly Report Nov. 25 to Dec. 25, 1944.” 
  
211 
CHAPTER X 
 
THE LAST OSS BRANCHES ARRIVE:  JANUARY-MARCH 1945 
 
Although the Burma Campaign was nearly at a close, Detachment 101 continued 
to change its force structure, reinforce its sections, and strove to become more efficient.  
Those sections with an immediate operational utility, such as the Air Drop Section and 
the Red Ass Squadron, continued to serve well and became even more indispensible to 
the Detachment’s operations.  Others, such as the X-2 and R&D Sections, could not 
offer the direct support needed to support the Detachment’s increasing operational focus.  
Conversely, the MO Section finally proved to be effective.  The operations of this 
Section were an indication that even at this late stage, a properly led and supported 
element could—even if had gotten off to a poor start—make an impact.  In particular, 
this period is when the OSS Operational Group (OG) Branch first made its appearance at 
Detachment 101.  At this late stage, this OSS element could not bring with it a mission 
unique enough to merit the effort required to include it as a separate section within the 
Detachment.  This chapter will discuss the organizational changes of the Detachment 
through March 1945. 
Strategically, the war in north Burma continued to be a hard-fought campaign by 
a variety of British (and Empire), Chinese, and American forces, that remained on a 
relative shoestring.  General Sultan’s multinational force continued to press the Japanese 
and forced them further south.  With the fall of Bhamo, NCAC’s goal was now to open 
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the route of the former Ledo Road to China, now renamed the Stilwell Road.  At the start 
of 1945, some 19,500 Japanese troops lay in the 50 miles of territory that separated 
NCAC forces from Allied forces in China.508  NCAC’s force had shrunk, when General 
Wedemeyer recalled two of its Chinese divisions in December 1944, back to China.  
Nevertheless, by the end of January, NCAC had the land route to China clear of the 
Japanese.  The first Allied convoys arrived in Kunming in early February.   
Now, all that NCAC had left to accomplish was to make sure that the route of the 
Stilwell Road was secure.  Nearby Japanese were still enough of a threat that they had to 
eliminated or pushed south.  In addition, the threat of having intact Japanese formations 
in the rear of the advancing British 14th Army necessitated that NCAC clear these forces 
from the area.  General Sultan, the NCAC commander, set his sights on taking Lashio.  
Capture of this town, on the route of the old Burma Road, would cut the lines of supply 
to any Japanese forces remaining north of the area.  Their inevitable retreat would create 
a large buffer of liberated territory that would secure convoys going to China from being 
harassed by the enemy.  The MARS Task Force and two Chinese divisions were the 
forces that Sultan had available to secure the area.  Although the Japanese bitterly 
resisted, they could no longer hold onto the area.  Chinese forces secured Lashio on 6-7 
March while the MARS Task Force harassed Japanese forces that were trying to retreat 
in the wake of the Chinese advance.  After taking Lashio, the Chinese force drove a 
further thirty miles south to take Hsipaw.  Meanwhile, on the western portion of 
NCAC’s AOR, the British 36th and Chinese 50th Divisions reached east of Mandalay to 
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link up with the British 14th Army.  They had also advanced close to Hsipaw.  This 
meant that there no longer remained a gap between the forces of NCAC or the 14th 
Army.  With its mission for NCAC completed, the 36th Division transferred back to the 
14th Army’s command on 1 April. 
The 14th Army was likewise making huge strides in central Burma.  An armored 
column broke out and in a blitzkrieg-like move, penetrated deep within the enemy lines 
in early March to take Meiktila.  This move, the first use of an air-ground-armor 
combination by the British, surprised the Japanese.  They only had some 4,000 defenders 
to meet a division of regular infantry, an armor brigade, as well as an additional air-lifted 
brigade.  Once the 14th Army took the town, the Japanese had to react because Meiktila’s 
capture cut off the escape route for the bulk of their force in central Burma.  Their 
savage but uncoordinated counter-attacks could not break the Allied hold on the town.  
The battle for Meiktila was decided in the Allies’ favor by the end of March, and with it, 
the Japanese also lost the crucial battle for central Burma.  Further north, other 14th 
Army forces invested the key city of Mandalay.  Unwisely, the Japanese held there.  By 
the time they ordered the retreat, their forces were in confusion.  With both these critical 
areas under Allied occupation, the Japanese no longer could mount an effective defense 
of lower Burma.  The way was open for the 14th Army to drive towards Rangoon. 
The Japanese trying to hold Rangoon and southern Burma faced another threat as 
well.  The XV Indian Corps was pressing into the Arakan region along the coast, and, 
compared to the fighting that had occurred in the region from 1942, made rapid progress.  
In January, the major town of Akyab fell.  By March, the British forces had conducted 
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an amphibious assault on Ramree Island.  They soon secured it for use as a base from 
which to launch attacks against the mainland.   
Through all these Allied drives, Detachment 101 continued to be a crucial 
element, particularly to NCAC.  Peers reported in January that the Northern Combat 
Area Command (NCAC) relied on the OSS because “practically all strategic and tactical 
operations are based on our intelligence reports” and that the USAAF derived 80 percent 
of its targets from Detachment 101 supplied intelligence.  In the field, Detachment 101 
units had expanded their operations to the south and east and were providing intelligence 
collection, guides, and forces that protected the flanks of conventional Allied units from 
the Chinese border to the Chindwin River.  For NCAC, this included assisting the 
American MARS Task Force and the Chinese 30th and 38th Divisions in the eastern part 
of Burma, and the British 36th and Chinese 50th Divisions in the west.  Detachment 101 
groups also provided intelligence that supported the 14th Army’s drive.  Additional agent 
groups penetrated the southern Shan States.   
Still, the focus of the Detachment at this late stage was on combat operations.  
Because the Allied advance again placed the Detachment farther south than it had ever 
operated, many Kachins wanted to go home.  Area #1 was particularly hard hit in this 
respect.  Six of its seven battalions disbanded and were transported back to their home 
areas.509  The OSS units consolidated.  By encouraging enough seasoned guerrillas to 
stay, and by recruiting a new mix of Shans, Chins, and even Burmese, the Detachment 
salvaged four battalions.  These combat forces operated in the path of the Allied 
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advance, and greatly disrupted Japanese efforts to counter the main Allied forces.  The 
Japanese recognized the effectiveness of Detachment 101’s guerrillas when they issued 
orders telling all rear echelon troops that they should consider themselves front line 
soldiers due to the presence of Allied airborne units—when in fact the only units there 
belonged to the OSS.  Peers estimated in January that with less than 1 percent of the 
Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) total strength, Detachment 101 had inflicted 
29 percent of the reported casualties.510   
Operations in north Burma were not the group’s only focus.  In February, the unit 
took responsibility for OSS operations along Burma’s Arakan coast and renamed the 
former Detachment 404-controlled Operation BITTERSWEET as the Detachment 101 
Arakan Field Unit (AFU).  Like the effort in the Shan States, Detachment 101 AFU 
involved a combined operations campaign with organic land and air elements.  The 
Arakan had a maritime component as well.  Such was the Detachment’s importance that 
early in the year, it had two high-level visits.  Donovan visited in January, as did General 
Sultan.  For the personnel of the Detachment, this period represented a rapidly changing 
strategic picture.  Despite the Allied advance, the OSS still had much to accomplish in 
Burma, and Detachment 101 still had to evolve to increase its effectiveness.511 
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Existing Force Structure 
As happened with the fall of Myitkyina, the rapid pace of the Allied advance 
once again left Detachment 101 headquarters far behind Allied lines.  This forced the 
group to once again advance its forward headquarters elements.  This time the move was 
to Bhamo, and between 31 January and 1 February, the entire Myitkyina headquarters—
including Peers—moved there.512  The new headquarters was called Detachment 101 
BA.  To Peers, the move put “all our activities within a forty minute flight to our two 
Field Area Headquarters.”513  The unit even closed the jungle school at Taro in February 
and moved it to Nazira as it was no longer practical to keep it at its previous location. 
The Operations Section had to account for an increasing number of indigenous 
recruits.  By January, two additional battalions were raised in Area #1, leading to a total 
approximate strength of 5500 indigenous soldiers.  But the drive south took some troops 
away from their home areas, and in the same month some 350 Kachins received 
discharges in Area #2 and went home.514   
The increased number of discharges meant that the Detachment officers had to 
have reserves of funds on hand.  Prompt payment helped ensure that serving troops 
remained with their units, or if they did not, that the former troops received honorariums 
for good service.  Both helped maintain good morale.  The Finance Section provided the 
Air Drop Section at Dinjan with a large ready reserve of several different forms of cash, 
both paper and coin silver.  Costs for operations alone in January amounted to some 
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470,000 rupees, while in March, the funds owed to the guerrillas disbanding in Area #1 
contributed to a monthly operating cost of 764,074 rupees.515  Paying off these troops 
was the largest single expense handled by the Finance Section during its existence.516 
The high operational tempo caused an increasing reliance upon the Detachment’s 
Red Ass Squadron.  This in turn caused them to take out of service a number of liaison 
aircraft for maintenance.  In January, the lack of servicing facilities left the Detachment 
with four L-1s and one L-5.  The stress placed on the L-1s was particularly severe.  The 
Squadron commander, Francis J. Reardon described some of the planes as having “a 
total of 7000 hours are on record as far as we can ascertain.  That is far above what is 
termed war weary aircraft … If no aircraft are forthcoming then it is only a matter of 
time before our planes become useless.”  The Section was hoping to secure twelve 
additional light aircraft as replacements and several more mechanics to keep the ones 
they already had in service.  Despite the problems, in January, the Red Ass Squadron 
managed to transport 30,450 pounds of supplies to the forward groups, 476 passengers, 
and 146 wounded, of which 70 were from the 475th Infantry Regiment.  These actions 
required over 421 hours of combat flying.  For these actions, the personnel of the 
squadron received a commendation from Brigadier General John P. Willey, the 
commanding officer of the MARS Task Force.517 
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In February, the squadron’s situation improved.  It moved to a new airfield at 
Bhamo and received new aircraft from Major General George E. Stratemeyer, 
commander of Army Air Forces in the China Theater.  The Bhamo airfield had seven 
aircraft, there were two aircraft at Nazira, two L-1’s undergoing maintenance, one 
airplane due to arrive from India, and an unserviceable Spitfire.  The Section was getting 
enough replacement pilots that reliance upon the USAAF liaison squadrons ceased.  By 
the end of February, the squadron flew nearly 413 combat hours, carried 508 passengers, 
evacuated 43 casualties and three prisoners, and flew 31,275 pounds of cargo.518   
March was a particularly busy month for the Red Ass Squadron as they assisted 
in the drive to take Lashio.  The planes flew in ammunition and equipment, carried out 
captured documents and wounded personnel, and flew Joost to his various battalion 
headquarters.  This ability was fortunate because in one case, it allowed Joost to warn 
two battalions that were out of radio communication that a Chinese unit would soon 
shell the area they were in with 155mm guns.  The battalions withdrew ahead of time, 
saving them numerous and unnecessary casualties.  In the course of conducting these 
and other operations, the Section reached another all-time high by flying 519 combat 
hours, carrying 573 passengers, evacuating 38 wounded and carrying 40,845 pounds of 
cargo.  Joost, commanding officer of Area #1, said that the light aircraft were 
indispensable to his actions.519    
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The Air Drop Section likewise operated at full capacity.  The total tonnage 
dropped in January again exceeded a million pounds, with 1,009,674 pounds dropped 
out of 200 C-47s, three B-25s, and a solitary B-24.  At the same time, the planes 
transported 334 personnel and parachuted 47 into the field.  Nineteen drops were 
conducted at night to infiltrate teams or agents under the cover of darkness.  During 
these missions, Detachment 101 assumed the responsibility of navigating the aircraft to 
the selected location and supplied the personnel to kick the cargo out of the airplane.  
The OSS assumed operational control of the assigned aircrews from the time the airplane 
took off until it had landed.  Prior to taking off, the crews—all selected from volunteers 
based on their experience and skill—were given a security brief and told never to reveal 
the location, cargos, or personnel dropped.  These flights originated from Myitkyina and 
accounted for a quarter of the total tonnage dropped to Detachment 101 groups that 
month.520 
February provided no let up with 168 personnel transported, 21 parachuted, and 
1,482,989 pounds of supplies dropped to the field groups from 261 C-47s, one B-25, five 
B-24s, and two C-45s.521  With the increase in dropping supplies to the forward groups, 
Detachment 101 also had to improve upon its logistics facilities.  In January, the group 
moved from the three warehouses that it had at Dinjan to six of better construction that 
were co-located together so that they could be more isolated.  Of these warehouses, the 
Supply Section used one for packing chutes and containers, two for arms and 
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ammunition, and the rest for other supplies.  This arrangement allowed the Detachment 
to have extra stocks of material on hand.  To help move the supplies they now had ten 
two-and-a-half ton trucks, five personnel at Dinjan and two at Nazira.522  By March, the 
number of warehouses available to the Detachment at Dinjan increased to sixteen.  This 
left the group with a reserve of 2,225,925 pounds of rations and 1,000,000 pounds of 
ordnance and quartermaster supplies.  This was about a two month reserve, as in March, 
the total amount dropped into the field was 1,476,942 pounds and 56 personnel 
parachuted.  The Detachment had ten dedicated C-47s at this time, with other specialized 
aircraft on call when needed.  The drops in March required 249 C-47 sorties, 7 B-24s, 
and 9 B-25s.  Most drops originated from Dinjan.523 
Like many other elements, in January the Communications Section was 
preparing to move from Myitkyina to Bhamo, where it had already constructed a series 
of four sixty-three foot steel towers arranged in a square.  All that was necessary for their 
use was to drive a transmitter truck underneath them, hook it up, and transmit.  
Meanwhile, the communications sub-section at Nazira handled an average of 4,640 
letter-code groups per day.  Field sections were equally busy, with Area #1 handling a 
daily average of 4,390 groups and Area #2, 3,605 groups.  The Cryptographic subsection 
was particularly hard hit.  Myitkyina handled 3,699 messages composed of 231,687 
groups; Nazira had 1,329 messages with 62,675 groups, Area #1 headquarters handled 
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1,398 messages and 89,579 groups, and Area #2 headquarters dealt with 1,123 messages 
and 58,467 groups.   
Despite the increased operational responsibilities, however, the supply situation 
for the Communication Section greatly improved and became, as the Section chief 
reported, “the best it has ever been.”  Quantities of the improved OSS-supplied SSR-1H 
receiver arrived, making it possible for Nazira to stop the production of field radios, 
thereby removing their “main headache.”  The wide distribution of one-time pads, a 
cryptographic device that was very secure as the key remained at base while the code 
was used once and thrown away, saved time on the sending and deciphering of 
messages.524  A trained cryptographer using a one-time pad could encode or decode a 
short message faster than using an electric code machine, and almost as fast as a code 
machine on a longer message.525  The level of traffic from the field only increased in 
February.  Area #1 sent 2,053 messages composed of 114,567 groups, while Area #2 
sent 1,344 composed of 66,286.526  The pace increased again on 9 March, when Bhamo 
took over the communications duties of Area #1 when that organization disbanded six of 
its seven battalions. 
On 4 January, the Pigeon Section established a loft in Bhamo in preparation for 
the time when other Detachment 101 elements would move there from Myitkyina.  
Pigeons were dropped with several agents and supplied to the pilots of the Red Ass 
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Squadron in case their planes went down, and they were left with no other method of 
contacting base.  On 10 January, the Section scored a success when several birds 
returned from an agent who stated that he could not find his dropped radio or food, was 
starving, and that the area was free of Japanese.  This opened the way to send the 
eighteen-man JACKO combat team on 19 January.527  The importance of pigeons to the 
Detachment rose as the operational level increased.  When a radio was down, the 
pigeons could deliver a message in a little more than a half hour what would take a 
human messenger to cover in three to four days.528 
Increased operations and larger numbers of indigenous personnel also meant that 
the Medical Section had to expand in order to meet the potential rise in casualties.  The 
first step was to make arrangements with the 200-bed 44th Field Hospital at Myitkyina, 
which was responsible for the care of Chinese and indigenous troops.  The 44th agreed to 
set aside a separate ward to take care of less-critically sick or wounded Detachment 101 
personnel whose care did not require moving them to Nazira.  This represented a vast 
improvement.  It reduced the number of casualties coming back to Nazira, and permitted 
treating of those who did not normally receive medical care because of the minor nature 
of their condition and the distance necessary to transport them.  To help expedite the 
transfer of indigenous troops to the hospital, the Medical Section received the help of the 
821st Air Evacuation Squadron, which assisted the Red Ass Squadron.529  With the 
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inclusion of Arakan operations into the scope of Detachment 101, the Medical Section 
also arranged to use the 142nd General Hospital in Calcutta, India, for the care of 
wounded OSS and indigenous troops on that front.530 
The hospital at Nazira nonetheless remained busy.  In January, there were sixty-
five admissions, twelve surgical procedures; with the laboratory, X-ray facility, 
dispensary, and dental clinic being correspondingly active.  Field medical personnel 
handled at least 346 surgical cases and cared for at least 6,500 instances of illness.  The 
majority of the cases treated, whether among indigenous troops or the local population, 
were for malaria.  These numbers do not tell the full story of the workload of the medical 
personnel assigned to the field.  Since medical personnel were scarce, the Detachment 
only had the bare minimum to make sure that all groups were covered.  This meant that 
in troop strength alone, medical personnel assigned to Area #2 had to care for an average 
of 150 men, while those in Area #2 cared for 750 men.  This does not count treating the 
local population.   
Such heavy workloads and a lack of replacements meant that medical personnel 
were becoming greatly fatigued and increasingly recognized as requiring rest.531  The 
remaining medical personnel from former Area #1 who had stayed in the field were 
having a “strenuous time keeping up with the marked increase in work” during March. 
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532
 Due to an increased combat role for the guerrilla battalions, they dealt with seventeen 
severe battle wounds, one of which was fatal.  Only six out of the fourteen field groups 
reported their medical load.  However, this still amounted to 281 surgeries, and treating 
1,192 instances of disease.  The Section was disturbed to find that much of this disease 
was due to soldiers not using mosquito nets and to poor sanitation, particularly in the 
preparation of food.533   
On the intelligence side of the operational spectrum, the R&A Section received 
new personnel and increased their liaison contacts with other organizations.  Relatively 
few of their personnel, however, had been supplied as true R&A personnel from 
Washington (in February, it was three out of eighteen).  Rather, Detachment 101 
assigned them to the Section in an ad hoc fashion, but this did not greatly affect the 
group’s performance.  By January, the Section was in communication with twenty 
separate organizations, among them several in NCAC, the USAAF, the Counter-
Intelligence Corps (CIC), The Office of War Information (OWI), and American, 
Chinese, British, and Indian combat units.  These liaison contacts increased the number 
of required oral briefings to a point that the Section chief reported that it was 
“impossible to keep a record for the month.”  In January alone, the Section wrote 
thirteen intelligence reports, many of which concerned the location and status of roads 
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and trails in enemy-controlled areas, and filled numerous requests for map and aerial 
reconnaissance photographs.534   
In February, an arrangement with the SI Section clarified R&A’s duties.  
Thereafter, R&A was responsible for processing “incoming intelligence and produces 
intelligence through interrogation, translation of documents, photo interpretation, and 
research.”535  The Section compiled the reports into finished products that the SI Section 
distributed.  Much of the R&A material focused on intelligence of immediate tactical 
use.  Even longer-range studies at this point concerned NCAC requirements, such as the 
inadequacies of the Japanese logistic system.536  The R&A Section also obtained the 
services of one of the Air Drop kickers to take aerial photography when requested, 
which was then turned over to Lieutenant Alger Ellis, the newly-arrived photo-
interpreter, Lieutenant Alger Ellis.537  A further utility for the R&A Section was 
operational support.  The Section defined no-bomb areas for the USAAF.  Once it 
received notification that a Detachment 101 unit was in a certain location, the Section 
plotted the information and sent it to the A-2 officer.  The Section also established a 
display room to exhibit captured enemy material.538 
The small SI Section was anticipating becoming a larger entity in Detachment 
101’s force structure.  Peers recognized that the Section was woefully short of personnel 
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and wrote to Donovan in January that although the unit furnished about 90 percent of the 
intelligence used by the USAAF and 85 percent of that used by NCAC, it had “only one 
SI man from Washington during the entire period.”539  The lack of personnel did not go 
unnoticed in the field.  The Arakan section chief complained, “not one item was 
transmitted to this Hqs between 21 February and 10 March except in the form of weekly 
summaries which arrive by pouch so late that most of the information has lost its 
value.”540  By March, minor personnel additions were helping SI.  They helped to sort 
through the more than 500 intelligence reports that it disseminated to various end-users, 
as well as assist in a new project of preparing a short history of Detachment 101.541  This 
final project would become the focus of the Section after March, when the Section was 
mainly in place merely to summarize operational results and to interview personnel 
returning from the field.  Section head Chester Chartrand received assistance in this 
endeavor from a newly created element called the Reports Section.  The single reports 
officer that composed the Section compiled lists of accomplishments for OSS 
Washington’s benefit.  Even in the limited time that he was at Detachment 101, the 
reports officer became frustrated with OSS Washington’s lack of direction.  When the 
Detachment disbanded in July, he wrote in his final report, “Since I have been here, I 
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have received no word from Washington as to whether the reports were fulfilling 
requirements or any criticisms that might help to improve them.”542 
Intelligence dissemination improved in February when a direct teletype line was 
laid to the 10th Air Force A-2.  This enabled Detachment 101 to pass “’hot’ information 
to them within minutes” upon receipt, and, increased the actionability of Detachment 
101-supplied intelligence.543  A Detachment 101 officer was also sent to the 1st Tank  
Provisional Group, and further liaison was established in March with the British 14th 
Army, the 19th Indian Division, and the 62nd Brigade.544 
The operations of X-2 finally paid operational dividends.  In January, the Section 
selected five members of the Burmese Anti-Fascist League (AFL), the existence of 
which had been uncovered in December, for insertion as agents into south central 
Burma.  The group’s work continued on creating black lists, and in January, the X-2 
Section busied itself with a 3,000-name list covering all of north and central Burma.  The 
X-2 Section also moved to Bhamo.  Although they had an office located with the 
Detachment 101 headquarters Section, the secrecy of their work necessitated that the 
main element be located in a separate area.  This separation from the rest of Detachment 
101 underscores the inability of the Section to integrate itself into the Detachment.545 
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The Section was operating with considerable difficulty in its relations with the 
CIC.  Though amicable on the outside, there was a power struggle between the two 
entities in large part because two top officers in each did not get along.  Peers’ influence 
had an effect and an X-2 observer related that it was “most gratifying to observe that 
Colonel Stilwell (NCAC G-2) appears to be backing Colonel Peers and Major Helfrich 
in placing the responsibility for running the CIT teams [with] X-2.”546  On 17 February 
X-2 scored a victory when during a meeting with CIC it established firm control over the 
loosely organized Counter Intelligence Teams (CITs).  This was necessary because the 
CIC was operating under the understanding that the CITs were under their control.  As 
such, on 10 February, CIC personnel had removed all intelligence files from the CIT 
headquarters.  The CIC stance was that while “Detachment 101 had admittedly furnished 
four officers, eleven interpreters, sixty native police with rifles, uniforms, equipment and 
munitions, critical clothing; equipment and supply needs for the teams; radio 
communications in all isolated areas; plane transport on any essential occasion,” that it 
was still their function and “CIC could and would be glad to carry on alone.”  
Thereafter, the CIC personnel assigned to the CITs were supposed to report through and 
take direction from X-2.  In turn, X-2 was to report directly to Colonel Stilwell.  With 
renewed vigor, the Section also established a CIT with the British 14th Army as it moved 
to liberate Mandalay.547   
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Yet, not all felt that the X-2 mission was entirely worthwhile.  One member 
wrote, “To put it bluntly, I do not feel that I have contributed anything of any value since 
I arrived at 101.”  His concern was mainly over the limited nature of X-2 work.  The 
CITs were entirely subservient to the Operations Section, and all recruitment oriented 
toward that purpose.  “The 101 show is a unified one and everything is controlled by 
Operations … in actuality all X-2 can do is advise … the agents we have recruited … 
primarily to gather combat intelligence or to further guerrila [sic] fighting … and no one 
can complain of this since that is the basis for 101’s existence.”  Part of the reason for 
the lack of being able to accomplish more intelligence gathering was because of the 
tentative nature that the OSS had in regards to the AFL.  The British were extremely 
wary of the possibility of having the Americans aid any political groups in Burma.  As a 
result, X-2 limited their interactions with the AFL to one of a purely military nature 
against the Japanese occupation.548 
Although it was not as tied into operation as other section were, the R&D Section 
furthered their work with camouflage items.  The first item for January was a device 
called War Paint, which was a kit for individual soldiers to camouflage their faces so 
that they could better blend in with the foliage, or to darken skin so that one could pass 
as a local inhabitant.  These kits were also being considered as an escape and evasion 
tool for downed Allied airmen.549  Still, the Section was difficult for Detachment 101 to 
evaluate.  Peers wrote Donovan, “Sometimes it appears questionable whether or not the 
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expenditure of personnel and equipment is truly justified … [they] are all industrious and 
hard workers … the only point in question is whether or not there is actually a field of 
employment for them here.”550 
Like the X-2 and R&D Section, the MO Section was trying to contribute to 
Detachment’s 101 operations.  Unlike them, however, it had an edge in the well-
prepared GOLD DUST team that had arrived in November 1944.  In January, the 
Section reorganized.  Its head was thereafter responsible for field operations and 
intelligence collection, and accordingly, based himself forward.  The Section deputy, 
emplaced at Nazira, was in charge of administration, editing, and the production of 
propaganda products.  The Section also created a five-person panel, with representatives 
from MO, Operations, SI, R&A, and Detachment 101 headquarters, to evaluate its 
propaganda products.  Additionally, daily meetings of MO personnel also contributed to 
the Section working more effectively.  With these efforts, the GOLD DUST team rapidly 
integrated itself into Detachment 101.  This was a welcome development because 
throughout most of 1944 the Section had been unorganized and had contributed little to 
Detachment 101’s mission.551  By February, the MO Branch at OSS Washington had 
ensured that the MO Section received enough equipment, personnel, and supplies that it 
was self-sufficient.   
On 17 February, the first true evidence of MO’s operational utility became 
evident.  By cooperating with the SI Section, an agent wearing a Burma Defense Army 
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uniform turned over a briefcase to the Japanese military police headquarters at Maymyo.  
The agent claimed that he had found it beside a wrecked vehicle on the Mandalay-
Maymyo road.  In reality, the briefcase contained MO forged orders that reversed the 
Japanese no-surrender policy.  It declared that soldiers could surrender if they were cut 
off, without ammunition, or incapacitated.  Agents slipped another copy of these false 
orders into the headquarters of a Japanese infantry regiment.  The MO Section followed 
this with a rumor campaign and an airdrop of leaflets over the Allied lines that 
purposefully fell on Japanese positions, outlining to Allied troops that they were to treat 
Japanese prisoners of war well.  OWI followed up with another white leaflet drop 
showing the surrender order and assuring Japanese troops that they would receive good 
treatment.  The British 14th Army was also given copies and thereafter, saw a noticeable 
rise in surrenders after the program’s initiation.  The surrender order program was not 
MO’s only work in February.  That month, the MO Section included items in every drop 
to the field, in total being responsible for sending out 24,000 items.  In the field, 
however, MO’s utility was not universally recognized.  One field operator struggled with 
this as he wrote back to Nazira, “I think it will get better as … MO prestige increases.  It 
has been a struggle even to convince the officers here that MO can do some good.”552 
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The MO Section was becoming increasingly effective in part because it was 
working hard to establish liaison with as many units—OSS or otherwise—as it could, 
and was putting its printing equipment at the disposal of other elements.  These efforts 
bore fruit.  Within Detachment 101 itself, MO had good relations with SI, R&A, and 
R&D.  This last Section helped to produce items, such as stamps, to assist MO’s work.  
The MO Section also produced a small weekly newsletter called The Jungle News that 
went out to all the field groups.  This was on its own an effective way to get the MO 
message across.  Outside of the OSS, MO secured the assistance of the 10th Air Force, 
which made available a night fighter for an MO operation.553 
The Section became even more useful when, in addition to Nisei and indigenous 
translators, they gained the assistance of six Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) that 
served as consultants. 554   The Section head reported that the POWs were “either writing 
the original Japanese material produced by the unit, or are criticizing Japanese work 
produced in the shop.”555  They may have assisted with the effectiveness of the Front 
Line Soldier Campaign, a series of anti-officer leaflets supposedly produced by Japanese 
non-commissioned officers.  Copies of these leaflets, found on the bodies of dead 
Japanese soldiers near Lashio, gave MO the impression that their presence was an 
indicator of low Japanese morale, for to be caught with them might have been a capital 
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offense.556  By March, the situation had so improved that the head of MO Washington 
visited the Detachment and described the operation as having had considerable problems 
getting started but having “achieved considerable success in the field.  This mission is 
considered the purest black operation that has been observed in any theater.”557 
New Branches Arrive 
Although individual members had previously arrived at the unit, OSS 
Washington tried to establish an OSS Operational Group (OG) at Detachment 101.  The 
OG Branch had been very active in the European theater, but was just starting to 
establish itself in the Far East.  The multi-faceted mission of the OGs was to organize, 
train, and equip local resistance organizations, and to conduct hit and run missions 
against enemy-controlled roads, railways, and strong points, or to prevent their 
destruction by retreating enemy forces.  Donovan believed that qualified soldiers with 
the required language skills and cultural background could be found among the many 
ethnic groups in the United States.  These soldiers could then be inserted as a team into 
enemy-occupied territory and successfully operate as small guerrilla groups.  Unlike 
OSS Special Operations (SO) teams in other theaters, the Operational Groups (OGs) 
always operated in military uniform.  They were trained in infantry tactics, guerrilla 
warfare, foreign weapons, demolition, were generally airborne qualified, and had 
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attached medical and communications personnel.  A typical OG Section had four 
officers and thirty enlisted men.  Individual teams were often half that size.558 
Their entrée into Detachment 101 would not be as easy as operations in Europe 
even though they had been sent to Burma for the same purpose:  to be a hard-hitting 
group behind enemy lines.  The only difference with the Asia groups, in contrast to the 
European groups, however, was in the lack of language skills and parachute training.  
The OGs in Detachment 101 were officially known as Unit D, Fourth Contingent, and 
initially consisted of nineteen officers and seventy-two enlisted men.  From there, the 
Detachment 101 OG was to form two combat teams, each further broken into two 
squads.  Immediately, the Section ran into difficulties.  The greatest was that the Medical 
Section deemed nearly 10 percent of the OGs as physically unsuitable for field 
operations.  They either filled in with other Sections or were sent back to the United 
States.559   
On 18 January 1945, Detachment 101 headquarters announced that the OGs 
would not serve in the field as a unit on the grounds that such a large group behind 
enemy lines might lead to excessive American casualties.  Moreover, the OG personnel 
needed jungle warfare training and most were not parachute-qualified.  As a result, 
Detachment 101 parceled out its OGs to groups already in the field, until conditions 
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existed that permitted a formation of OGs to go as a group.  Meanwhile, the 
Communications Section received the nine OG radio operators and three radio 
technicians.560  Other OGs filled in with other sections—sometime with unharmonious 
results.  The personnel officer who had received some OGs to serve as administrative 
personnel, described their assignment by calling them, “bloated with promises and 
dreams of glory in the field.”561  Despite not having served as a team, however, the OG 
personnel assigned to Detachment 101 gave exemplary service and suffered several 
personnel killed in action.   
 Another new element in Detachment 101s arsenal was the Office of the 
Coordinator of Native Affairs.  The large number of Kachin troops mustering out of the 
organization made the addition necessary.  Lieutenant Julian Niemczyk, the officer 
assigned, was in charge of making sure that discharged soldiers were paid in full, 
properly decorated, and given an appropriate mustering-out festival.562 
The increased operational level also required that the Operations Section rethink 
how it was conducting itself.  Previously, it had been in charge of formulating its own 
plans, but realized that this arrangement was not the most effective.  Separate elements 
barraged headquarters with various plans in the hopes that one would be approved.  The 
solution was to create a Plans Section, or in military terms an S-3, to which groups 
submitted potential plans for consideration.  This unit was assisted by a weekly meeting 
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in which NCAC would brief Detachment 101 on their future areas of operation and 
request certain items of information.  The Section then developed plans for how to 
obtain this, while the R&A Section also searched their files to see if they might already 
have information that would be of use.563 
 Other final important changes for the Detachment involved its force structure.  In 
February, the Detachment 101 base at Calcutta was detached from the unit and renamed 
Detachment 505.  This change eased Nazira’s efforts, as it no longer had to account for 
incoming and outgoing personnel.  The second administrative change was the formation 
of the Arakan Field Unit (AFU) in February.  The AFU was composed of OSS units 
operating in conjunction with the Indian 15th Corps that had been set up under the 
direction of Detachment 404 as it was in the South-East Asia Command (SEAC).  
Because of the confusion with having two OSS elements operating in Burma, 
Detachment 101 received authority for OSS operations north of Rangoon.  As a result, 
the AFU was detached from Detachment 404 and given to Detachment 101.  Its 
operations will be the final case study.  By February, the Schools and Training Section 
of Detachment 101 was sending newly-graduated agents to the Arakan for operations.564   
Conclusion 
 By the end of March all elements that would make up Detachment 101’s force 
structure were in place.  The lack of attention from OSS Washington was apparent.  The 
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OSS focused on the war in Europe so much so that operations in Burma—or even the 
Far East—were an afterthought.  Only the success of Detachment 101’s operations in 
1944 had brought attention from Washington.  By this time, however, the new arrivals to 
Detachment 101, such as the OGs, could not bring with them a mission warranting the 
effort of trying to accommodate their particular specialty as a distinct entity.  Other 
Sections, such as R&D and X-2 were falling even farther behind.  While their inclusion 
did further the mission, it only did so tangentially.  This was because by the time they 
arrived—or organized themselves in such a way to be able to contribute—the 
Detachment’s mission was so focused on guerrilla warfare and intelligence gathering 
that unless sections could directly impact those core functions, they were of little utility.  
A surprise element, however, was the MO Section.  After a long period of inexcusable 
ineffectiveness due to lack of attention on the part of MO Washington, the Detachment 
101 MO Section was making big payoffs.  The intense training and preparation of the 
GOLD DUST team before they arrived was the reason why this element was able to 
contribute to Detachment 101’s core missions.  Even at this last stage in the Burma 
Campaign, a section focused on achieving effective liaison and coordination, that did not 
have internal squabbles, and which wanted to assist combat operations, could have a 
measureable impact on Detachment 101’s ability to wage war on the Japanese.  With 
Lashio having fallen to the Allied advance, the OSS effort in Burma was nearing an end.  
The next chapter will detail how these final months had an impact on the separate 
elements in Detachment 101’s force structure, and how, at the same time, the 
Detachment itself was disbanded. 
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CHAPTER XI 
 
THE LAST MONTHS:  APRIL-JULY 1945 
 
 By April 1945, Detachment 101 had taken a central role in the Northern Combat 
Area Command (NCAC).  It was now the sole remaining combat forces available to 
General Sultan.  Despite its new role and the impending defeat of the Japanese in Burma, 
the unit still went to great efforts to work as efficiently as possible by streamlining its 
organization and gearing itself to support the increased operational role.  At no other 
point in the war did Detachment 101 better demonstrate its inherent flexibility.  It 
undertook numerous and disparate missions while simultaneously planning for its own 
demise.  This chapter will examine the organizational changes made by Detachment 101 
and how the unit dismantled itself while still maintaining a high operational tempo. 
By April, the war in Burma was going very well for the Allies.  Lashio has fallen 
to Chinese forces in March, as had Mandalay and Meiktila to the British.  British forces 
in the Arakan and Central Burma were making a two-pronged drive for Rangoon.  
NCAC’s forces had reached the end of their operational area, and also no longer had to 
cover the rear of the British 14th Army.  Beginning in March and completed in May, the 
entire MARS Task Force was withdrawn and sent to China.  The British units in NCAC 
had already reverted to 14th Army control.  The main Chinese forces in NCAC were 
recalled to serve as elite units in the National Chinese Army.  This left the OSS as the 
only ground combat unit, American or otherwise, operating in Burma.   
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Although Peers was planning to move Detachment 101 to China to serve in the 
Chekiang area, General Sultan had other ideas.565  He wanted Detachment 101 to protect 
the Stilwell Road by clearing the Shan States, which were a haven for Japanese troops 
fleeing Burma.  NCAC feared that at least 10,000 troops from the Japanese 18th and 56th 
Divisions would be able to retreat to Thailand.  There, they could regroup and once 
again threaten the Allies when they moved to attack that country after Burma’s 
liberation.566  Clearing them would require that the Detachment function more like a 
conventional force.  Not only was this a new mission for Detachment 101, but it was 
done under less than ideal conditions.  Many of the remaining Kachins refused to go any 
farther, requiring that the unit demobilize many of its guerrilla formations.  The 
Detachment had to consolidate its battalions and to recruit were it could, including large 
numbers of Shans, Karens, and Burmese—some still wearing the uniform of the 
Japanese-sponsored Burmese Independence Army.  Peers reconfigured the Detachment.  
Instead of Area #1 and Area #2, it now had four battalions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 10th). 
Intelligence collection became even less important to Detachment 101 as the unit 
adopted a new mission:  in Peers’ words, to “kill and capture as many [Japanese] as 
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possible.”567  The groups still had several long-range groups that had parachuted in, and 
numerous agent groups.  They were, however, were becoming less valuable as the need 
for their intelligence ceased or as Allied movements bypassed them.  By the end of May, 
only seven groups remained in the field in north Burma.  As the unit had demonstrated 
previously, it was highly adaptable.  However, its last assignments were costly.  The 
group suffered more casualties, comparatively, during these final months that at any 
other time of the war.  Indeed, as one veteran noted, “With less experienced leaders or 
without the intimate knowledge of the Burma-style campaign gained through three years 
of similar operations, the hazards of such an undertaking might have been disastrous.”568  
At the same time, the Detachment 101 Arakan Field Unit (AFU) was supporting an 
intelligence mission for British forces.  Despite the operational focus, the Detachment 
had to devote an even greater administrative effort to ensure that the unit ran smoothly in 
it last months. 
The Detachment 
 Although operations were beginning to wind down, this did not mean that 
Detachment 101’s force structure and sections remained static.  This included the 
elimination of an entire Section.  Peers came to believe that “it is very difficult to draw a 
line between which is OG and is SO, and anything reported by either of the individual 
branches is purely eye-wash.”  He also felt that a separate Operational Group (OG) 
Section resulted in an unnecessary duplication in communications, supply, 
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administration, and other entities such as medical.569  In an effort to resolve this problem, 
in April he transferred OG personnel into the Special Operations (SO) Section. 
 To no surprise, Detachment 101’s air elements continued to be of great 
importance.  The Red Ass Squadron moved forward to Bhamo to provide greater support 
to the field groups.  Although operations had slowed since the previous month, in April 
it flew 655 hours, evacuated 24 wounded, and carried 368 passengers and 22,910 pounds 
of cargo.  Three planes even flew a mission eighty-six miles into hostile territory—the 
farthest the squadron had yet penetrated—to bring back three Japanese prisoners.  The 
squadron had an additional problem when seventeen new pilots arrived and there were 
only fifteen aircraft available, including those under repair.570  Operations in May 
declined significantly.  It flew 464 hours, evacuated thirty-nine casualties, carried 177 
personnel, and just 8,645 pounds of cargo.571  This included, however, a strenuous 
period from 8-10 May when a Japanese force attacked a Detachment 101 unit.  The Red 
Ass Squadron reacted quickly and evacuated twenty-five casualties from a makeshift 
airfield under attack by the Japanese.  In June, the squadron moved from Lashio to an 
airfield at Lai Hka where its aircraft were used by battalion commanders to coordinate 
operations of their far-flung companies, to conduct reconnaissance on Japanese 
positions, and even to mark enemy positions for air strikes.  This enabled even closer 
support to the field units because the aircraft were now only a half hour’s flight away.  
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Indicative of its high level of efficiency is the following report; “an enlisted man was 
shot at 1020 … through the rapid and well coordinated evacuation system … the soldier 
was evacuated and met at Bhamo airstrip at 1700 hours … about 300 air miles from the 
site of his injury.”572 
 Likewise, in April, the Air Drop Section operated at a reduced level with the 
group allotted only seven C-47s allotted—and the distance of the dropping zones from 
the main airfield at Dinjan meant that many could only fly one sortie per day as each 
flight took a seven-hour round trip.  Still, the Section dropped 1,196,447 pounds of 
supplies and parachute twenty-nine personnel into the field, requiring 229 C-47 sorties 
and thirteen B-25 special missions that were flown out of the newly finished all weather 
airfield at Bhamo.  The Section recorded its first losses since January 1944 when two C-
47s crashed with the loss of four OSS personnel.573  By May, Air Drop operations were 
noticeably winding down and the Section only dropped 837,487 pounds of supplies 
requiring 183 C-47 sorties and 5 B-25s that parachuted six personnel into the field.  This 
represented the same levels seen in November 1944.  This meant that the Detachment 
only utilized an average of six had seven C-47s available to it.574  In June-July, the 
Section only dropped 841,963 pounds, some of which was clothing, food, and supplies 
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to thank villagers for their assistance.  On their return, the drop aircraft stopped at 
collection points and picked equipment and arms to bring back for turn-in.575 
Communications experienced a minor reorganization when the section at Bhamo 
took over communications duties from Area #2 when that organization disbanded.  The 
disbanding produced a surplus of radios that were reconditioned and redistributed.  This  
eliminated any shortages.  The timesaving laying of a cable from Lashio to Bhamo also 
allowed sending messages in the clear without encoding, thereby facilitating 
communications duties at Bhamo.  This was fortunate as the section also began to handle 
communications from the Arakan Field Unit, resulting in a combined daily total of some 
175 messages and 11,000 groups.576  May’s total showed the same general level with 
5388 messages composed of 326,894 groups.  The general pace, however, was 
decreasing as stations closed and liaison officers returned from their assignments.577  The 
totals for June and July combined reflected the reduction in traffic; 328,566 groups for a 
total of 6,309 messages.578  Although the Section had adequate radios and receivers, they 
still worked to develop new and smaller equipment.  Future items of supply to the field 
groups were a miniature transmitter and receiver of less than a pound in weight, and the 
Eureka portable radar beacon, that would to allow planes to hone in on groups and drop 
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during poor visibility.579  Other sections also focused their efforts in the tactical 
situation. 
 The MO Section saw increased utility.  As the Detachment moved into the Shan 
States, it managed to distribute 30,730 copies of some twenty-one different leaflets.  
Many of these exploited the low Japanese morale and revolved around surrender themes.  
They appear to have produced results.  Although MO reasoned that although they could 
not prove the link, the Section’s black propaganda efforts may have influenced the 
surrenders.  In particular, some Japanese soldiers who surrendered under a white flag 
had in their hand the MO-produced modification to the no-surrender order.  The Section 
reported that one Japanese soldier urgently “sought to bring out that he came within the 
provisions” of the no-surrender order and “was therefore entitled to the good treatment 
promised in the leaflet.”  Because of this possible success, the MO Section decided that 
its best course was to refine the surrender leaflets.580   
Although the Detachment’s function was now more of supporting tactical combat 
operations rather than strategic intelligence—such as determining enemy order of 
battle—there remained some successes.  During the last month of operations, the long-
range agent teams scored a penetration through the cooperation of a Shan official who 
had his own police force with Japanese-furnished passes that allowed them to move 
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about in enemy territory.581  With the war winding down in the NCAC area, the R&A 
Section turned its analytical attention to the Arakan, and in particular, Rangoon.  Still, 
reports came at a hurried pace from the groups under NCAC; 515 reports in total came 
into the R&A Section during April and the initial interrogations of Japanese prisoners of 
war and Burmese collaborators kept the interrogators and translators busy.  The Section 
also revamped how it would present its reports.  Instead of the weekly intelligence 
summary, the Section substituted a daily edition beginning on 18 April.  Additionally, 
the Section reorganized by cross-referencing its files to ensure that they were readily 
available for the numerous analytical subjects that might present themselves.582  Peers 
commented to Donovan on Detachment 101’s unique arrangement regarding intelligence 
collection and dissemination.  
 
 The lack of intelligence personnel …  has resulted in a change from the OSS 
conception of collection and dissemination of information … SO has been and is 
responsible for the collection of all information, guided in part by requests from 
one of the dissemination agencies … Previously, with one intelligence officer 
[Chester R. Chartrand of the SI Section], we were able to disseminate all of our 
tactical information … As a result the R&A section has been developed to handle 
the dissemination of all information, regardless of type.  Therefore, the situation 
stands, SO collects, R&A disseminates.  We would never have had the means to 
accomplish our intelligence mission if this procedure had not been adopted.583 
 
These comments reflect upon the very beginning of Detachment 101, when a lack of 
personnel forced the unit to use whomever it had to fill new roles that came along.  The 
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OSS did not create Detachment 101 to gather intelligence, but it evolved into a core area, 
that to its end users was perhaps the most useful.   
 The X-2 Section expanded its Counter Intelligence Teams (CIT) throughout 
Lashio and the surrounding region, but recognized that the mission was coming to an 
end.  Contacts continued with the Burmese Ant-Fascist League (AFL).  The BARK 
team, made up of AFL members, was parachuted by X-2 into Pyinmana on 30 March.  It 
supplied tactical information on Japanese forces and movements that X-2 liaison officer 
Stuart Power then gave to the British 14th Army.  X-2 also planned to infiltrate personnel 
and agents to the Arakan region to kidnap selected enemy personnel and to be of use 
during and after the securing of Rangoon.  CIT teams continued to have success, and in 
the Katha area alone, arrested 152 Black hats [Japanese collaborators] of which Burma 
government authorities convicted thirty-seven.584  On 25 May, however, the CIT 
program was considered complete.  The teams disbanded.  Many of the X-2 personnel 
transferred to the Arakan.  There, the Section organized into two small groups.  One 
section joined the amphibious assault on Rangoon, while the other joined the British 14th 
Army in the event that that element first reached the city.585 
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Detachment 101 Disbands 
 July 1945 was officially the last month that Detachment 101 was active, but the 
process of disbanding began long before.  The first moves of disbandment occurred in 
May.  By then it had become readily apparent that Nazira was too far away from the 
action and that the unit would not need to train additional agents for operations.  The 
Detachment started to shut the base down.  The first sections to close at Nazira, such as 
MO, R&D, the School, the Pigeon Section, and the hospital, were those that had little 
effect on tactical combat operations.  Detachment 101 took advantage of the fact that the 
U.S. Army Services of Supply (SOS) in India had numerous vehicles that it needed to 
get to China, but no drivers.  As a result, SOS turned vehicles over to units that needed 
to transport personnel and equipment, so long as the vehicles ended up in an Army depot 
in China.  The MO Section packed up its facilities—to include the Field Photographic 
laboratory—and departed for China.  This was the first of four Detachment 101 convoys 
to travel the Stilwell Road from May to July.  The remaining personnel and sections 
from Nazira not sent to China, transferred to quarters near Dinjan.  There, sections still 
needed to support operations, such as a skeleton medical element, continued working.586 
After Nazira, the next bases to close were Detachment 101 BA at Bhamo and 
Detachment 101 AFU in Rangoon.  They both closed on 6 June and transferred their 
assets to Detachment 404.  The last Detachment 101 field radio station went off the air 
on 7 July and thereafter, Force 136, [SOE in the Far East] accepted responsibility for 
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remaining agents.  Only Detachment 101’s headquarters at Dinjan remained.  This was 
soon turned over to Detachment 206, a supply organization for Detachment 202.  
Detachment 101 officially closed on 12 July 1945.  By mid-July all that remained were 
mostly administrative functions, such as the Finance Section and legal representatives, 
who ensured the unit finalized its debts and obligations to its indigenous personnel.  This 
included making final restitution to the families of the thirty-eight missing or deceased 
indigenous agents.587   
The Medical Section gave returning field personnel examinations for fatigue, 
disease, and parasites before sending them to their new assignments.  Thirty percent of 
Detachment 101’s personnel had enough time in theater, or a medical reason, to return to 
the United States.  Those that did not went to other OSS organizations in the Far East.  
The SO and OG personnel were sent to Detachment 202.  There, they formed the 
nucleus of several SO teams, such as BABOON 2, GNU, and COW.  Several former 
101ers also served in the post-war Mercy Mission teams that parachuted into Japanese-
held POW camps in China to prevent any harming of Allied prisoners.  The eleven 
teams operated at great peril since many Japanese commands were unaware that the war 
was over.  The teams arranged for food, medical care, and the evacuation of the POWs.  
Many of the Detachment 101 Nisei served as translators on these teams, including for 
teams CANARY, MAGPIE, and PIGEON.  Other former Detachment 101 personnel 
served on teams ALBATROSS, CARDINAL, DUCK, and RAVEN.  In all, 50 percent 
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of Detachment 101’s former personnel went to China.  The remaining 20 percent of 
Detachment 101’s former personnel went to Detachment 404 where they were involved 
in operations in Thailand, and post-war intelligence missions in the SEAC AOR.588   
Conclusion 
Despite the war in north Burma being almost over by mid-1945, the Detachment 
once again reinvented itself when it undertook the role of conventional warfare.  The 
role did not suit the clandestine organization, yet it still worked.  According to one of the 
American battalion commanders, it only succeeded because the Japanese by then were 
beaten and had poor morale, “If the Japanese in this area had been the same [Japanese] 
we fought in northern Burma our force would not have lasted for two days.”589  Yet, it 
was also the cohesiveness of the Detachment’s various sections that allowed for success.  
Without effective Communications, Air Drop, or liaison aircraft Sections, the 
Detachment never could have completed the mission change. 
As it was, the Japanese could still be quite determined and in many cases were 
better armed than the OSS units were and backed with artillery.  This caused the 
Detachment to suffer during this period its highest casualty rate of the war.  In May and 
June alone, it suffered forty-four killed, thirty-four wounded, nine missing, and twenty 
captured.  The toll was also hard on the American personnel—considering the previous 
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light casualties—with five killed and three wounded in June and the beginning of July.  
The damaged inflicted on the enemy was far greater.  From May to June, Detachment 
101 units were responsible for killing 1,246 Japanese troops and they liberated 13,600 
square miles of territory.590  A unit in the process of tearing its own structure apart 
conducted these exceptional accomplishments.  It is a reflection of Detachment 101’s 
inherent flexibility that it could adopt a new operational role, that of conducting heavy 
combat operations and a new mission in the Arakan, while simultaneously disbanding.  
The next chapter will be the final case study.  It will examine an ad-hoc mission that 
Detachment 101 picked up from Detachment 404, the Arakan Field Unit. 
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CHAPTER XII 
 
THE ARAKAN FIELD UNIT:  FEBRUARY-JUNE 1945 
 
 Detachment 101 was known throughout OSS as an organization that ignored 
branch distinctions and amalgamated its various functions to serve common goals.  This 
allowed the group to slowly become a combined operations unit that was without peer in 
OSS.591  In 1945, Detachment 101 was best able to demonstrate the flexibility that had 
characterized its operations throughout the war.  In the Shan States, Detachment 101’s 
intense operational focus meant that the unit there became more focused on intelligence 
of immediate utility as opposed to integrating a long-range intelligence collection effort 
into the combat elements as had the case in 1943-1944.  In the Arakan, however, the 
integration of tactical and strategic intelligence collection became reality.  The sort-lived 
Detachment 101 Arakan Field Unit (AFU) was dubbed with the derogatory name “All 
Fucked Up,” just as the China-Burma-India Theater had been called “Confusion Beyond 
Imagination.”  In practice, the name was a misnomer as the AFU represented a true test 
of Detachment 101’s way of war.  It integrated its various sections into a single 
autonomous unit, and represented a pioneering use of maritime, land, psychological, and 
intelligence components.  
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While AFU operations did not involve the large guerrilla formations prevalent in 
north Burma, it reflected Detachment 101’s flexibility to adapt its role to the mission 
placed before it.  In so doing, Detachment 101 took OSS assets already in the battle area 
and added others to give the unit a new mission and direction.  The result was that 
Detachment 101 demonstrated its ability to take over a pre-existing unit of limited 
utility, and to mold it into one with a much broader operational scope.  In north Burma, 
the fall of Lashio to combined American/Chinese forces to the east and Mandalay and 
Meiktila to the British in the west, was near.  In the south, the Indian XV Corps was 
pushing through the Arakan region to its goal of liberating Rangoon.  The Arakan 
offered a different operating environment for Detachment 101.  Despite working more 
closely with the British than had been the case in north Burma, relations were not always 
harmonious.  OSS personnel were extremely wary of the attempts that they saw by the 
British either to spy on them, or to sway the local public opinion away from the 
Americans.  One of the most blatant examples of British-inspired anti-American 
propaganda was newsletters printed by the Rangoon Liberator.  This daily began 
publication on 13 May and contained a number of articles that praised the British war 
effort against Japan while downgrading that of the United States.592  Some of this 
behavior could be understood.  Most Burmans hoping for independence looked to 
America for help.  As had happened in north Burma, the residents in the south did not 
see the Americans as having colonial designs on the country.  The Burmese often asked 
OSS personnel when the Americans were going to help them gain independence from 
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the British.593  As one OSS operator noted, the British could not help to see that the local 
population was “pleased” with their liberation by the British, but would have been 
“wildly enthusiastic” if their liberators had been American.594  
 Another issue that had the potential to split U.S.-British relations was the arming 
of Burmese political groups, like the Anti-Fascist League (AFL).  The AFL was a 
Marxist-leaning group composed of Burmese who had initially supported the Japanese 
invasion.  In their own words, the AFL was “not pro-British, but we prefer the Allies.  
We are against Fascism.”595  The group articulated the Burmans’ anti-colonial 
sentiments, which had gotten so bad that Americans were warned not to go into certain 
areas because they might mistakenly be shot because “hatred for the British had reached 
that point.”596  In discussions with “P” Division, Peers and OSS Chief Donovan took the 
stance that Detachment 101 followed throughout the war, that despite the assistance they 
might offer, Detachment 101 did not arm politically motivated groups.  The OSS’s only 
interest was in forming guerrilla groups to fight the Japanese, not in creating a post-war 
independence movement.  Detachment 101 only wanted the intelligence that such groups 
might offer.  The decision to arm the AFL was left to Force 136.597   
The OSS also had to contend with an entirely different operating environment 
than north Burma.  The Arakan region itself consists of a coastal plain lined with 
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mangrove swamps that were frequently pierced with tidal creeks, or chaungs.  Numerous 
ethnicities lived in the region, and with their religion being primarily Buddhist or 
Muslim, had little in common with the Americans.  The area itself has dense foliage and 
an OSS observer called it one of the “world’s worst battlefields—a combination of 
jungle, paddy fields [rice], and mountains.”  A patrol might “come within ten yards of a 
Japanese patrol without ever detecting it.”598  It was this strategic and tactical picture that 
Detachment 101 faced in the Arakan. 
The Arakan Field Unit (AFU) 
 The roots of the AFU predate Detachment 101.  Although it had responsibility 
for the Andaman Islands, India, Indonesia, Malaya, Sumatra, Thailand, and parts of 
Burma and French Indo-China (Vietnam), the primary mission of the British Southeast 
Asia Command (SEAC), and its subordinate OSS element [Detachment 404], was to see 
to Burma’s liberation.  Churchill himself issued this directive.599  To help accomplish the 
task, OSS Detachment 404 would operate as an intelligence unit in conjunction with the 
XV Indian Corps.  Prior to that, the only intelligence organizations available in the 
region were the British V-Force and scattered SOE elements.600  To help accomplish the 
task, OSS Detachment 404 was to assist the XV Indian Corps by long-range intelligence 
and reconnaissance patrols, while V-Force did the same closer to the main battlefront.  
The OSS was not able to accomplish its long-range mission until Detachment 101 took 
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control, but it performed better at short-range intelligence gathering missions than V-
Force had.  Because of this, Detachment 404’s operational elements focused on 
surveying places in the Japanese rear for the XV Indian Corps to amphibiously assault, 
while the intelligence component focused on gathering information about Japanese 
organizations and dispositions.601 
The Arakan Field Unit (AFU) began on 10 December 1944 as the Detachment 
404 AFU, but the OSS also called it by its code name, Operation BITTERSWEET.  The 
initial joint Maritime Unit (MU) and OG that made up BITTERSWEET set up 
headquarters at Cox’s Bazar, now in modern-day Bangladesh.  BITTERSWEET moved 
to ‘Camp Ritchie’ at Akyab, Burma, in January.  There, it conducted underwater and 
shore reconnaissance missions in support of the British advance.602  Its teams were under 
strict orders to fire only in self-defense and followed the guidance that the “most 
successful penetration group is one which never fires a shot.”603   
Other OSS elements followed.  In December, a MO Section of seven personnel 
arrived that in January, attempted to print a Burmese language newsletter called the War 
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Mirror.604  MO personnel then regularly infiltrated behind enemy lines and gave the 
newsletter to Allied sympathizers for distribution.  This continued for the duration of 
operations.  Although the Section recognized that it was on the operational side as 
opposed to intelligence, it also assisted X-2 personnel.605   
As early as December 1944, Peers was discussing sending an officer of X-2 to 
the project.606  Originally, the BITTERSWEET X-2 element was going to mimic the 
operations of Detachment 101’s X-2 Section by forming two Combat Intelligence Teams 
(CITs).  The Section soon deemed this impractical because the pace of the Allied 
advance was too fast.  The X-2 Section decided to retain all personnel in one unit and to 
follow the combat operations as closely as they could by incorporating into the 
headquarters of the British 25th Division.  There, they were in place to join the OG 
Section in the unopposed amphibious assault of Akyab Island.  Once on Akyab, the 
group began apprehending black hats and conducting interrogations.607  In many cases, 
the X-2 teams found that their best informants were those who were on the black lists, 
but who wished to ingratiate themselves to the Allies now that the Japanese were being 
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forced out.608  Meanwhile, personnel from the Special Operations (SO) Section worked 
with the British V-Force so that they could familiarize themselves with the operations.609   
 The Schools and Training (S&T) Section—long held in rear areas—also moved 
forward.  They set up a school for the purpose of training indigenous agents close to the 
areas in which they would work.  After briefly setting up on Akyab, they moved to 
Ramree Island on 23 January.  There, they assessed and recruited several men to address 
the problem of such work being “considered secondary to operations instead of integral 
to operations.”610   
 Intelligence was handled by a fledgling SI Section headed by Anglo-Burmese 
agent Edward Law Yone, and an R&A element.  The SI element functioned differently 
than with Detachment 101 in north Burma.  SI personnel accompanied the XV Indian 
Corps on operations, particularly amphibious ones.  Once the Allied presence was 
established, SI personnel contacted local headmen and influential persons, as well as 
conducted interrogations and recruited indigenous agents to establish intelligence 
networks.  The OSS gave perspective agents a summary training course, after which they 
were sent on short-range missions to acquire specific information, such as the number 
and location of enemy personnel.  One of their first actions under Detachment 101 was 
to apprehend a known collaborator, Tun Lin, and make him a double agent.611  The SI 
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Section also infiltrated agents by indigenous watercraft.  They succeeded in penetrating 
the lines and gathering much intelligence on Japanese forces.  Because of these 
successes, the OSS became the primary organization to furnish intelligence on the area 
of the Prome-Taungup Road.  This was the same area that the failed W Group had 
entered in late 1943.612  By the end of AFU operations, the SI Section was able to send 
into the field forty-nine named operations.  These teams were mostly composed of 
indigenous personnel recruited and trained to gather intelligence near Rangoon.  Five 
were complete failures, as they had no contact with base.613 
Meanwhile, operational responsibility for Burma north of Rangoon was given to 
Detachment 101, while areas south of Rangoon were given to Detachment 404.614  On 
16 February, Detachment 101 activated the Detachment 101 Arakan Field Unit.  During 
his visit there, Peers placed Major Richard L. Farr in command of the AFU and he 
established his headquarters at Akyab.  The forward section at Kyaukpyu was placed 
under the command of OG Major Lloyd E. Peddicord and his deputy, MU Lieutenant 
Commander Derek Lee.  Detachment 101 BA (the Detachment 101 element at Bhamo) 
would handle administration and coordination.  Another minor Detachment 101 
headquarters to handle administration, supplies and parachute packing, was established 
in Calcutta at the same location as Detachment 505.  Operations themselves would be 
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coordinated through Allied Land Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA).615  Major Charles 
J. Trees later replaced Farr in command. 
When Peers arrived, he found an “utter lack of coordination between 
branches.”616  Detachment 101 had long been known as an organization that lacked 
distinction or compartmentation between operational branches.  Peers transferred 
responsibility for airdrop from Force 136 to OSS control.  Representatives of other 
Detachment 101 elements trickled into the AFU.  In March, Detachment 101 detailed an 
officer, who coordinated through Detachment 101 BA (Bhamo), to handle the AFU’s 
financial needs.617  The R&D Section at Nazira assisted the AFU by working on requests 
from Petticord to improve upon items like sub-machinegun magazines or methods to 
carry additional ammunition.618 
 The R&A contingent on the other hand, handled much of the tactical intelligence.  
As the Detachment 101 elements at Nazira and Myitkyina had before, the Detachment 
101 AFU R&A Section compiled weekly summaries for their intelligence consumers.  
Research and Analysis personnel based themselves near the combat elements to be able 
to provide requested information as quickly as possible.  This included participating in 
all major actions and amphibious landings.  In late March, XV Indian Corps commander 
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Lieutenant General Philip Christison, commended the AFU for the value of its 
intelligence.619 
Now under Detachment 101, the MU and OG Sections of the AFU made several 
long-range reconnaissance missions on behalf of the XV Indian Corps.  The MU Section 
later reported that the sections operated together with a “minimum of friction, each 
pulling their own weight on operations.”620  An example is Operation BOSTON, a 
reconnaissance mission conducted on 20 February 1945 at Foul Island.  Two MU P-
boats (Pursuit) took the joint team to the island.  Seven MU swimmers in kayaks then 
conducted a shoreline reconnaissance to see if Japanese troops were near the beach.  
Once deemed secure, a fifteen-man OG team went ashore for a more thorough 
investigation.  The OSS determined that Foul Island was unoccupied, but that it would 
not be of military use other than for a coast watcher, weather, or radio station.   
The MU Section, however, suffered from poor environmental conditions and a 
lack of supplies.  The MU Branch had trained its swimmers for underwater swimming 
with the LARU rebreather, an underwater recirculating breathing device invented by 
MU Captain Christian Lambertsen.  It permitted a swimmer to remain underwater for an 
extended period and emit no telltale bubbles.  The chaungs that the MUs were to 
reconnoiter, however, were murky and crocodile infested.  This forced the swimmers to 
conduct their reconnaissance missions on the surface.  Several other items that they had 
trained with and which were of use, such as enough kayaks, remained at Detachment 
404 headquarters at Kandy.  They only arrived at the AFU when operations were 
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beginning to wind down, and in the meantime the MU had to borrow equipment from 
the British, or make due as they could.  Because of this lack of material and the inability 
to perform their mission, the MU personnel at times were used for operations other than 
what they had been trained for, such as operating a maritime ferry service and refueling 
Catalina PBY aircraft at sea.  Without adequate kayaks and unable to use the LARUs, it 
was left for the MU P-boats to infiltrate up the chaungs to detect an enemy presence or 
for depth readings to be conducted from their decks as opposed to letting the underwater 
swimmers do it covertly.  This new method brought with it the added danger of detection 
and risk if one of the P-boats grounded in uncharted enemy-controlled waters.621   
 In March, the AFU began preparations to assist in the invasion of Rangoon, 
because there was very little in the way of intelligence being supplied from the city or 
from lower Burma.  It was here that the shift from support to combat operations to a 
strategic intelligence mission occurred.  This is exactly opposite of what the Detachment 
was doing for NCAC.  Tactical operations continued, but became of less utility.  The 
MO Section continued to distribute the War Mirror, and at times had to go to great 
lengths to ensure that the locals helped.  One MO soldier wrote headquarters, “I am the 
first American in this village … it is a custom in a Chin village for every visitor to chew 
beetle [nut] at the headman’s house-I am trying to get out of it-no luck … I have to take 
it.”  Other times, the distribution of the newsletter required bribing local headmen with 
rupees or opium.622  The MO Section made improvements in its ability to print 
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newspapers in multiple languages.623  However, after five weeks of this, the work came 
to naught because the British clandestine services were under the impression that MO 
actions were fanning the flames of Burmese nationalism.  This forced MO to give up 
their agent chains at the end of March.  They were forced to use pre-existing Force 136 
chains.624  Thereafter, MO material would come from Calcutta vice the MO forward 
Section at Akyab.625  These actions greatly reduced MO’s utility in the campaign. 
 Still, MO had other projects.  One of these was SWAMP ISLAND, which was an 
attempt to get bypassed Japanese personnel to surrender.  Many were still living in the 
mangrove swamps, and their eradication was difficult.  As with any MO operation in the 
Arakan, this had to be cleared with the British.  Information for these programs came 
from both the British and from the R&A Section.  Once approved, SI agents helped in 
the distribution of the leaflets.  That Section had placed village headmen on their payroll 
for fifty rupees per month.  For this payment, the headmen notified the OSS when 
strangers arrived in their villages, and they distributed MO propaganda.  This 
arrangement also greatly facilitated the X-2 Section in it efforts to root out suspected 
Japanese agents.626 
 In line with the focus on intelligence operations, in late March the MU and OG 
Sections were withdrawn.  This included the P-boats that had been so instrumental in 
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infiltrating OG, SI, and MU personnel.  The majority of the OG Section went to China to 
train parachute units under the CARBONADO Plan, which was the potential seizure of 
the China coast as a method of inching closer to Japan itself.  The AFU OG had been 
unique in that it had never received parachute training in the United States, so the British 
granted permission—with Donovan’s prodding—for the Section to undergo parachute 
training at the school at Chakala.627    
 At the beginning of April, after leaving behind liaison with the XV Indian Corps, 
the AFU moved its headquarters forward from Akyab to Kyaukpyu to consolidate 
personnel and administration.  Detachment 101’s influence was beginning to take effect 
and the AFU reported that “branch consciousness has been submerged in favor of the 
main mission of this unit.  The entire unit is beginning to work together as a team.”628  
Work to support the required infrastructure to support clandestine intelligence operations 
was underway.  The U.S. Army Engineers created a camp for the OSS that they then 
turned over to the S&T Section for the establishment of another agent training school.  
At the same time, the OSS attached Communications personnel to the camp to assist in 
training agents in signal plans and code.  Additional assistance was offered by the 
USAAF when liaison was established with the 2nd Air Commando Group, thereby 
securing the use of two L-5 light aircraft. 629  This was fortunate as in 10 April, the AFU 
received word that on 15 April they would take over all V-Force operations in the 
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area.630  This was due in part to V-Force having been operating in the area since 1942, 
but having never made very deep penetrations into enemy territory nor developing much 
intelligence on Japanese forces.631 
In April, the AFU extended their informant networks and sought to interrogate 
locals who had knowledge of the Japanese military.  The X-2 Section worked with local 
headmen to help uncover local black hats.  This information helped the SI and R&A 
elements verify that their intelligence had some credibility, and helped ensure that the 
indigenous informants/agents were not fabricators.  Those that were found to be black 
hats and who were unwilling to help the Allies, were removed from the operating areas 
so that they could not inform the enemy on Allied clandestine methods.  In all, during 
the month the AFU interrogated ninety-seven locals.  They were each paid anywhere 
from five to fifteen rupees for their information.  The AFU estimated that some 50 
percent of these interrogations resulted in usable intelligence.  The OSS paid regular 
agents on a scale of two rupees per day with bonuses for mission completion or 
important intelligence supplied.  Much as it had done in north Burma, the SO Section 
also worked to supply intelligence.  Under Operation ANNE, it set up a network of 
village headmen in Japanese-occupied areas that helped to recruit local agents to report 
on the Japanese.  These contacts enabled the OSS to uncover more intelligence in eight 
days than the “British ‘V’ Force had gotten out of the same area in the course of two 
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months.”  With these information sources, the AFU was able to submit forty-nine 
intelligence reports, as well as daily situation reports that it supplied to the British.632   
These agent chains became a standard operating procedure for the AFU through 
early May.  For instance, in early April, the SI Section had eight operations in the field.  
They also sent out dozens of short-range penetration teams as well.  Unlike Detachment 
101 operations in north Burma, there was little time to properly train these agents.  These 
were typically one or two man teams of locally recruited personnel to which the OSS 
had given a short course in intelligence operations at the S&T camp before infiltrating 
them into Japanese-occupied areas.  Like the intelligence-specific missions of 
Detachment 101 in north Burma, these teams focused on intelligence, not combat 
operations.  Their combined total of Japanese killed was minor.  Because of their limited 
training, the intelligence they produced was not as strategic or central to the campaign as 
had been produced by similar agent groups in north Burma.  However, the sheer number 
of teams going behind Japanese lines helped to ensure that some of these teams 
produced usable information.633  By late February, however, the Japanese started to 
realize the effectiveness of the OSS’s agents and instituted a 5,000-rupee reward for any 
Allied agent turned over to them.634 
In April, the MO Section mirrored Detachment 101 programs from north Burma 
for use in the Arakan.  EVERYBODY’S DOIN’ IT was an adaptation of the false 
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surrender order that MO had used with success in the Bhamo-Lashio campaigns.  As in 
north Burma, this purported to be an order from higher headquarters telling Japanese 
troops that they could surrender if there was no other option.  A follow-on campaign 
called THE WATER’S FINE emphasized that the Allies would treat Japanese prisoners 
of war well.  Other programs aimed at getting Burmese collaborators to stop helping the 
Japanese.635  The surrender campaigns were of such importance in part, because in an 
initial survey of the Arakan front, an MO representative reported in November 1944 that 
a “brisk trade is going on in ‘surrender leaflets.’  Through a middleman, informant 
purchased his surrender leaflet very secretively and paid about five rupees for it.  The 
nearer one gets to the front, the higher the price.”  In April, the AFU could report that 
they had six Japanese soldiers surrender to them.636  Both “P” Division and Mountbatten 
approved a new program, the “Dah” Plan, in late March.  The plan called for stenciling a 
picture of a Dah—a type of Burmese sword—on Japanese killed and at the sites of 
destroyed infrastructure and vehicles.  The intent was to goad the Japanese into believing 
that the multiple minorities in Burma had organized against the occupation and had 
finally “found a common basis for cooperation.”637  Still other themes concentrated on 
the shoddy construction of Japanese war material.  This was reinforced with Project 
NATTERJACK, a Force 136 project to infiltrate Japanese ammunition into the enemy 
logistic system that would explode upon use.  
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Rangoon 
The capture of Rangoon was the main goal of the British.  To the OSS, it 
represented a valuable intelligence target, as well as a possible staging area from which 
to launch operations into Thailand.638  To uncover intelligence on the city itself, SO 
began parachuting agents in the region.639  The X-2 Section had a group of two radio 
operators and three agents training at Nazira to parachute into Rangoon.  There, they 
would meet up with a group of thirty men for the purpose of abducting a “top Ranking” 
Japanese intelligence officer.640  The group, dubbed Operation WINEGLASS IV 
dropped west of the city on 30 April.  They were too late because Japanese intelligence 
personnel had already fled six days prior.  But, the team was still of use.  The group 
made it into Rangoon and provided military intelligence to the British 26th Division as it 
approached the city.  The OSS supplies some of this information to the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) who used it to bomb Japanese targets ahead of the Allied advance. 
Much as they had in Europe, the OSS decided that to fully exploit the city’s 
capture would require the formation of a City Team.  In this case, the Rangoon City 
Team would exploit targets for their intelligence value by securing known collaborators, 
documents, and prisoners from Japanese military, police and intelligence facilities.  They 
also sought out intelligence in such locations as government buildings, police stations, 
telegraph offices, newspaper offices, libraries, universities, and banks.  The function of a 
city team was purely that of intelligence, requiring a heavy concentration of X-2, SI, and 
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R&A personnel.  Other OSS elements were also required, such as communications, Field 
Photo to copy documents, and OGs for security.  Although the British knew that the 
teams were OSS, an attempt was made to keep the purpose a secret.  In this case, the 
Rangoon City Team was to adopt the cover of a Combat Interrogation Team (CIT) like 
X-2 had formed in the north Burma campaign.641 
The test for the Rangoon City Team came on 3 May 1945.  On that day, they 
rendezvoused twenty-five miles out in the Bay of Bengal from the Rangoon River, to 
take part in Operation JEAN or in British parlance, Operation DRACULA; the 
occupation of Rangoon.  The group was a mixed lot of MO, OG, and X-2, and landed in 
the city proper at 1630 hours.  This was several hours ahead of the British invasion 
forces.  Once in Rangoon—which the Japanese had abandoned—the City Team spread 
out and began to exploit the area for intelligence.  The Detachment 303 R&A Section 
assisted in this endeavor by providing area maps marked with the suspected locations of 
intelligence targets.  The OSS sent reinforcements to the Rangoon City Team ten days 
later.  The AFU headquarters moved into the city at the same time.642     
The Japanese had destroyed many of their documents, but some remained 
scattered throughout locations they had formerly occupied.  In the time between their 
withdrawal and the Allied invasion, locals had ransacked and looted the former-Japanese 
buildings.  They inadvertently scattered documents, making it harder for the AFU to sort 
and compile them.  One of the OSS officers described the situation, “When our men 
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arrived … the papers were usually in ragged heaps, amply intermixed with old bandages, 
toilet articles, discarded Japanese socks and other miscellaneous rubbish.”  Despite the 
added difficulty, by 16 May the AFU had scoured the city and collected numerous 
documents, including those that concerned Japanese business and industry, and military 
manuals.  The work remained for them to sort, classify, and microfilm their intelligence 
take.  To assist in the translation of captured enemy documents, Detachment 101 had 
provided two of its Nisei from north Burma, Lieutenant Ralph Yempuku and Sergeant 
Richard Hamada.643    
The MO Section set up a production office and arranged with local printers and 
civilians to start production of a newspaper, and secured local printing equipment and 
typeset.  The State Department, however, soon announced the U.S. considered the 
Burma campaign over.  With little utility seen in keeping MO in operation, the 
contingent was withdrawn.  Only one representative remained to conduct operations into 
occupied southern Burma.644   
The X-2 Section transferred to Rangoon from Kyaukpyu and reinforced their 
element in early May.  They wanted to scour the city to learn more about how Japanese 
intelligence worked in Burma; their operating procedures, agents, and recruiting 
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methods.645  The X-2’s coverage of the Japanese intelligence system was thorough and 
uncovered the existence of sleeper agents of the Minami Kikan (Japanese intelligence 
organized for the Burma National Army), as well as information on the more well 
known Kempeitai (Japanese military police, which also had an espionage function).  
They were able to accomplish this even faster than the British intelligence organizations 
could establish themselves in Rangoon.  This did little to help Anglo-American relations.  
Embarrassed, the British then required an arrangement in which the X-2 Section passed 
primacy on to the British.  Thereafter, X-2 needed to secure permission before they 
could conduct interrogations.  In turn, the British provided the information they had on 
the Japanese intelligence network.  X-2 determined the Japanese intelligence system in 
Burma was of poor utility and extremely underdeveloped.646   
The seven-man X-2 Section also had several other intelligence coups.  Chief 
among this was the acquisition of Japanese diplomatic codebooks.647  The Section also 
discreetly maintained contact with the AFL and used them to help further intelligence 
collection.  One of the chief X-2 officers considered the AFL “a gold mine if we are 
courageous enough to dig for the ore.”  X-2 considered these contacts so worthwhile that 
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they planned to keep a representative in Rangoon.648  Meanwhile, the X-2 Section 
terminated the WINEGLASS IV operation, after it had provided valuable intelligence on 
the disposition of Japanese forces fleeing Rangoon. 
Reactions to the Rangoon City Team were mixed.  Peers thought the unit did a 
commendable job but relayed that several Detachment 404 personal told him of their 
unfavorable impression of the group’s work.  Peers’ immediate superior, John G. 
Coughlin also thought the unit performed well.649  However, the intelligence production 
of the Rangoon City Team was impressive.  The R&A Section alone managed to secure 
and process 1750 enemy documents, over 1000 Japanese books, and take 10,000 
microfilm frames.650   
Conclusion 
Detachment 101 transferred the AFU back to Detachment 404 on 5 June, thus 
ending the 101 presence in southern Burma.  Only the units in the lower Shan States 
awaited their disbandment.  The impressions of the AFU were mixed.  Peers was 
generally pleased with the group, but had the following to say; 
“I will have to admit that from the day I took over 101 AFU … it was somewhat 
of a bugaboo, but I do believe that in the latter phases their work was good.  
From an operational and intelligence point of view, they were producing good 
intelligence … From an administrative point of view, it was somewhat fouled up 
to the very end … simply caused by every detachment in the IBT either assigning 
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or attaching personnel to 101 AFU at will … this, coupled with the distance 
between Akyab and Nazira, created a very bad administrative set-up.”651 
 
Regardless, the results of the individual OSS Sections in the AFU were impressive.  The 
R&A Section managed to (from December 1944 to June 1945) produce 360 reports 
totaling 783 pages, while at the same time providing 1910 map sets for use in the 
field.652  The MO Section as well managed to produce several publications.  More 
importantly, however, the individual Sections functioned very closely and relatively 
cohesively.  Most notable of this was the coordination between the OG and MU 
Sections.  These two groups—while having different specialties—were nearly seamless 
in their joint operations.  Like other OSS operations, the group also had the flexibility to 
adapt to the local situation and to take missions as they came along.  The British 
recognized this, and the OSS reported that they “do not hesitate to say that the results 
obtained by the AFU surpass by far those of V Force, the work of whom has been 
absorbed by our unit.”653 
 However, there were faults with the AFU.  Much of this came from the previous 
command, Detachment 404, who had in particular poorly managed the MO and MU 
Sections.  MO suffered from a lack of equipment, and then had to curtail its operations 
due to British political sensibilities.  The MU Section had it worse.  Detachment 404 sent 
it to Burma to perform a job for which it was unprepared.  Its equipment had not arrived, 
and what had was inadequate.  An example of this is the MU P-boats.  These boats only 
had a short range of 500 miles, and because of their noisy, dual 1320 horsepower V-12 
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engines, they had to carry enormous quantities of high-octane gasoline.  This left the 
possibility, as one MU report said, that “a single incendiary bullet would convert one of 
these craft into a 70-ton funeral pyre with all hands on board.”  This was not an unlikely 
scenario.  Using them to slip into an enemy position undetected was “almost out of the 
question,” due to muffled roar of their motors.  Yet, necessity dictated that they be used 
in this fashion.  As it was, MU representatives made it to Rangoon to look for a base 
from which they could conduct operations further south.  This was as far as the Section 
got.  On 15 June the OSS ordered the MU Section in the Far East to disband.  
Detachment 404 had grossly mismanaged what could have been one of the most useful 
OSS elements in the Far East.654 
 More importantly, however, the AFU represented the flexibility of Detachment 
101 as an organization.  The Detachment’s main focus at the time was supporting 
NCAC, in which it was undertaking a new role for itself, that of switching from guerrilla 
warfare to a more conventional role.  It was less than six months away from total 
disbandment.  The Arakan mission was one that was nearly out of the Detachment’s 
operational range, and was far away from its main bases.  Yet, the Detachment was able 
to undertake this new mission in a detached area, while at the same time coordinating 
with the numerous OSS branches and commands involved.  It was also able to establish 
an entirely different type of organization, a City Team, with which it had no experience.  
That Detachment 101 had the flexibility to juggle concurrent but dissimilar missions is a 
testament to the unit’s ability to fill roles that other units could not. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 From its beginning in mid-1942 until its inactivation in July 1945, Detachment 
101 had the longest period of service of any OSS group.  It was consistently able to 
change its operational focus and adopt new missions to assist conventional forces.  More 
than any other OSS unit, Detachment 101 fulfilled OSS Director William J. Donovan’s 
image of clandestine units that aided conventional operations through intelligence 
collection and sabotage.  To fulfill Donovan’s vision, the unit itself evolved.  The initial 
contingent of twenty-one men that arrived in the China-Burma-India Theater in June 
1942, little resembled the group that grew to almost 1,000 OSS personnel and 10,000 
indigenous troops in the India-Burma Theater by July 1945.  That the group could make 
the transition from a small band to a major combat formation in a little over three years 
is a tribute to the unit’s adaptability.  Yet, there are several reasons why Detachment 101 
achieved success, as the study of the unit’s organization has shown. 
 First, the unit’s inherent flexibility allowed it to constantly alter its force as the 
situation—and where success—dictated.  Colonel Carl F. Eifler, Detachment 101’s first 
commanding officer, wanted to use sabotage operations against the Japanese forces.  His 
long-range penetration operations, while having the potential of being strategically 
significant, were beyond Detachment’s limited abilities in 1943.  Instead, and with little 
other choice, Eifler focused on shallow penetrations, such as the FORWARD and 
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KNOTHEAD missions, that allowed Detachment 101 to fill roles that other units could 
not.  These groups’ focus on intelligence operations became one of Detachment 101’s 
core missions and greatly improved the unit’s utility to other formations.  When he 
assumed command from Eifler in December 1943, Colonel William R. Peers took a 
more pragmatic approach.  He reinforced missions like FORWARD and encouraged 
them to develop a guerrilla capacity.  His command style became evident during the 
Myitkyina campaign when Detachment 101 greatly assisted the Allied effort far beyond 
what their relative lack of numbers would suggest would be possible in a conventional 
situation.  When the Allies kicked off the Myitkyina offensive, Detachment 101 was 
ready to support their specific intelligence needs and to become an effective guerrilla 
force that devastated the Japanese in their rear areas.  By the end of the Myitkyina 
campaign, the guerrilla warfare mission became Detachment 101’s main role in the 
Burma Theater until the end of the war.  By this time, Detachment 101 was flexible 
enough to support two separate campaigns—in the Shan States and in the Arakan—
while simultaneously being in the process of disbanding. 
The second factor contributing to the success of Detachment 101 was its freedom 
to change its command structure to meet its evolving mission roles and duties.  Much of 
this was due to the lack of direction from higher authorities.  At first, this was a severe 
detriment.  It caused great confusion and helplessness in 1942 as the unit searched for a 
mission.  Once Detachment 101 established its role in the Burma Campaign, the lack of 
oversight became a hidden strength.  With no one looking over the Detachment, its 
commanders could determine how to best formulate its organization and operational 
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methods, and could adopt its lessons learned more quickly.  From the moment it arrived 
in the CBI in 1942, Detachment 101 received little guidance from OSS Washington.  
India was half a world away and the communications infrastructure at Nazira was 
rudimentary at best.  Detachment 101, then under the Coordinator of Information (COI) 
was the first unit of its type under the umbrella of an organization that was likewise, the 
first of its type.  As such, Detachment 101 was a pathfinder element with no previous 
example to follow.  Moreover, Detachment 101 did not interest OSS Washington to the 
point that it would give the unit direction.  This fault can be laid at the feet of COI/OSS 
director Donovan, who was a poor administrator and in any case, focused on the war 
against Germany, and ignored Burma.  On the U.S. Army side, General Stilwell’s 
NCAC Headquarters was only interested in results, not in how the unit operated.  As 
Peers commented in mid-1945, “Stilwell and Lt. Gen. Sultan, have always issued clear-
cut mission orders, leaving planning, direction and operation entirely to this unit.  With 
this we have been able to fully employ the imagination and ingenuity of every officer 
and enlisted man in this entire organization.”655 
Under Peers’ direction, Detachment 101 became a more proactive, effective, and 
reliable organization.  He reorganized the unit, strengthened critical but undermanned 
sections, and incorporated new OSS assets.  He created an Operations Section to 
effectively coordinate its elements and established a central intelligence staff to evaluate, 
analyze, and disseminate intelligence collection to its best advantage.  These changes 
allowed Peers to focus his attention less on running the Detachment and more on 
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developing it into a larger asset for the north Burma campaign.  Under Peers’ direction, 
the unit developed a strategic focus by incorporating OSS elements, such as 
psychological warfare, that did not provide immediate operational returns.  Operations 
were no longer the sole force driving administrative change.  Once established, the unit 
was able to change its methods at will to those that were most effective.   
One of these was to ignoring OSS Branch distinctions.  Detachment 101 was the 
only unit within OSS to do so, making it unconventional even within the OSS.  This lack 
of compartmentation enabled Detachment 101 to better absorb disparate functions into 
its operations.  Yet, Detachment 101 at first did not plan to follow this model.  In 1942 
and 1943, Eifler’s ambition surpassed his resources.  Although all his men were from the 
Special Operations Branch, the group had the beginnings of the Communications, 
Special Funds, and Schools and Training Sections.  Several long-range mission failures 
encouraged the unit to evaluate its lessons learned, and focus on realistic missions, that 
in turn, increased the unit’s need for personnel.   
Increased operational duties, however, again meant that the Detachment had to 
virtually ignore OSS Branch distinctions and assign personnel in an ad-hoc fashion to 
where they were most needed.  Although end of mission reports from many of the 
Detachment 101 sections relate concerns with the practice, it allowed the unit to better 
integrate its separate elements into one operational focus in a coordinated and 
uncompartmented fashion.656  This was not a pre-planned process, as Detachment 101 
could only make due with what was available.  If OSS Washington ignored pleas for 
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personnel, there was little that the Detachment could do.  This was especially true of 
staffing OSS-specific branches, several of which arrived too late or without enough 
support to contribute much to the Detachment’s operations.  Organizationally, all 
elements that would make up Detachment 101’s force structure were in place by March 
1945.  But, the lack of attention from OSS Washington remained apparent.  New 
arrivals, such as the OG, did not have a mission unique enough to merit the effort of 
trying to accommodate their particular specialty as a distinct entity.  Other late-arriving 
sections, that were mission-specific such as R&D and X-2 only assisted tangentially.  
One X-2 member put it even more succinctly, calling his Section “ornaments on a tree 
not producing much light … insofar as original intelligence X-2 would get a D or an 
F.”657  Only an element such as MO, which could integrate its efforts into operations, 
had the potential to grow into a main part of the unit’s force structure.   
Third, by concentrating on the unglamorous mission of building liaison with 
other organizations, Detachment 101 was able to become far more influential and 
effective than would have been the case for a force of a similar size.  Like Eifler before 
him, Peers encouraged liaison with other units.  For instance, in the Myitkyina 
campaign, Detachment 101 was the only element that was keeping the American and 
British forces in communication.  Peers later commented on the benefits that 
Detachment 101 received from its liaison arrangements “… it is believed that one of the 
outstanding reasons for the assistance and cooperation rendered this Detachment has 
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been through … liaison."658  Detachment 101 also used its unconventional forces to 
achieve liaison in other ways.  By adopting the role of helping downed Allied pilots and 
providing the USAAF with target data, Detachment 101 achieve extraordinary 
cooperation and secured scarce airlift that enabled Detachment 101 to expand its forces 
and area of operations.  Detachment 101 became so important to the USAAF that by the 
end of 1944 it boasted that the unit “has rescued so many pilots from the jungle that the 
total ‘dollar value’ of such pilots … exceed the cost of all Detachment 101 
operations.”659   
Fourth and lastly, any study on Detachment 101 would be remiss if it did not 
acknowledge the tremendous assistance offered by the indigenous peoples of Burma, 
particularly the Kachin.  Without their indispensable help, the unit would not have been 
able to acquire its intelligence or carry out guerrilla warfare.  In so doing, the 
Detachment became a model in the post-war period for clandestine operations using 
indigenous personnel—even extending to post 9/11 operations. 
Yet, the Detachment’s success did not come easily, and not without mistakes.  
The intense operational focus led the group to under develop—or even ignore—
important areas, such as administration.  One of the Detachment’s ranking officers put it 
succinctly; “a unit of the size and scope of Det. 101 requires a staff … willing to devote 
their time to prosaic, dull administrative duties to further the success of the ‘glamorous’ 
field operator, to relieve the Commanding Officer of meddlers and irrelevant minor 
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problems, and to be actively interested in the welfare of the unit as a whole.”660  The lack 
of administrative personnel produced some negative results.  At times, the unit suffered 
from low morale in part because its lack of staff personnel to submit reports caused 
soldiers to not receive awards or promotion.  As one officer noted, “Many of those 
righteously, justifiably, and deservedly, have not received recognition because of this 
deficiency.  The theory that units operating in the field do not require a full staff is 
entirely irroneous [sic].”661  
Peers was aware of the problem, but could do little because of the lack of 
attention from OSS Washington.  He commented, “For a unit to function effectively it 
must have competent administrative personnel.  This Detachment actually handles the 
administration of what would normally be expected of a Division, with the personnel 
that would normally service a Company, or at most, a Battalion.”662  Yet, not all was the 
fault of OSS Washington.  As a new civilian agency with detailed military personnel, the 
OSS had difficulty getting their personnel promoted.  Field personnel felt the effect most 
because officers and men at OSS Washington were most likely to receive promotions.  
OSS Headquarters did not have visibility over those in the field and they often were 
forgotten.   
Yet, despite the unit’s problems, by 1945, the Detachment’s accomplishments 
were considerable.  The OSS credited the unit with  
American airmen rescued    232 
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281 
Other Allied personnel rescued   342 
Known enemy killed:     5,447 
Enemy killed or seriously wounded (estimate): 10,000 
Enemy captured:     64 
Bridges destroyed:     51 
Railroad trains destroyed:     9 
Military vehicles destroyed:      277 
Supplies destroyed (estimate):     2,000 tons 
Supplies captured (estimate):    500 tons 
Intelligence furnished to NCAC:   90 percent  
Targets designated for air action: 65 percent, resulting in 
11,225 killed and 885 
wounded663 
 
The unit had been able to mold its disparate OSS Sections into a force that was capable 
of utilizing land, air, and sea elements for intelligence collection, conducting Civil 
Affairs, and waging guerrilla and psychological warfare.  These abilities gave the unit 
direction and control over its operations, resulting in a unit that was preeminent in OSS.  
Although other OSS combat operations gave exceptional service, such as the OSS 
Operational Groups in Europe, and SO missions in France and China, none was as 
central to the conduct of an entire campaign as was Detachment 101 in Burma.  
Although the situation Detachment 101 faced in Burma in WWII was unique, the 
group’s organization challenges, solutions, and method of warfare offers lessons that can 
be adapted to today’s Special Operations forces. 
                                                 
663
 Kermit Roosevelt, The Overseas Targets:  War Report of the OSS, Vol. Two (New York: Walker, 
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Successful Guerrilla Force (Boston:  Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 217. 
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